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In early 1998 Bangladesh adopted on recommendation by the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) the disclosure review system in respect of prospectus 
registration replacùig the merit review systern. According to the new system, a Company 
offering shares to the public for sale must make "full and fairy7 disclosure of al1 material 
information. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in giving consent to the 
issuance of shares, is required to ensure that the requisite information has been disclosed 
in the issuer7s prospectus. It does not have any power to look into the rnerit of an 
o f f e ~ g .  Whether this systern would benefit investors as well as the national econoniic 
development of Bangladesh is evaluated in the present thesis by comparing Ontario law 
with Bangladesh Iaw. 
The fundamental difference between Ontario Law and Bangladesh law is 
that the former is based on the combination of the disclosure theory and the "blue sky" 
(merit review) theory while the latter is based on the disclosure theory alone. 
Accordingly, the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) exercises twofold powers: it 
reviews the disclosures contained in a prospectus and also determines the merit of the 
offering. In other words, it ensures that "full, true and plain" disclosures are made in a 
prospectus, and at the sarne time it examines the o f f e ~ g  to see whether any element 
jeopardizing the public interest is present in the offering. If it determines that any factor 
exists which suggests that it should be precluded in the public interest, it will refiise to 
receipt a prospectus. 
This thesis argues that the characteristic feature of a security transaction is 
that it involves risks a range of risks for investors including fraud risks which result from 
misstatement or understatement of materiai facts. Prospectus disclosures eliminate many 
of the risks arising fkom lack of information, and offer various investment opportunities 
to people who, depending on their differing risk bearing capabilities, make investment 
decisions in light of such disclosures. Thus the disclosure regime has the effect of 
creating an environment of investment competition in the securities industry. As a result, 
resources are mobilized into the productive sectors, which eventually brings economic 
development of a country. From this perspective the disclosure approach recently adopted 
by Bangladesh seerns to be encouraging. But the success of this system depends largely 
on the assurance that the risks offered by prospectuses are "normal" business risks of 
profit and loss, and that "abnormal" business risks are precluded. Since the SEC does not 
have any preclusion jurisdiction, it is argued that it cannot protect the investors against 
abnormal business risks. If investors suffer any losses resulting from such risks, they may 
lose confidence in the securities industry of Bangladesh. Thus, a compromise between the 
two approaches of disclosure and merit review, as in Ontario, has been suggested for 
Bangladesh both fiom investor protection and economic development perspectives. 
vii 
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1 PRELUDE 
The People's Republic of Bangladesh, bom on 16 Decernber 197 1, is a 
developing country with the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US $ 3 3  billion and 
annual per capita GDP of US $265.' It has a heavy foreign loan and a deficit budget. For 
the last four financial years (FYs) its GDP growth has been within the range of 4% to 
6%'; in FY 1996/97 it was 5.9%' and in the FY 1997198 it was ~ . 6 % . ~  For the FY 
1998199 it was forecast to be 6.2%.5 It has a very low saving and a poor investment rate. 
In the FY 1997198 its gross domestic savings and investment were merely 7.9% and 
16.3% of the GDP r e ~ ~ e c t i v e l ~ . ~  In the same period Bangladesh had an inflation rate of 
6.3%'. a budget deficit of 5.4%' of the GDP and a foreign debt of US $ 14,8 13.0 million 
or 43.7% of the GDP'. 
1 Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE), Bangladesh: Introduction to the Dhaka Stock 
fichange, @haka: DSE, 1998) at 1. 
See Asian Development Bank (ADB), Asian Developrnent Outlook-1998 (Hong Kong: 
Oxford University Press, 1998) at 117, and infra notes 3  and 4. 
' Bangladesh Bank, Barshik Report (Annual Report), 1997-98, @haka: Bangladesh 
Bank, Feb.1999) at 2. . 
Ibid. 
Supra note 2. 
Supra note 3 at 14. 
7 Supra note 3 at 4. 
Supra note 3 at 3. 
Supra note 3 at 7. 
To add to its fiscal difficulties, Bangladesh has a small capital market. In 
the calendar year (CY) of 1992 there was a market capitalization of barely US $.3 14 
billion, and in CY 1996 it increased to US $4.6 billion.10 Following a scamll in 1996 the 
market experienced a decline of capitdization. As of June 1997 market capitalization fell 
to US $2.5 billion." At the end of March 1998 it m e r  declined to nearly US $2.3 
'O See ADB, Report and Recornrnendation of the President to the Board of Direclors on 
a Proposed b a n  and Technical Assistance Grants tu the People's Republic of 
Bangladesh for the Capital Market Development program, (ADB : Manila, 1997) at 5 8 
(hereinafter ADB Reporî), 
" In 1996 an aMcial profitable (secondary) share market was created by the 
manipulation of share pnces by some dishonest insiders of companies and at the same 
t h e  the bank interest rate decreased. This Ied many investors to withdraw money from 
the banks and to invest it in the share market. But when the manipulation was detected, a 
meteoric fall of share prices took place in the market. Ovemight many investors lost 
everythhg. A World Bank report highlights this episode as below: 
The lack of transparency and accountability combined with a frai1 
regdatory framework and indigent infrastructure paved the way for market 
manipulations during July-November 1996.During this period, share 
prices multiplied nearly four times; market capitalization jumped from a 
tiny fkaction to around 20 percent of GDP, increasing almost three-fold; 
the price-earning ratio soared to 80; and law and order situation was 
created when 20 to 30 thousand unemployed students, mastans (hoodlums) 
and others gathered every day outside the Dhaka and Chittagong stock 
exchanges @SE and CSE) to trade shctres, hoping that they wodd get rich 
overnight. For some the fantasy indeed became a reality, but for most of 
the half a million retail investors, who assumed a position in the market 
with cash taken out of their savings and fixed deposits, real asset sales and 
borrowings, it turned into a nightmare. Since mid-Novernber 1996, share 
prices moved mostly in one direction- d o m  - and the price index has now 
dipped below the bourses' starting point in mid-1996. Bangladesh Annual 
Economic Update 1997 (South Asian Region, the World Bank: October 
1997) at 25. 
'* Supra note 10. 
billion (approx. Tk. 1 11 bi~lion).'~ The ratio of market capitalization to GDP in 1992 was 
merely a 1.3% and rose to 12.9% in 1996.'"~ of March 1998 that ratio fell to about 7% 
of the GDP and about 8% of the GNP compared to 16% and 37% of GNP in Pakistan and 
India respectively, the two neighboring securities markets of ~an~1adesh.l' In the prïmary 
market, initial public offerings (IP0s)l6 raised about US $2.7&on in 1992.17 This 
amount increased to about US $44.5 million in 1996,18 followed by a fall to about US $17 
million (Tk. 800 million) in 1997.19 In 1996 24 IPOs of US $54.94 million worth were 
issued." In the foIiowing year only 12 IPOs of US $12.55 million were offered." Thus in 
these two calendar years, on average, only 18 IPOs of about US $33.75 million were 
issued, whereas to meet the investment need of the country 100 IPOs of nearly US $276 
million ( approx. Tk. 13000 billion) are requiredmz2 In the secondary market , on the other 
l3 See "Secondary Market AfTairs" SEC Quarterly Review 4:3 (Jan.-March 1998) at 8. 
Taka (Tk.) is the currency of Bangladesh. As of February 1998 US $ 1= 46.30 taka., 
supra note 3 at 122.. 
l4 Supra note 10 at 6. 
I5 'Yhrrent Issues in Bangladesh Capital Market" Portji'olio 1:6 (April 1998) 7 at 7. 
l6 "Initial Public 0ffering7' is the process pursuant to which the fmt offer and 
distribution of securities of an issuer to the public, either through an underwriter or 
occasionally directly by the issuer, is made by way of a prospectus.. . An IPO may consist 
of or include a secondary distribution of securities held by an existing .shareholder.": G. 
R. D. Goulet, Public Share merings and Stock Exchange Listings in Canada, (North 
York, Ontario: CCH Canadian Lunited, 1994) at 569 
I7 Supra note 10 at 6. 
I8 Supra note 10 at 6. 
l9 See F. E. Cookson, and M. E. Hauque, "Bangladesh Capital Market: Current Issues 
and Options" Porrfolio 1:8 (June 1998) 1 lat 12. 
20 Supra note 1 at i 1. 
21 Supra note 1 at 1 1. 
" Supra note 19 at 11. 
hand the annual tumover of securities in 1992 at the stock exchangesD was about US 
$1 lmillion, which rose to over US $700 million in 1996.'~ Up to March 1998 it stood at 
about US $0.805 million ( Tk. 37.84 million).'5 The number of listed companies is 
increasing every year. In 1992 there were 145 companies listed on the Dhaka Stock 
Exchanges E SE).^^ This number increased to 183 in 1995 when the Chittagong Stock 
Exchange (CSE) was e~tablished.'~ As of March 1998 both the bourses had 203 
companies on the iïsts in total.28 The number of listed securities is also increasing ; it was 
153 in 1992~' and rose to 223 in 1998:' 
Ail the statistics given above make it clear that Bangladesh is a poor 
economy with a very low contribution fiom the securities industry to the GDP. In view of 
this scenario the Asian Development Bank (hereinafter ADB), with the ultimate aim of 
eradication of poverty and improvement of living conditions, has underscored the need 
for reform, on the highest priorïty basis, in the Bangladesh financial sector (banking 
sector and capital market) because "(w)ithout efficient financial markets the mobilization 
of additional resources for development will slow d~wn"~ ' .  Sunilarly, the Govemment of 
'3 Bangladesh has two stock Exchanges, viz. the Dhaka Stock Exchange Ltd. and the 
Chittagong Stock Exchange Ltd. 
24 Supra note 10. 
Supra note 13 at 2. 
26 Supra note 10. 
" Supra note 10. 
28 Supra note 13 at 2. 
29 Supra note 10. 
30 Supra note 13 at 2. 
31 Supra note 2 at 118. Stiglitz considers the financial markets of a country the brain of 
its economic system and says that "if they fail, not only will the sector's profits be Iower 
Bangladesh considers "the development of the domestic capital market to be critical to its 
overall resource mobilization effort vital for the future growth and development of the 
country's ec~nomy"~'. Accordingly, the Govemrnent recognizes the need to introduce 
capital market r e f o r ~ n s ~ ~  and, following the 1996 security market scam, adopted a reform 
program called the Capital Market Development Program (CMDP) with the broad 
objective '%O develop a fair, transparent, and efficient market"34. To this end Bangladesh 
received a financial loan and technical assistance gants from the ADB on the 
recomrnendation of an ADB report (hereafter ADB ~ e ~ o n ) . ~ '  
The ADB Report put forward its recommendation after reviewing the state 
of Bangladesh capital market and the concerned institutions. One of its fmdings was that 
in the area of IPO approval the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereafter SEC), the 
securities market watchdog of Bangladesh, was applying a system based on merit 
than would otherwise have been, but the performance of the entire economic system may 
be impaired.": J.E. Stiglitz, "The Role of the State in Financial Markets," Proceedings of 
the World Bank Annual Conference on Developrnent Econamics 1993, (World Bank: 
Washington, D.C., 1994) at 23, cited in A. Hossain and S. Rashid, "Financial Sector 
Reform", in M.G- Quibria, ed. The Bangladesh Economy in Transition, (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1997) 22 1 at 22 1. In particular, the importance of the securities markets 
in the nationai economy of a country lies in the k t  that they "channel individual 
institutionai savings to private industry and thereby contribute to the growth of capital 
investment". S. Rep. No. 91-1218, at 2, quoted in T. W. Joo, "Who Watches the 
Watchers? The Secunties Investor Protection Act, Investor Confidence, and the 
Subsidization of Failure", (1999) 72 S. Cal. L, Rev. 1071 at 108 1. 
32 Supra note 10 at 48. 
33 Supra note 10 at 2. 
34 F. Narayan, "The Capital Market Development Project" Portjiolio, supra note 15 at 14. 
35 Ibid. For the title of the report, note 10 supra. 
regulation instead of fidl disclosure of information through prospectus? This caused 
considerable delay in getting approval to IPOs frorn the  SEC^', which ranged from 6-12 
~ n o n t h s . ~ ~  It also revealed that in 95% of cases its assessrnent of issuers' projections 
contained in prospectuses tumed out to be wronga3' Sometirnes the concerned officiais 
intentionally delay in approvïng the prospectus with an intention of being (illegally) 
"~atisfied".~~ At the end of the year it lends approval to prospectuses en masse. As a 
result, the market gets flooded by Initial Public Offerings @'Os). Because of so many 
lPOs coming together in the market at a time the issues are less subscnbed and the issuer 
fails to implement its commitments as forecast because of a shortage of funds. This, in 
turn, affects the investors who get less or no di~idends.~'  According to media reports 
dwing the Iast few years only 5% of companies have disbursed dividends as forecast in 
their prospecnises.42 Thus, on the whole, the investors and the public lost their confidence 
in the market, which deteriorated when the 1996 share scam took place. 
In consideration of the aforementioned finding of the ADB Report the SEC 
decided to give up the "merit review" policy and to adopt the "full disciosure" poli~y.43 I, 
36 Supra note 10 at 13. For discussion of the concepts of "disclosure" and "ment 
regulation", infra notes 179-1 89 and accompanying texts. 
37 Supra note 10 at 13. 
38 "SEC-er behishebi karmokando" ('bhesponsibIe Activities of the SEC') Share Bazar, 
(a Bengali national magazine), 4:8 (16 July 1998)3 at 4. 
39 Ibid. at 5 .  
Ibid 
41 Ibid. 
" Supra note 38 at 5. 
" K.U. Ahmad, "Informational efficiency in the Stock Market", The Daily Star (a 
national daily) (27 July 1998) at 4. 
early 1998 it started asking issuers to provide full disclosure of information in 
prospectuses and advised the investing public to make their investment decisions in light 
of such d i sc l~sure .~~  It formally adopted the disclosure review system in January 1999 by 
rnaking the Public Issue Rules, 19982~ (hereinafter PIR). 
Under the new legal arrangement the investors in Bangladesh have been 
given the whole responsibility of making investment decisions in light of the disclosed 
information by the issuers in prospectuses, The SEC no longer shares the responsibility, it 
merely ensures full and fair disclosure of material in f~rmat ion .~  But this disclosure 
system poses different kinds of problems, For example, it is difficult for the investors, 
particularly the lay investors, to assess the ment of a securïty which is ever speculative in 
nature.47 In rnaking investment decisions they need to purchase services of the market 
intermediaries like investment advisors, Such institutions are, however, newly developed 
in Bangladesh and as such their services are hardly reliable.48 In addition, the accuracy of 
information disclosed in prospectuses is questionab~e.49 Legal remedy against any 
questionable disclosure or misstatement in prospectuses is far beyond the reach of the 
" See T.I. Khaiili, M.A.Kashem and M.S. Rahman, "Restoring Lost Confidence" Star 
Magazine (a supplementary of the Daily Star ), (3 April 1998) 4 at 6. 
45 NO. SEC/Sec. 7/P/R-98/ MO, Bangladesh Gazene (supplementary), (25 Jan. 1999) 12 1. 
46 For discussion of the concept of full and fair disclosure of matenal information, infrn 
notes 29 1-198. 
47 Supra note 38 at 35. For the nature of a security, NIfra notes 76-1 18 and the 
accompanying texts. 
48 Supra note 38 at 35. 
49 supra note 38 at 35. Also see M. Rahman, Letter to the Editor, The Holiday (a national 
weekly) (26 June 1998) at 2, 
investors because it involves costs and tirne?' The only remedy availed of is the 
administrative action by the SEC, namely imposition of fines on the responsible 
c ~ r n ~ a n i e s . ~ '  But this does not help the investors. If a Company is penalized for 
misstatement, the fines will be received by the government, not by the investors, Due to 
ali these factors the investors have lost their attraction for investment in s e c ~ r i t i e s ~ ~  This 
aspect of the problem connected with the disclosure regime in Bangladesh necessitates 
the present endeavor. 
This thesis will examine the above problems with a view to making 
recommendations as to how they can be addressed. It will do so by a comparative analysis 
of a well developed regime, namely Ontario. The reason behind choosing Ontario for 
cornparison is that it is the biggest securities market in Canada, and its law and policy 
with respect to securities regulation are basicaliy foilowed in other provinces. Its 
economy depends on these markets "to piay a pivotai role in the capitd formation and 
wealth creation process.. .(generating) significant jobs in the financial services se~tor"'~. 
Given this role the OSC wants them (the markets) to be "efficient, open and fair"" so that 
50 For a general view of the problems in civil litigation, see R. Rahman, Civil Litigation 
in Bangladesh, @haka: Nuruzzaman Choudhury, 1986). 
' See "Regulatory Matters- Penalty Imposecl" SEC Qunrterly Review (kt.-Dec. 1994) 
19. 
" Financial Express (a national daily) (18 July 1998) at 1 ;  n ie  Bangladesh Observer (a 
national daily) (5 July 1998) at 1 .  
53 Ontario Secunties Commission (OSC), A Changing Commission for a Changing 
Market- 1997 OSC Annual Report (hereinafter 1997 AnnuaZ Report), (Ontario: OSC, 
1997) at 7 .  
54 Ibid. 
(a) "capital cm be raised and securities traded quickly and without 
unnecessary costs or impediments"; 
(b) "current, complete and comparabIe public information about 
issuers and market activity are available"; and 
(c) "custorners interests corne first and investors are protected fiom 
market abuses".55 
As a measure of investor protection Ontario securities law requires the 
full, mie and plain disclosure of information relevant to investor decisions? It prescribes 
forms detailing the matters to be contained in the prospectuses of different types of 
companies. Each of the forms sets outs so rnmy matters that if it is tmly complied with, 
there may be litde undisclosed. Non-disclosure or partial disclosure or false disclosure is 
remediable by an investor suit for damages which is easy and less time consuming. As a 
result, in rnost of the cases information provided by companies is found to be full and 
true, though not aiways in plain terms? Besides, the OSC has a discretionary 
jurisdiction, though not often used, to refuse a prospectus in public interest and on some 
other specific grounds, which serves as an investor protection shield. Thus the Ontario 
investors enjoy the benefits of both disclosure and, to some extent, ment review. As a 
result, in Ontario there is an increasing demand for 1 ~ 0 s . ~ ~  It indicates that the investors 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ontario Securities Act(OSA), R.S .O. 1990, c. S -5, S. 56. 
" D. L. Johnston and K.D. Rockwell, Canadian SecuBties Regulation, (Toronto: 
Butterworths, 1998) at 8 1. 
'* Supra note 53 at 1 1. 
have confidence in the securities markets which, in turn, contributes to the formation of 
capital and the economic progress of the province. 
The present work is an attempt to find out, through cornparison, what 
types of information are subject to prospectus disclosure and what role the respective 
securities commissions of Ontario and Bangladesh play in this regard- In other words, it 
will be considered whether disclosure required by the Iaws of Ontario and Bangladesh is 
enough to guarantee the investor protection or whether further interventions by the 
securities commissions are needed to ensure investor confidence. After discerning the 
similarities and disparities between the Ontario and Bangladesh laws, prescriptions to the 
problem prevalent in the latter would be suggested to import from the former, where 
appropriate. The proposed cornparison is justified given the facts 
(a) that the matters to be compared (disclosure and the roles of the OSC and SEC) have a 
comrnon function under both the systems, namely to provide information to the 
investing public conceming an investment enterprise and thereby to ensure its 
protection59; 
(b) that both Ontario and Bangladesh belong to the same legal and economic family, 
namely cornmon law system and market economy system. 
59 This functional affinity is the core of comparative research. To quote Bogdan, 'The 
compared legal d e s  and institutes must be comparable to each otherfinctionally: they 
must be intended to deal with the same problem." : M. Bogdan, Cornpurative Law, 
(Sweden: Norway: Law and Taxation Publistiers, 1994) at 60. 
The whole work is divided into four Sections .Section 1 constitutes the 
present part of the thesis. Section 2 makes comparisons between the disclosure regimes of 
Ontario and Bangladesh. This Section has three sub-divisions: Sub-section 2.1 gives an 
introductory idea to the central theme of the thesis. It explains the circumstances 
necessitating prospectus registration both in Ontario and Bangladesh. The purpose is to 
see if the prospectus registration renders similar functions under both the jurisdictions. 
Sub-section 2.2 looks into the theoretical foundations of prospectus regulation with a 
view to revealing how Ontario and Bangladesh conform or d s e r  in this regard. Sub- 
section 2.3, which constitutes the centrepiece of the Section, is designed to discern the 
actual sirnilarities and disparities between the concerned laws. Section 3 provides a 
critical evaluation of the comparisons of the concerned laws and the underlying theories. 
Section 4, the closing part, contains the conclusion of the thesis and sets forth some 
recornmendatione for refonns of laws, where necessary 
2 PROSPECTUS DISCLOSURE AND THE ROLE OF THE OSC 
AND THE SEC- COMPARISONS 
2.1 CONTEXTUALUING PROSPECTUS DISCLOSURE AND THE ROLE OF 
THE SECURITIES COMMISSIONS 
2.1-1 INTRODUCTION 
The central focus of the thesis is the role of the securities commissions of 
Ontario and Bangladesh with respect to disclosure through prospectus. It deds with the 
extent to which information should be disclosed to the investors and whether the 
commissions should review the ments of the securities offered by the prospectuses. 
Discussion of matters like these in the forthcorning parts of the thesis presupposes, as a 
preliminary, an inquiry into the meaning and purpose of a prospectus, the nature of 
transactions requinng a prospectus, and the involvement of the respective securities 
commissions of Ontario and Bangladesh in this respect. The following discussion is 
being directed to that end. 
2.1.2 ONTARIO 
The OSA does not contain a definition of bcprospectus".60 A prospectus is 
generally understood as a document that contains detailed information6' concerning the 
issuer? its business, management and s e c ~ r i t y ~ ~  being distnbuted&l etc. so that the 
potential investor(s) c m  make an informed decision on investment in security. It is "the 
principal ticket to freely tradable sec~rities'"~. It is the "principal" ticket because 
60 However, a dictionary of Canadian law defines it as "[alny prospectus, notice, circular 
or advertisement of any kind whatsoever,. . . whether in writing or otherwise offering to 
the public for purchase or subscription any shares or debentures of any company". 
Daphne A. Dukeiow and Betsy Nuse, The Dictionary of Canadian Law, 2d ed. (Carswell: 
Scarborough, 1995) s.v, "prospectus". This definition is almost the reproduction of S. 30 
of the English Companies Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict. c.48, and S. 95 of the (Ontario) 
Companirs Act, 1907, S.O. 1907 c. 34. It may, however, be said to be an obsolete 
definition in view of the modern securities law of Ontario. First, under the modem 
securities law of Ontario prospectus is not meant to be anything like advertisement, 
notice, etc., which rather, if made in furtherance of the sale of securities, will be called 
"trading7' in securities. See the texts accompanying notes infra notes 119-134. Second, 
today prospectus is not meant to distribute securities to the Public. Because the word, 
"public" triggered interpretive problems, the legislature deleted it fiom the statute with 
reference to prospectus requirement in 198 1. For details, see infra note 73. Third, 
according to the modem law a prospectus is required to distribute securities. But the 
given defuiition only covers a narrow area of securities, narnely shares and debentues. 
Thus an infinite variety of securities are left outside its fold. 
Information required by the OSA will be discussed in Sub-Section 2.3, below. 
62 ccksuer77 means a person or company who has outstanding, issues or proposes to issue, 
a security. : OSA, R.S.O. c.S.5, S. l(1) "issuer". 
63 For the meaning and definition of "security", see the text accornpanying infra notes 
76-1 18. 
For the meaning of ccdistribution77, see texts accompanying in@ notes 135-146. 
Dillon, "The Prospectus Exemptions, Process and Presentation", Basic SecuBties, 
(Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, April 1988)l at 1 excerpted in H.L. O'Brien, 
Securities Regdation Cases and Materials, vol. 1, (Halifax: Faculty of Law, Dalhousie 
University, Fall 1995) at 623 (Course materials prepared for law students of Dalhousie 
University). 
nonnally a person or Company can carry on a di~tribution~~ in securities ody  by having a 
prospectus approved by the O S C . ~ ~  There are exceptions to this provision. First, 
exemptions fkom the prospectus requirement are available under the  OSA^^ or Regulution 
or the OSC Rules. 69 Second, they rnay be granted by the OSC at its discretion where 
statutory exemptions are not applicable7* Thus though prospectus is the general 
requirement for issuing securities, there are exceptional situations in which this 
requirement does not apply. This arrangement, cded  the "closed system", was introduced 
in Ontario on 15 Mach 198 1.7' Prior to that date distributions of securities to the public 
66 For the meaning and definition of "distribution" in securities, see the text 
accompanying infra.notes 135- 147. 
67 OSA. R.S.O. 1990 c.S.5, S. 53(1). 
68 OSA, R.S .O. 1990 cS5, ss. 72-73. 
69 Ontario Securities Act Regulation (OSAR), R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 1015, S. 14; 
OSA, R.S .O. 1990 c.S -5 as am., 143. For the rule-making power of the SEC, see infra 
note 603. 
70 1 .  S. 74(1). The discretion enjoyed by the OSC with respect to prospectus 
registration impacts on the Ontario securities industry. The following comment is quite 
appropriate in this respect: 
the Act (OSA) is devised in such a way to make the securities industry in 
Ontario beholden d2y in and day out to the Commission (OSC). They are 
either there trying to find that they fit within the requirements of the 
registration provisions or that the prospectus meets the requirements of the 
regdations and the forms which are required by the commission, or they 
are there seeking to expand and enlarge upon one of the areas of the 
exemptions so that they can see whether they escape the net of the 
Securities Commission, or they are there begging the Securities 
Commission to exercise the extremely wide discretionary powers vested in 
the commission. Legislature of Ontario Debates- Oficial Report 
(Hansard), 31 (6 Aprii 1978) at 1291 (Mr. Renwick). 
71 For details see H.G. Emerson, "Business Finance under the "Closed System" of the 
Ontario Securities Act: Statutory Scheme and Pitfalls", in Law Society of Upper Canada, 
were oniy possible by filing a prospectus with the OSC unless exemption pro-*visions did 
apply.72 In other words, non-public distributions were kept out of the scope off prospectus 
regdation. However, it was not clear who was the "public" that needed protection, which 
created "a minefield of interpretive diffi~ulties"~~. To replace such difficulties with 
"'simplicity and ~ e r t a i n t y " ~ ~  the present system was set up. 
-- - - 
Special Lectures -Corporate Law in the BOS, @on Mills: Rechard De Boo Picblishers, 
1982) 29 at 35-45. 
'' OSA, S.O. 1978 c. 47, S. 5 1. Before this act (effective fiom June 1978) prmspectus was 
required where there was a primary distribution of securities to the public.: OSA,  R.S.O. 
1970 c. 426, S. 35. Because the word "public" was debatable, Merger Report 
recomrnended for its removal from the OSA.: Report of the Comrnirtee of the , Ontario 
Securities Commission on rhe Problerns of Disclosure Raised for Znvestors b y  Business 
Combinations and Private Placements, (Ontario: Department of Financial and 
Commercial Affairs, Province of Ontario, Feb- 1970) (Merger Report), at p-. 3.20. See 
for the interpretive debates, infia note 73. 
73 Johnston and Rockweil, Securities Regulation in Canada, supra note 57, a t  70. For 
example, in several cases "public" was interpreted differently. Nash v. Lynde,. [1929] 
AC. 158 (H.L.) is the leading English case in which the word was considered in 
reference to securities legislation. There it was rnaintained that a document a s  a 
prospectus should be "shown to any person as a member of the public and as an 
invitation to that person to take some of the shares referred tom therein. (Per Lord 
Hailsfiam L.C., at 164). Viscount Sumner said, ""The pubIic", . . . is of course a general 
word. No particular nurnbers are prescribed. Anything from two to infniry maay serve: 
perhaps even one, if he is intended to be first of a series of subscribers, but makes further 
proceedings needless by himself subscribing the whole. The point is that the offer is such 
as to be open to any one who bnngs his money and applies in due form, whetner the 
prospectus was addressed to hun on behalf of the company or not." (at 169) (emphasis 
added). Further, in effect he said that "friends, even if they are business friends" do not 
constitute the public and, therefore, a single private communication among them is not a 
prospectus. (at 168). Thus close friends and business associates were excluded h m  the 
definition of "public". This is known as "friends and business associatesyy test-. In R. v. 
Empire Dock Ltd. (1940), 55 B.C.R. 34 (C. C.), one of the earliest Canadian w e s ,  it was 
observed by Lennox Co. J. that "the meaning of the words 'the public' cannot be tied 
down to a specific quantity". (at 37). The US Supreme Court enunciated a tes t  called 
"need to know" test in its decision in the SEC v. Ralston Purina Co. (1953), 3846 U S  
119,73 S.Ct. 98 1. In thzt case the defendant company sold its securities of worth $ 
Under the closed system, if the exemption-bypasses are not open, no 
person or company can trade in a security without a prospectus provided such trade is a 
2,000,000 to its own employees under a stock investment plan. Some of the employees 
held positions in the company and the others were more junior employees, e.g., foreman 
entrusted with the duty of supervision at the lowest level- .The Court held it would be 
superfluous if a prospectus information were provided to the first categories of employees 
because they did know of them by virtue of their position in the company. Rather the 
other employees devoid of the positional advantage had a "need to know" of them. The 
Corn said, "The design of the statute (The Securities Act, 1933) is to protect investors by 
promoting fidl disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment 
decisions. . . . An offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is 
transaction 'not involving any public offering"'. (at 124-125, footnote omitted). It also 
said that "the statute would seem to apply to a "public offering" whether to a few or 
many." (at 125, footnote ornitted).Thus the Court means that whoever has or have a "need 
to know", irrespective of the number, must be supplied with a prospectus while securïties 
are offered for sale. In R. v. Piepgrass (1959), 29 W.W.R. 218,23 D.L.R. (2d) 220, 125 
C.C.C. 364,3 1 C.R. 2 13 (Alta C.A.) the Alberta Court of Appeal said, "It is clear fkom 
cases and from the authorities cited that it is impossible to defme with any degree of 
precision what is meant by the term "offer for sale to the public"" (Per Macdonald J. A., 
23 D-L.R. at 228). Of course, it applied the '%ends and business associates" test and held 
the accused liabie because the persons (five in number) to whom they sold shares "were 
not in any sense friends or associates of the accused, or persons having comrnon bonds of 
interest or association-" (23 D.L.R. at 228). In R. v. McKillop , Cl9721 1 O.R. 164,4 
C.C.C. (2d) 390 (Prov. Ct.) a small group of persons 
were termed as pubiic. An offer of sale of shares to them was held to be an offering to the 
public. Both Ralston Purirza and Piepgrass were referred to in this case. The court laid 
down that 
In my opinion the sales made by the accused to the various named 
individuals were not of a strictly pnvate nature. In other words, shares 
were not only available to those particular people to the exclusion of al1 
others. While it is true that the individuals who purchased the shares 
constituted a s m d  number in proportion to dl residents of this 
community, nevertheless, they were not a favoured few, so far as 
possessing knowledge of the availability of the shares was concerned. (1 
0-R at 168 and 4 C.C.C. at 394, per Greco, Prov. Ct. J.). 
74 Merger Report, supra note 72. 
distribution of such sec~uity?~ The definitions of "security", "trade" and "distribution" 
are the key to understanding the nature of securities transactions as well as the 
significance of the need of a "prospectus". 
Securitv: 
The OSA enurnerates a list of 16 instruments to be included within the 
ambit of "sec~ri ty".~~ That list is not however, exhau~t ive .~~  Its fold is so expansive that it 
may entail "anything that acts like a security, even if not specified in the definiti~n"'~. It 
75 OSA,R.R.O. 1990..c.S.5, S. 53(1). 
76 Ibid., S. l(1) ~bsec~rity". 
77 Section l(1) in defining "securïty" uses the word "include" instead of "mean" and thus 
the definition is inclusive in nature. However, as to whether the definition is exhaustive 
or not there is a debate between Alboini and, Johnston and Rockwell while commenting 
on the decision in Re George Albino, Feb. 19911 14 O.S.C.B. 365. In this case a question 
arose whether "the phantom stock plan" (a long term incentive plan) was a secunty or 
not. One cornmissioner held in the affirmative, one in the negative and third one declined 
to decide the issue. On the basis of this decision V. P. AIboini says that " the definition 
(of security) has been treated as if it were exhaustive": V. P. Alboini, Securities Law and 
Practice, 2d ed,, (Toronto: Carswell, 1984), vol. 1, at 0-29. His interpretation seems to be 
grounded on that it was a 2: 1 majority decision. But Johnston and Rockweil differ with 
Alboini in that his interpretation was "incorrect" as "[olnly one commissioner used the 
reasoning" (that the phantom stock plan was not security): Johnston and Rockwell, supra 
note 57 at 25 n. 15. In fact, declining to decide an issue, in law, should not, it is 
subrnitted, be interpreted to have amounted to a negative decision. As such the decision in 
the present case cannot be said to be a 2: 1 decision. Thus Johnston and Rockweli's 
argument may be said to be correct. 
78 Johnston and Rockwell, supra note 57 at 125. In this comection Iacobucci is worth 
quoting, "If the definition is not sufficiently wide to catch what are thought to be 
securities, then obviously the objectives of the statute will not be attained". : F. Iacobucci, 
'The Definition of Security for Purposes of a Securities Act", Proposuls for a Securities 
Market Law for Canada, (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1979) at 230, 
excerpted in H. L. O'Brien, ed. Secunties Regulation Cases and Materials, (Halifax, 
Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University, Fall 1995) at 404. This purposive approach to 
is so broadly interpreted because the Securities Act is a remedial legislation?9 The 
Supreme Court of Canada made this point clear when it said that "(s)uch remedial 
legislation must be constnied broadly, and must be read in the context of the econornic 
reaiities to which it is addre~sed"'~. The court had in mind the basic policy objective of 
the securities legislation, namely the protection of the investing public.81 Thus in George 
Albino it was reiterated that "[ilf the particular set of legal nghts and obligations under 
review was found to be a security, the investing public would be protected through fidi, 
true and plain disclosure of al1 material facts in a prospectus"82. 
interpreting the meaning of "security" has been taken by courts of US and Canada in 
various cases.: see infra note 101-1 13 and the accompanying texts. 
79 Remedial legislation is "(a) statute having for its object either to redress some existing 
@evance. or to introduce some regulation or proceeding conducive to public good". 
Benjamin W. Pope, Legal Defnitions, (Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1920) SV. 
"remedial legislation". As to how a remedial statute should be constnied Maxwell lays 
down that "remedial statutes.. .are to be construed liberaily and beneficially, so as to 
prornote as completely as possible the suppression of the rnischief intended to be 
remedied, and to give Me and strength to the remedy". : P.B. Maxwell, The Interpretation 
of Statutes, (Colorado: Fred B. Rothman & Co., 199 1) at 203. 
80 Paczfic Coast Coin Exchange v. OSC (1977), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1 12 at 127; 80 D.L.R. 
(3d) 529 at 538. What is meant by "economic reality" in the present context? It has been 
defined by the Supreme Court of Hawaii in State Commission of Secunfies v. Hawaii 
Marker Center. 485 P .  2d. 105 (Hawaii Sup. Ct. 1971) at 109 as the "subjection of the 
investor's money to the risks of an enterprise over which he exercises no managerial 
control". This formula was borrowed fiom R.J. Coffey, "The Economic Reaiities of a 
"Security": 1s There a More Meaningf'ui Formula?", (1967) 18 W. Res. Law Rev. 367. 
*' See PacificCoast. 2 S C R  112, at 126; 80 D.L.R. (3d) 529, at 538. For this point see 
also Hawaii, ibid. 
'' Re George Albino, supra note 77 at 427. 
However, Gillen groups the aforesaid 16 branches into three, to wit, 
common securities, less common securities and non-exclusive s e c ~ r i t i e s . ~ ~  Within the 
"common" category are included, fïrst, different kinds of shares, and bonds, debentures 
and other evidence of indebtedne~s.8~ The expression "other evidence of indebtedness" 
covers all forms of debt instruments, eg., Ioan cornmitment letters sold for a substantial 
considerati0n.8~ Second, it (the common category of securities) covers documents which 
are evidence of option, subscrïption or other interest in a s e ~ u r i t y . ~ ~  "An option is a 
contractual right to purchase or sell a security at a specific exercise pnce"87, e-g., warrants 
and rights. "Subscription" refers to forms which one can sign up in order to buy 
securities. The term "other interest" is of very wide s ~ o ~ e . ~ ~  Third, the "common" 
securities also include those which are "cornmonly known" as sec~rities.8~ There is no 
well accepted definition of c'cornrnonly known" securities. The US Supreme Court laid 
down a test of determination of such securities, narnely the "character the instrument is 
given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and economic 
inducements held out to the prospect"". For example, a basic pyrarnid scheme was held 
-- 
83 M.R. Gillen, Securities Regulation in Canada, 2d. ed., (Scarborough: Carswell, 1998) 
at 107. 
" OSA, R.S.0.1990, c. S.5, S. l(1) "security" (e). 
85 LI. S. V. Austin, 462 F. 2d 724 ( 1 0 ~  Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1048 (1972). 
86 OSA. RS.0.  1990, c. S.5 
" Alboini, Securities Law and Fraccice, supra note 77 at 0-38. 
88 R. V. Hansen (1973), 12 C.C.C. (2d) 368 (B. C. Prov. Cf.). 
OSA. R.S.O. 1990 c. S.5, S. l(1) "security" (a). 
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corporation, 320 U.S. 344 (1943) at 352-53,64 S-Ct. 120 
at 124. 
to be a security of such kind? The "Iess comrnon category" includes "items al1 of which 
would normally involve an initial payment, which will be used to produce some future 
r e t ~ r n s " ~ ~ ,  e.g.  a certificate of interest in oil, natural gas or mining leaseY3 an income or 
annuity contract not issued by an insureP4 and a document evidencing an interest in a 
scholarship or educational plan or  trust?' The last category, narnely the non-exclusive 
category, includes the following: 
(i) "a document evidencing title to, or an interest in, the capital, assets, 
property, profits, eanllngs or royalties of a person'"6; 
(ii) "a profit sharing agreement or ~ertificate"~~; 
(iii) "an investment contract other than investment contract within "the 
meaning of the Invesmtent Contracts AC^'*. 
9 L SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, 348 F. Supp. 766 @. Ore. 1972.). 
"A pyramid scheme is a scam. One person (the top of the pyramid) starts it. That person 
convinces others to give him or her money in exchange for some kind of product or 
service. Those purchasers are the second level of the pyramid. They recover their money 
and make a profit by selling the sanie good or service to more people. The base of the 
pyramid expands as more people buy into the scheme. Higher levels receive a percentage 
of sales on lower levels. Eventually, the pyramid collapses, as there is nobody left to 
invest. When that happens, the people at the bottom of the pyramid lose al1 of their 
investment. The person at the top often chooses this time to flee the country with his or 
her proceeds." : Johnston and Rockwell, supra note 57 at 27. 
92 Gillen, supra note 83 at 108. 
93 OSA, R.S.O. 1990 c. S.5, S. l(1) cbsecurity" (j). In Emery English, [Jan. 19661 O.S.C.B. 
27, the OSC held a sale of a fiactional interests in certain oil leases as trading in 
securi ties. 
94 Ibid., S. 1(1) "security" (m). 
95 Ibid. , S. 1(1) "security" (O). 
% Ibid., S. l(1) 4bsecurity" (b). 
97 Ibid., S. l(1) "security" (i). 
98 Ibid., S. l(1) ''security" (n). 
AU of these sub-categories are "sufficiently broad and vague enough to capture dl that 
needs to be regulated" under the Ontario Securities ~ c t . ~ '  Thus documents evidencing 
"interests in property" may relate to nurnerous transactions of daily life. lW They bave 
been judicialiy interpreted to concern transactions with the purpose of investment only 
inasmuch as the basic policy objective of the act is to protect the investing public. roi A 
profit sharing agreement is recognized as being included within the branch of "investment 
19102 contract which also rernains undefined in the OSA. Judiciai interpretations of the term 
have, however, been made in USA and Canada In SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing colo3 the 
defendant offered leases and assignments that conveyed interest in property. The  COU^ 
interpreted the transaction as "investment contact" looking into the nature of the 
instrument concerned. It said that "(i)n applying the acts of this general purpose, the 
coui-es have not been guided by the nature of the assets back of a particular document or 
offenng. The test ratber is what character the instrument is given in commerce by the 
99 Gillen, supra note 83 at 110. 
lm Supra note 83 at 110. 
101 OSC v. Brigadoon Scorch Distributors (Can.) Ltd-, [1970] 3 0.R 7 14, 14 D.L.R. (3d) 
38 (Ont. H.C.). In this case warehouse receipts for scotch whisky traded through a 
broker was held to be a security because the purpose of the purchase was not 
consumption, rather investment. Earlier, in R. v, Dalley, El9571 O.W.N. (C.A.) 123 an 
agreement evidencing the sale of a fiactionaï interest in the rights of prospecting 
petroleum and natural gas in a land was held by the Ontario Court of Appeal as a security. 
It said, "The agreement was designed . . . to serve the same purpose as corporate shares 
would have served., ., namely as evidence of tiùe". (per LeBel J.A.) at 125. 
'O2 n i e  OSC declined to admit "profit sharlng agreement" beyond "investment contract" 
in Raymond Lee, [June 19781 OSCB 119 at 125,saying that "Literal application of this 
clause . . . (to designate such agreement a separate branch of security) would expand the 
application of the Act (OSA) into realrns limited by the imagination of counsei". 
term of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the econornic inducements held out to the 
97 104 prospect . In this respect it (the court) was guided b y  the broad policy of the Securities 
Act, 1933. It said, "Courts will construe the details of an act in confonnity with its 
dominating general purpose, will read text in light of context and will interpret the text so 
far as the rneaning of the words fairly pennits so as t o  carry out in particular cases the 
97 105 generally expressed legislative policy . This broad purposive approach has been 
adopted by courts to interpreting the meaning of "security" in general and "investing 
contract" in particular. In SEC v. WJ. Howey  CO.'^^ the U.S. Supreme Court had to 
decide only the question whether a scheme that involved no actual participation of the 
investor was an investment contract. It set forth a test c d e d  common enterprise test to 
determine "whether the scheme involves (1) an investment of money in (2) a comrnon 
97 107 enterprise (3) with profits to come (4) solely from the efforts of others . Subsequentiy, 
this test had been applied in a lot of cases in US both a t  the state and federal ievels. One 
author establishes by research that the Howey test is ccincomplete or misleading" in that 
(1) it defies the nsk of Ioss of the initial contribution made by the purchaser; (2) the 
phrase bbcornrnon enterprise" is ambiguous (e-g. an organization where there must be 
more than one investor, whereas the risk of Ioss may exist even if there is a single 
investor) ; and (3) compared to the risk of loss of onginal investment much emphasis is 
. 'O3 320 U.S. 344 (1943), 64 SCt. 120. 
'" Ibid. at 352-353. 
'O5  &id. at 350-351. 
'O6 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
put on the inducement of future profits whereas the risk is "the single most important 
economic characteristic which distinguishes a security from the universe of other 
7, 108 transactions . Then the author presents hïs own formula extending the meaning of 
"economic realities" of a se~urîty. '~  Later, in Srate of Hawaii v. Hawaii Marker ~ e n r e r '  'O 
one of the basic questions was whether the minimal participation of the investors in an 
enterprise would mean that they did not expect profits '3olely" from the efforts of others 
o r  promoters. The Supreme Court of Hawaii found a problem with the word "solely" used 
in the cornmon enterprise test established in the Howey quoted above. It termed the 
Hawey test as "mechanical" to protect the investors and interpreted the word "solely" 
fiom broader statutory policy perspective so that investors even with minimal 
participation in the management of the enterprise be protected. Then it laid down a test 
for determining the nature of security transaction, which is known as risk capital test in 
line with the definition of "csecurity" proposed by Professor coffey.' That test reads as 
follows: 
An investrnent contract is created whenever: 
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and 
(2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise, 
and 
(3) the hinùshing of the initial value is  induced by the offeror's promises 
or representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a 
'O7 Ibid. at 301. 
'O" R.J. Coffey, "Economic Realities of a "Security" : 1s There a More Meaningful 
Formula?", supra note 80 at 374-375. 
log For Coffey's definition of "security", infra note 1 18. 
I l o  Hawaii, supra note 80. 
I l 1  Infra note 118. 
valuable benefit of some kind, over and above the initial value, wilI 
accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation of the enterprise, and 
(4) the offeree does not receive the rïght to exercise practical and actual 
control over the managerial decisions of the enter-rise.' I 2  
In Pncific ~oast'" the Supreme Court of Canada applied both Howey and Hawaii tests in 
determining whether a particular transaction was an investment contract. It emphasized 
upholding the policy objective of the OSA (i.e. investor protection) in interpreting 
securities transactions even beyond those tests, if necessary. To quote De Grandpre J.: 
It is clearly Iegislative poiicy to replace the harshness of caveat emptor in 
security related transactions and courts should seek to attain that gc'al even 
if tests carefully formulated in prior cases prove ineffective and must 
continudy be broadened in scope. It is the policy and not the subsequently 
formulated judicial test that is decisive. ' l4 
The foiiowing definition qualifies the tests discussed above: l Is 
An investment contract is a contract whereby a person, having been led to 
expect profits, undertakes to participate in the risk of a venture by a 
contribution of capital or loan, without having the required knowledge to 
carry on the venture or without obtaining the nght to participate directly in 
decisions concerning the carrying on of the venture.' l6 
I l 2  Hawaii, supra note 80 at 109. 
Pacifie Gold Coast, supra note 80. 
'14 2 S.C.R. 112 at 132. 
See Johnston and Rockweli, supra note 57, at 30. 
l l6 Quebec Securities Act (QSA), Q.S. 1982 c. 48, S. 1 "'an investment contract"(emphasis 
added) 
As appears from this definition, investment in the nsk of an enterprise in the management 
of which the investor does not have any actual control is the chief feahwe of an 
investment contract.lL7 This is also true of any security transaction in general.'18 
Trade: 
Like "security", "trade" is defined inclusively under the OSA. In the first 
place it includes "any saie or disposition of a security for valuable consideration", 
Il7 This basic feature is defined as "economic reality" of a security transaction. For the 
definition and interpretation of the concept, supra notes 80. 
"' See supra notes 80 and 90-108 and the accompanying text. Coffey, supra note 80 at 
377 defines "security" based on the "economic reality" concept as below: 
' "security" is: 
A transaction (except an isolated transaction not involving an offering 
to the public) in which 
a person ("buyer") fumishes value ("initial value") to another 
("seller"); and 
a portion of initial value is subjected to the nsks of an enterprise, it 
being sufficient if- 
(a) part of initial value is furnished for a proprietary interest in, or 
debt-holder claim against, the enterprise, or 
(6) any property received by the buyer is cornmitted to use by the 
enterprise, even though the buyer retains specific ownership of 
such property, or 
(c) part of initial value is furnished for property whose present 
value is determined by taking into account the anticipated but 
unrealized success of the enterprise, even though the buyer has 
no legai relationship with the enterprise; and 
at the time of the transaction, the buyer is not familiar with the 
operations of the enterprise or does not receive the nght to participate 
in the management of the enterprise; and 
the funiishing of initia1 value is induced by the seller's promises or 
representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a 
valuable benefit of some kind, over and above initial value, will accrue 
to the buyer as a result of the operation of the enterprise. 
whatever may be the modes of payment (Le., marginal, installrnent or o t h e r ~ i s e ) . ~ ' ~  The 
purchase of a security cannot be said to be a trade within this definition, "at least with 
respect to distributions of se~urities"'~~ because the object of securities regulation is to 
regulate the sellers and protect the buyers.12' "(A)ny sale or disposition" in question refers 
to both primary and secondary market transactions (of sale or  disposition).'^ Secondly, 
the term, '?rade" includes transactions on behalf of others. Within this category are two 
types of transactions, namely (1) "participation as a floor trader in any transaction in a 
security upon the floor of any stock exchange"'= and (2) "any receipt by a registrant of an 
order to buy or seil a security"lz4. The former refers to a floor transaction on an exchange 
by an agent of a broker and the latter to a registered dealer's receipt of an order to buy or 
sel1 from a client- The d e f ~ t i o n  of the latter kind of trade confms that a purchase or an 
order to purchase a security is not a trade but receipt of an order for purchase is-I3 
Penultimately, "trade" includes "transfer, pledge or encumbrancing of securities (by 
control persons) . . . for the purpose of giving collateral for a debt made in good faith? 
The last branch of the definition encompasses "any act, advertisement, solicitation, 
119 OSA, R.S.O. 1990 c. S.5, S. l(1) "irade" (a). 
120 Gillen, supra note 83 at 122. 
12' W.W. Cameron, "Regulation and Distribution of Securities in Ontario" (1954) 10 
U.T.L.J. 199 at 199. 
122 Gilien, supra note 83 at 122. 
'" OSA, R.S.O. 1990 C S ,  S. l(1) "trade" (b). 
1 24 Ibid. S. l(1) "trade" (c) Here "registrant" means a person or Company registered or 
required to be registered" under the OSA.: OSA. ibid., S. 1(1), "registrant". 
12' Aiboini, s u p  note 77 at 0-69. 
conduct or negotiation directiy or indirectly in furtherance of "any of the above 
mentioned branches of t r a d e ~ . ' ~ ~  The orbit of this branch is difficult to draw. For its 
application the basic requirement is that there be some act in furtherance of a trade or, in 
other words, before the completion of a trade."' An offer to sell, '" providing a Est of 
narnes of prospective purchasers of a s e c ~ ~ r i t ~ , ' ~ ~  advertisements published before and 
after incorporation of a company with the effect of soiiciting the public,131 etc. are 
examples of trading within the meaning of this branch. But if an act takes place "after" 
the completion of a trade, that WU not be attracted by the definition.l3' 
OSA, R.S.O. 1990 CS, S. l(1) %ade7' (d). A person holding more than 20% of the 
voting securities of the issuer seems to be a control person under section l(1) 
"distribution" (c) of the OSA. 
'27 OSA. R.S.O. CS, S .  l(1) "trade" (e). As to why this branch has been brought within 
the definition of "trade" Gillen wntes, 
The pre-sale process may involve a varïety of pre-sale activities before the 
customer actually buys. The sales pitch may involve various pressure 
tactics and possibly subtle misrepresentations. There is a risk that the 
buyer may rely on these pre-sale representations or be influenced by pre- 
sale pressure tactics, To prevent the potential loss in confidence in the 
market ftom such activities, securities acts regulate these activities as well. 
Gillen, supra note 83 at 123, 
12* Ibid. 
'" Alboini, supra note 77 at 0-67. 
"O OSC v. Luccis & Co.. June 1962 O.S.C.B. 1. 
13' R. v. Golden Sharnbrock Mines Lrd.. [1965] O.R. 692, [1965] 3 C.C.C. 72 (0nt.C.A.). 
The ads were published by a private company. On that ground it was argued that it was 
not a made within the rneaning of the OSA. The court did not accept this because they 
constituted "a representation intended to induce the person solicited to purchase". Thus 
"solicitation" to purchase was an act in furtherance of trade (sale). 
' 32 Re Ontario Secunties Commission and C.A. P. Ltd., ( 1  972) 1 0.R 205 (H.C.). Cf. R- 
Sussman, F1;arch 19931 16 O.S.C.B. 1209. 
It should be noted that ail the branches of trade have one cornmon 
ingredient, to wit, consideration, both actuai (e-g., sale) and contempIated (e.g., an offer 
to sale).133 Transactions involving such considerations as envisaged by the OSA are too 
many to mention. The Legislature, with the purpose of protecting the investing public in 
mind, has "chosen to define it (trade) broadly in order to encompass dmost every 
conceivable transaction in securities", 134 in the same vein as it has done with respect to 
the term of "security" itself. 
Distribution: 
A trade in securities, as defined above, (e-g., sale, disposition, or offered 
for sale or disposition) will be called a distribution in any of the following circumstances 
and will give rise to the need of a prospectus: 
1. A trade in securities will amount to a distribution if they have not been previously 
issued."' In other words, a person or Company issuing securities fiom treasury wiil be 
said to distribute securities and will, therefore, be required to file a prospectus with 
- -. 
133 Absent consideration a gift is not a îrade.: Huntingford, W. Thomas and Anchor 
Machine & Manufacturing Ltd. (1990), 13 O.S.C.B. 3478. 
134 R. v. Sussman, supra note 132 at 20-2 1. (emphasis added). 
135 OSA, RS.0. 1990 C H ,  S. l(1) "disîribution" (a). In Durham Securities Corporation 
Ltd. there was a distribution of securities in British Columbia. Within two days from the 
date of completion of the sale a registrant in Ontario purchased a considerable number of 
those secwities mostly fkom the original purchasers and then resold them to Ontario 
residents. The OSC disregarded the difference of two days between the original 
distribution in British Columbia and the resale in Ontario and considered them happening 
"concurrently". On this basis it did not view the shares to have been previously issued. 
the OSC for its acceptance. This is the most common type of distribution 
136 necessitating a prospectus- . 
2. If securities, previously issued, have been redeemed or purchased back by or returned 
to the issuer as gifts and the issuer trades in them ( e-g., resells or offers for resale), it 
will be a distribution requhing a prospectus137. The prospectus is so required because 
in such cases the issuer "may well have access to information that is not available to 
the 
3. Where a control person of an issuer releases securities from his or her or its holdings 
and trades in them, that will arnount to a distribution and a prospectus will be 
required.I3' A "'control person" is a person or company or combination of persons or 
companies who, by holding sufficient number of any securities of the issuer, c m  
matenaily affect the control of the issuer.'" A holding of more than 20% of the 
outstanding voting securities of the issuer is, in absence of evidence to the contrary, 
deerned to give a person or company the said ("control person") position.141 In such a 
Therefore, the sale by the Ontario registrant was held illegal as he did not file a 
prospectus with the OSC. pet. 19901 13 O.S.C.B. 5 109. 
13' Gillen, supra note 83 at 124: 
137 OSA, R.S.O. 1990 c- S.5, S. l(1) c6distribution" (b). 
13' Gillen, supra note 83 at 125. 
13' OSA, R.S.O. 1990 c. S.5, S. l(1) Lcdistribution'7 (c). In Company X, Re (1995), 18 0. S. 
C. B. 797, the ControIling Shareholder, holding 80% of shares, sought exemption from 
prospectus requirement for sale of rights. The OSC dismissed the application, because the 
sale constituted a distribution and required fiing and delivery of prospectus. 
140 See Johnston and Rockwell, supra note 57 at 69.. 
141 OSA, R.S.O. 1990 c. S.5, s- l(1) "distribution" (c). "Voting security" is a non-debt 
security attachinp voting right under al l  circumstances or under particular circumstances 
that exist. OSA, R.S.O. :990 c. S.5, S. l(1) "voting security". 
case a person to be a control person need not to have actual control. It will suffice if it 
can be established that his or ber position is such that he or she should materially 
affect contr01.'~~ Thus in Re Deer Horn Mines Ltd.. the 14.6% security holder argued 
that it did not have control, the OSC held it sufficient to materially affect control of 
the i s s ~ e r . ' ~ ~  A prospectus is required of a control person distrïbuting securities with a 
view to compelling him to disclose information susceptible to the price of securities, 
which he may have known by virtue of his position in the issuer's company. 
Otherwise, he rnight have concealed such information and made unfair profits.i" 
4. As said earlier, exemptions from the prospectus requirement are specified in the OSA 
or Reg~la t ion'~~,  or are granted by the OSC applying its discretionary powers.'" The 
rationaie for such exemption provisions may be that the purchaser is such a person 
who does not need the prospectus information for his or her protection- If that 
purchaser resells bis securities, the subsequent purchaser may, however, require such 
protection. In that case the subsequent sale wiU be a "distribution" necessitating a 
prospectus. '47 
Thus, as shown above, the OSA defines "security" and "trade" in an 
inclusive fashion. Also the judiciary, in interpreting them, takes a very broad approach in 
I 42 Merger Report, supra note 72  at 4.02. 
[Jan. 19681 0.S.C.B. 12. 
See Gillen, supra note 83 at 126. 
145 OSAR, 1990 Reg. 10 15, S. 14; OSC Rules, Rule 46-50 1. 
'46 OSA., R.S.O. 1990 c. S.5, S. 74(1). For the rationale of such exemptions, see Gillen, 
supra note 83 at 127. 
147 OSA. R.S.O. 1990 c. S.5, S. l(1) ccdisVibution77 and S. 72(4), (5) and (6). 
pursuance of the legislative policy of protecting the investing public in consideration of 
the economic reality of securîty transactions, namely risk in the investment in an 
enterprise in which the investor exercises no effective managerial control. In so doing the 
courts seem to be "oversolicitous" to bring even "doubtful" schemes within the fold of 
"security", which the legislature has left undefined.14* AS a result, perhaps there WU be 
found no instance where a person has been refused a remedy because the transaction in 
question is not a security within the stanitory def in i t i~n. '~~ Similarly, "trade" is 
interpreted b r ~ a d l ~ . ~ ~ ~  "Distribution" has, however, been defined exclusively to rnean any 
one of the four kinds of issuing of securities as mentioned above.''' If in a given situation 
a document can be identified as a "security" and a transaction as a "trade" falling within 
any of the four types of distributions, it will be incumbent on the issuer to meet the 
prospectus requirement. In other words, if there is a distribution of a security, "(t)here can 
be no question but . . .the filing of a prospectus"1s2 because "its acceptance by the 
Commission (OSC) is fundamental to the protection of the investing 
14* LaSkin C.J. in Pacifc Coast Coin Exchange, supra note 80 at 1 17. 
14' See W.V.R. Smith, "Securities Regulation in Ontario"(1968) 4 Texas Int'l. L.F. 454 
at 461. 
lSo See the text accompanying supra note 134. 
lS1 See the text accompanying supra notes 135-146. 
lS2 Per Henry J. in Jones v. F.H. Deacon Hodgson Znc, [1986] 9 O.S.C.B. 5579 (H.C.), 
at 5590. In this case the plaintiff purchased some shares from the defendant investrnent 
dealer who offered shares for sale as part of a distribution of securities, but no prospectus 
was fded with the OSC pnor to such distribution as required by section 53(1) of the OSA. 
Subsequently the purchaser sought a declaration from the court to the effect that absent 
prospectus the contract of purchase and sale of securities was void. On that basis he 
claimed back the money he paid to the defendant as purchase pnce. Henry J. held the 
transaction nul1 and void in view of S. 53(1) which clearly prohibits distribution of 
2.1.3 BANGLADESH 
In Bangladesh the Public Issue Rule (PIR) defines "prospectus" as "any 
document prepared for the purpose of comrnunicating to the general public a company's 
plan to offer for sale its se~urities"~~~.~ccordin~ to The Companies Act, 1994 (CA), the 
issuance of an application form for shares or debentures of a Company must be 
accompanied by a prospectus unless such form is issued (a) in connection with a bona 
fide invitation to a person to enter into an undenuritkg agreement with respect to the 
shares or debentures, or (b) in relation to shares or debentures which are not offered to the 
public.L" Reading this provision together with the prospectus definition it rnay be simply 
securities without filing a prospectus the purpose being the protection of the investing 
public. The statutory purpose was the core of his consideration. In his own words, "While 
the coua should be reluctant to interfere with contracts freely made, in this case the 
overridingconsideration is the need to support the fundamental purpose of the statute as a 
matter of public policy to protect the integrity of the regulatory scheme of the Act;. . ." (at 
560 1). A contrast is found in a British Columbia case based on similar facts in which the 
Court of Appeai declined to hold the non-cornpliance with the prospectus filing provision 
of the British Columbia Securities Act, S.B.C., 1967, c.45, S. 37, void ab initio because 
that would ailow the companies that issued shares without filing prospectus "to escape 
their obligations to perform their agreements (of sale)". Ames v. Investor-Plan Ltd. 
(1973), Cl9731 5 W.W.R. 451,35 D.L.R. (3d) 613 (B.C.C.A), at 618. This decision was 
criticized by a commentator who concluded that "In a case of non-compliance such as 
Ames there is every reason to hold that the purpose of the legislation and protection of the 
public require that such contracts be declared prohibited and illegal and therefore 
voidable (but not void as in Jones) at the option of the purchaser." (footnote omitted and 
emphasis added). Stanley M. Beck, "Securities Regulation- Failure to File Prospectus- 
Validity of Contract- Exclusiveness of S tatutory Remedy" comment (1974) 52 Cm. Bar 
Rev. 589 at 598. 
lS3 Jones, ibid. (per Henry J.). 
'" PIR, r. 2(d). (emphasis added). 
Is5 The Cornpanies Act, 1994 (Act No. 1 8 of 1994) (hereinafter CA 1994). S. 135(3). 
put that when a company offers securities to the general public for sale, it must publish a 
prospectus.156 From this general requirement the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) may, however, gant  exemptions.157 Thus, absent exemptions, an offering of 
securities to the public for sale requires filing a prospectus with the SEC. The meanings 
of "securities", 'offer for sale" and "the public" are essential to understand the context of 
prospectus requirement in Bangladesh. 
Securities: 
The Securities and Exchange Ordinance(SEO), 1969 defines "securities" 
to mean any of the following instruments. 
(a) govemment s e c ~ r i t i e s ~ ~ ~  meaning prornissory notes (including 
treasury bills), stock-certificates, bearer bonds and al1 other securities 
issued by the Government except a c u r r e n ~ ~ - n o t e ' ~ ~ ;  
(b) instruments which create a charge or lien on the assets of a 
company. 160 
(c) instruments acknowledging loan to or indebtedness of a company, 
e.g., debentures, debenture stock.I6' 
See D. Keenan, Smith and Keenan 's Company Law, (London: Piiman Publishing, 
1987) at 11 1. 
'" Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, Ordinance No. XVlI of 1969, (hereinafter 
SEO), S. 2D(1). 
Is8 SEO, 1969, S. 2(l)(i). 
'" The Securities Act, 1920 (Act No. X of 1920), S. 2(a). 
160 SEO, S. 2(1)(ii). 
(d) Any stock, transferable shares, script, note and bond.I6' 
(e) Investment contract. lci3 
(f) Pre-organization certificate or s u b ~ c r i ~ t i o n . ~ ~ ~  
7 9  165 (g) Any interest or instrument commonly known as "security . 
(h) Any certificate of deposit for, certificate of interest or participation 
in, ternporary or intenm ceaificate for, receipt for, or any warrant or 
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the above?'  
The types of securities have, as discussed earlier, their counterparts in Ontario law, albeit 
the latter provides a longer list of securities. However, the most striking point of 
difference in this respect between the laws of Ontario and Bangladesh is that the former 
defines securities inclusively while the latter exclusively, i.e., in defining "securities" the 
OSA uses the word "include7' but the SEO uses "mean". Therefore. while interpreting 
"securities", the Canadian courts (particularïy Ontario's) take a broader view and 
sometimes define securities beyond the branches named in the OSA. In so doing they take 
into consideration the statutory objective of "investor protection" and the "econornic 
reaiity" of securïties transactions.16' Like Ontario the securities legislation of Bangladesh 






167 Supra note 80. 
has a broad objective of providing protection to the investing public. '13 Needess to say, 
in both the jurisdictions the nature or the "economic reality" of securities transactions 
should also be same because the said reality is universally associated with every security 
transaction. Therefore, it may be argued that in Bangladesh "securities" should be defined 
and interpreted inclusively alike in Ontario. In other words, the SEO should use the word 
"uiclude" instead of "mean" to define "securities and an amendment to that effect is 
desirable so that no transactions quaiimg the "economic reality" test can be cmied on 
without a prospectus and the investing public can be protected thereby. 
Offer for Sale: 
In Bangladesh a prospectus is required for the sale of securities of a 
Unlike Ontario, Bangladesh law is silent with regard to the need of a 
prospectus for the resale of securities, e.g., for resale of securities after buyback by an 
issuer, resale by a control person.'70 In other words, "offer for sale" of securities in the 
present context means oniy an offering of a company's treasury securities for public sale. 
Any other disposition of securities (e.g., pledge by a control person as in Ontario) does 
not require the publication of a prospectus. 
The Public 
168 See the prearnbles to the SEO and the Securities and Exchange Commission Act, 1993 
(hereinafter SECA). 
169 Supra note 156. 
There is no definition in the securities law nor is there any judicial 
interpretation avaiiable in Bangladesh on who constitutes "the public" to the context of 
securities law. In Canada, as seen earlier, the term "the public" created interpretive 
difficulties and, therefore, was eliminated from the OSA with respect to securïties 
registration. 17' The same is me in Bangladesh. 
2.1.4 CONCLUSION 
It appears frorn the foregoing discussion that unlike the Ontario 
counterpart Bangladesh law defmes "securities" very narrowly. It calls for a prospectus 
when there is a sale of treasury securities, which is the most common fonn of 
"distribution" of securities in Ontario. But Bangladesh law falls apart from Ontario law in 
that the latter requires a prospectus also for s econdq  offerings (e-g., resale by a control 
person). Nevertheless, the fundamentai points of similarity between the two iaws in this 
respect are that prospectuses perform the same function of making disclosure information 
to the buyers of securities with the purpose of protecting their interests, and that. unless 
exemptions are availabie, prospectuses must have to be fded with the respective secunties 
commissions, namely the OSC and the SEC. It may be noted in this comection that 
neither of the securities laws of Ontario and Bangladesh does define "disc1osure~'- Black's 
Lmv Dicrionary defines it in terms of the securities law as "the revealing of certain 
financial and other information believed relevant to investors considering buying 
''O The texts accompanying notes 136- 148 supra. 
secuities in some venture"."' The basic principle in this regard is that a prospectus must 
disclose whatever information is required by the law under which it is issued. This was 
underlined in the English case of Roussel1 v. ~urnham.'" In this suit the defendant 
company issued a prospectus on 14 Nov. 1906 offering 70,000 shares to the public for 
subscription. Among others, tt mentioned 1000 shares as the minimum subscnption upon 
which the allotment of shares might be made. It also contained a description of the 
materiai contracts, which included the narnes of the parties thereto and their dates, 
character and effect. On 26 November of the same year a French translation of that 
prospectus was published, in an abridged form, in a French newspaper, Le Journal. In the 
latter there was missing the statements of, inter aliu, the amount of the minimum 
subscnption, the names of the parties to and dates of sorne of the material contracts. It, 
however, contained a statement which ran, in translated form, as thus- "The company is 
in a position at once to allot 1OOO shares according to the provisions of its articles, but 
15,000 shares have dready k e n  subscribed". The plaintiff, a Frenchman, filled out the 
application form prïnted in the Le Journal seeking an aiiotrnent of 700 ordinary shares. 
He was ailotted those shares for which he paid in part. Subsequently, a cal1 for the unpaid 
money was made, but he declined repudiating the allotment and demanding back the 
money he paid. The company tumed down his request, which gave rise to a Litigation. The 
plaintiff chiefly reLied on the ground that the Le Journal contained no information about 
-- - -  
17' Supra note 73.. 
17' Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed., s-v. 'cdisclosure~'. 
173 (1909) 1. Ch. 127 at 13 1 (per Parker J.). 
the minimum subscription upon which directors rnight proceed to allot shares under S. 4 
of the Companies Act. 1900. He also pleaded that the prospectus in question should be the 
one on which he actually relied; that the defendant had published another prospectus 
which fulfilled the statutory requirements was immaterial. The defendant based its 
defense on that it thought the plaintiff, when applied, relied on the reai prospectus instead 
of the advertisement in the French newspaper. The Court, however, upheld the plea of the 
plaintiff. Parker J. interpreted the above quoted statement ('The Company is in a position 
at once to allot 1000 shares.. .") as to suggest that the minimum subscription on which the 
directors couid go to allotment 1ûûû shares, but he doubted if such an irnplied statement 
arnounted to name the minimum subscription. He underlined the importance of narning 
the minimum. He observed that 
But evenif there is such an implication as is suggested, 1 do not think it 
would be a ~ ~ c i e n t  cornpliance with the Act. The provision is inserted 
for the protection of applicants for shares, that they know the extent of the 
nsk which they run having regard to the old practice of going to allotment 
where no suffkient capital bas been provided for working expenses. . . . . it 
appears to me that the statement which the Legislature contemplated was 
an express statement, and not one which c m  be implied or inferred from 
other statements in the prospectus.174 
In other words, Parker J. underscored that whatever information is asked by the law must 
be disclosed by an issuer in its requite f o m  or fashion. In R. v. ~ a r v i n ' ~ ~ ,  a. a newspaper 
ad, instead of providing full information required by the Companies Act. 1907'~~~ stated 
174 Zbid. at 132-133. 
17' 18 0.L.R 49. 
176 S.O. 1907, c. 43. 
the name of a mining company, the nature of the mining ciaims owned by it (the 
company), the names of the directors, etc. directing the public that "For full particulars 
apply to J.W. Garvin & Co.. .. or to any well known Toronto brokers". This was held to 
be a prospectus within the rneaning of S. 95 of the Act. But since it did not contain alI 
requisite information, the court held it be a violation of the Act. Merdith CJ. maintained 
that "it (prospectus) shall contain the information which the Act (Ontario Cornpnnies Act, 
Y, If7 1907) requires to be inserted in a prospectus . 
The next Sub-Sections will examine the extent of disclosure and the role 
of the securities commissions in each jurisdiction. 
2.2 PROSPECTUS DISCLOSURE AND THE ROLE OF THE OSC 
AND THE SEC: THEORETICAL BASES 
2.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since prospectus regulation in Ontario and Bangladesh is the centrepiece 
of the present work, it is necessary to look into the theoretical assumptions underlying the 
laws of the respective junsdictions. It will help to understand on what rationales are based 
the respective laws of Ontario and Bangladesh. The loopholes and shortcornings of laws 
originate fiom the defects of the underlying theones and, therefore, any reforrn to the laws 
needs re-thinking of those theories. T ' u s  before going into the comparative study of the 
- 
lT7 Supra note 175 at 55. 
legal provisions conceming prospectus regulation it is necessary to inquire into their 
theoreticai rationdes. To quote Eagleton, where the "taken-for-granted activities begin to 
falter, log-jam, corne unstuck, run into trouble,. . .theory proves ne~essary" '~~.  
The theories underlying the laws of Ontario and Bangladesh are presented 
below in bnef followed by the history of their adoption in the respective jurisdictions. 
2.2.2 CENTRAL MESSAGE OF TEE THEORIES 
In Canada (and, therefore, in Ontario) securities regulation in general and 
prospectus regulation in particular are based on the fusion of two theoretical flows, 
namely the disclosure theory and blue sky t h e ~ r ~ . ' ~ ~  Bangladesh corporate and secunties 
law is underpinned by the disclosure theory. The United Kingdom (UK) and the United 
States of Arnerica (USA) are the birth places of the disclosure and blue sky theories 
respectively. ''O 
The disclosure theory posits that the sale of securities by a corporation be 
allowed without governmentd or administrative interference provided full disclosure of 
information conceming the securities is made to the prospective investors. The first and 
foremost end served by this theory is to provide information to the investors and thereby 
to make them independent in making their investment decision in light of the information 
17' Terry Eagleton, ï?ze Signijkance of Theory, (Oxford, ZJK: Cambridge, Mass. USA: 
Basil Blackwell, 1990) at 26. 
17' Goulet, supra note 16 at 79. 
' " J.P. Williamson, The Securities Regdation in Canada, (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1960) at 4 and 11. 
disclosed by the issuer. The government or government agent entmsted with the 
responsibility of overseeing the securities markets, namely the securities commission, is 
required to ensure that such disclosure is made. It does not, in a paternalistic manner, 
determine the merit of the offerings and thereby not decide for the investors as to whether 
investment should be made or net."' Thus while the United States of America (USA) at 
the federal level opted for this theory as  the basis of the Securities Act of 1933'~~. the then 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt emphasized that "(t)here is . .. an obligation upon us to 
insist that every issue of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be 
accompanied by full publicity and information, and that no essentially important eiernent 
attending the issue shail be concealed from the buying public."'83 The ultimate purpose is 
7 7  184 to "to protect the public with least possible interference to honest business . "The 
purpose of the whole (disclosure system) is to provide an equality of opportunity for all 
investors in the market place, to sellers as well as b ~ ~ e r s . " ' ~ ~  As such, through disclosure 
of information an open and transparent market would be established where the potential 
18' Gorder, with respect to disclosure review, writes, c'[A]dministrators f'us on whether 
the registration statement is misleading in my material respect or whether it omits any 
matenal information. They may demand that the issuer change the level of disclosure but 
may not affect the terms of the offering. Once the information contained in the 
registration statement is complete, accurate, and not misleading, the administrators must 
approve the registration statement, regardless of their opinion of the terms of the 
offering.": G. Gorder, "Compromise Merit Review- A Proposal for Both Sides of the 
Debate", (1984) 60 Wash. L. Rev. 141 at 143 note 14. 
182 15 U.S.C. 77a (1995). 
183 77 Cong. Rec. (March 29, 1933), at 955 (Message from President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt). 
lW Ibid. 
lg5 Merger Reporî. supra note 72 at para. 2.0 1. 
investors, in order to own a securïty, would compete with each other to reach an 
"'equilibnum price". This "equilibrium pnce", also called "accurate price77186, "shouid 
refiect as nearly as possible the securïty's 'intrinsic In other words, if a 
securïty's price reflects its fundamental value, it will be called an accurately priced 
security. Such a security, in tuni, ensures "that (investment) capital is properly allocated, 
77 188 and this is good for society in generai - 
The blue sky theory, on the other hand, postulates that the ment of 
securities be assessed by the securities commission or concemed govemment body 
applying its discretion before the securities are offered to the public for sale. On its 
judgment of merit it should refuse permission for  sale if it considers it (the sale) against 
the public interest. To quote one author, this heory requires "examination of the 
proposed security by the regdatory agency to determine the economic viability of the 
security and underlying enterprise before allowing the issue to be offered to the 
The purpose of blue sky legislation is, like that of disclosure law. to protect the 
investors, but in a "paternalistic" manner. 
2.2.3 HXSTORY AND RATIONALE FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE THEORIES 
IN ONTARIO AND BANGLADESH 
lg6 See R. A. Robertson, "In Search of the Perfect Mutual Fund Prospectus", (1999) 54 
Bus. Law. 461 at 468-69. 
'" A. R. Rodier, "Prospectus Disclosure Under the Proposed Securities Act in Ontario: 
Problem in a Changing Environment", (1985) 23 U.W.O.L.Rev.2 1 at 23. 
Ig8 Robertson, supra note 186 at 468. 
2.2.3.1 Ontario 
The concept of corporate disclosure dates back to the 19" century English 
history of company law following the repeal of the Bubble Act. 1720'~' in 1825"' which 
- - - - - -- - - - 
189 Iacobucci, supra note 78 at 229. 
'" 6 Geo. 1, c. 18, cited in L. C. B. Gower, Princi ' s  of Modern Company Law, 5th ed. 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1992), at xlvii. 
19' Securities regulation in the sense of provisions concerning the licensing of brokers 
was fmt intmduced in 1285 by the a statute of Edward 1. By the end of 17" century share 
trading and stock-broking were common in London. In 1697 the legislatue passed ""An 
act to restrain the number and iil practice of brokers and stock-jobbers." : 8 & 9 Wm. 3 
(1697) c. 32, quoted in L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, (Boston and 
Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1983) at 1. During frrst and second centuries of the 
18" century mushroomed the number of companies. Of them the most influential was the 
South Sea Company which was granted monopoly by the British Government to trade 
with South Amenca and the Pacific Islands. The company flotations boom is popularly 
called the "south sea bubble". Fraudulent stock promotion by such cornpanies (including 
the South Sea Companies) were rampant, In order to check this "garnbling mania" the 
Parliament, instigated by the South Sea Company, passed the Bubbie Act in 1720. 
Gower, ibid. at 25. It declared mischievous undertakings void and illegal (S. 18), and 
imposed penalties on brokers dealing in securities of illegal companies (S. 21). see, 
Gower, ibid. at 26. However, the passage of the Bubble Act Ieft an adverse impact on the 
business of South Sea Company alongside the business of other speculative enterprises, 
though the real purpose of this statute was 'hot to tone down a speculative boom in shares 
of other joint stock cornpanies but to reduce their cornpetition with South Sea Company 
for public funds". Goulet, supra note 16 at 83. The public lost confidence in the stock 
market, which caused a meteonc fa11 of the share prices of the South Sea Company. The 
Company could not recover from this position and ultimately it dong with its 
contemporaries burst out Iike bubbIes in the sea. A poem reflects on the fate of the South 
Sea Company and its contemporaries, and their effect on the then society as follows: 
"The Bubbles now are banished from the Light, 
And hide their heads in Realms of Endless Night. 
Life vanishes away like to a Dream 
And what is now become of the South Sea Schemes." 
A Gideonette ,The Art of Stockjobbing,(London: 1746, G.L.P.C., XVIIl-46-3, quoted in 
Armand Budington, The English Business Company afrer the Bubble Act 1 720-1 800, 
(New York: The Commcriwealth Fund, 1938) at 24. 
was the "first attempt at a Company ~ c t " l ~ '  in England. In fact, the Joint Srock 
Companies Act of 1844"~ was fust to provide for the "modern prospectus 
194 requirement and thereby to introduce a mechanism of disclosure as a "safeguard 
against f r a ~ d " ' ~ ~ .  Through this legislation "(m)odern securities regulation began in 
9,196 England . For the next four decades no significant development took place. In 1889, 
when a question arose as to a director's liability for misstatement in a prospectus, the 
House of Lords held that it was a good defence for the director that he (the director) 
believed, in good faith, in the truth of the statements, however unrea~onable.'~' In the 
following year the Directors ' Liabiliw Act '*, which was passed to respond to the said 
liability decision, provided for liability of directors and promoters for any loss, resulting 
from an untrue statement in a prospectus, sustained by any subscriber of securities on the 
faith of the prospectus. 
In 1894 England examined the rationale of "merit review" of securities 
(which was subsequently introduced in the USA as blue sky Law discussed below) and 
ultirnately rejected it after a Commission report that said: 
-- - - 
192 Gower, supra note 190 at 26. 
lg3 7 & 8 Vict. C. 110 & 11 1, cited in Gower, supra note 190. 
lg4 Loss, supra note 191 at 2. The Bill of the 1844 act was prepared by William 
Gladstone, then President of the Board of Trade, who can be called the father of modem 
company law as it introduced three basic principles. First, it provided for incorporation by 
registration instead of special act or charter. Second, it distinguished company froni 
private partnership requiring companies consisting of more than 25 memben to register. 
Third, it provided for full publicity of information. : See Gower, supra note 190 at 39. 
lg5 Gower, supra note 190 at 39. 
'% Williamson, supra note 180 at 4. 
Ig7 Deny v. Peek (1889), 14 A.C. 337 (H.L.). 
Your Cornmittee may observe that they have disrnissed from their 
consideration every suggestion for a public enquiry by the registrar or 
other official authority, into the soundness, good faith, and prospects of 
undertaking at this or any other stage of a company's formation. To make 
any such investigation into the position of every new company cornplete or 
effectua1 would demand a very numerous staff of trained officers, and lead 
to great delay and expense, while an incomplete or perfunctory 
investigation would be worse than none. It would be an attempt to throw 
what ought to be the responsibility of the individual on the shoulders of 
the State, and would give a fictitious and unreai sense of security to the 
investor, and might also lead to grave abuses.'99 
The Companies Act of190dOO followed, which contained greater disclosure 
requirements. This Act, after amendment in 1907, was replaced by the Companies 
(Consolidation) Act of 190820' fuaher widening the scope of disclosure. To quote Mulvey: 
The purpose of the legislation is not to regulate or supervise the actions of 
directors of companies, but to afford the investing public a means of 
ascertainhg the true inwardness of flotations and by means of annual 
staternents and reports of directors and auditors to disclose to the 
shareholders h m  time to tirne the methods by which the &airs of the 
company are conducted."' 
'The English expenence through 1908 laid the basis for Canadian 
legislation"203 Securities regulation in Canada started in the guise of corporate legislation 
in late 1 8 7 0 s . ~ ~  Particularly, Ontario introduced securities regulation in 189 1 by adopticg 
Ig8 53 & 54 Vict. C. 60, cited in Gower, supra note 190, at xlviii. 
lg9 One clause of the Report Cd. 7779, 1895, quoted in T. Mulvey, "Blue Sky Law", 
(1916) 36 Can. L. T. 37 at 45- 
63 & 64 Vict. C. 48, cited in Gower, supra note 190 at xlviii. 
201 8 Edw. 7, C. 69, cited in Gower, supra note 190 at xlviii. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Supra note 180 at 8. 
*O4 Goulet, supra note 16 at 84. 
the English Directors' Liability Act of 189P05. In 1897 it required the delivery of financial 
statements to the shareh~lders.'~~ In 1907 Ontario Companies Actzo7, based on the English 
Componies Act of 190Pm, was passed. It provided for wider scope of prospectus 
disclosure compared to the English act? In 19 12 the Ontario act introduced, arnong 
others, a provision of public offerings by u n d e ~ m t e r s . ~ ' ~  After 19 12, the "blue sky" 
legislation discussed below was added to the disclosure legislation of Canada in general 
and Ontario in particular. 
Blue sky law"' was first introduced in the state of Kansas of United States 
in 19 1 1.212 In Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co. 2'3 it was stated that the aim of the law was to 
'O5 Ibid. at 85. 
'O6 Ibid. 
'O7 S.O. 1907c.43. 
208 Supra note 20 1. 
209 Goulet, supra note 16 at 85-. 
Ibid. 
21 1 It is not certain when and how the term "blue sky law" did actudy originate- But the 
fiequent use of the term in different literature leads to the conclusion that it refers to anti- 
fiaud law. A Canadian author, for exarnple, in an attempt to define blue sky law wrote: 
The State of Kansas, most wonderfully prolific and rich in farming 
products, has a large population of agriculturists not versed in ordinary 
business methods. This State was the hunting ground of promoters of 
fiaudulent enterprises; in fact their fkaud became so barefaced that it was 
stated that they would seli building lots in the blue sky in simple. 
Metonymically they became known as blue sky merchants, and legislation 
intended to prevent their fiauds was called Blue Sky Law. supra note 199 
at 37. 
In a study of the primary materials in this comection, Macey and Miller discovered that 
the earliest use of "blue sky" was fiom 1910. They quoted a press release issued by then 
Kansas Banking Commissioner, J.N. Dolley, (who is caiied the father of Blue Sky Law) 
as complaining that '6enormous amount of money the Kansas people are being swindled 
out of by these fakers an3 'blue-sky' merchants.' ": Letter fiom J.N. Dolley @ec. 16, 
stop "speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of 'blue s e ; '  " or 
"to stop the sale of stock in fly-by-night concems, v is ionq oil wells, distant gold mines, 
and other like fraudulent exploitations." In Kansas the law required both securities and 
securities salespersons to be registered with the State Bank Cornmissioner who was the 
controlling and supervisory authority with regard to securities. On application for such 
19 IO), reprinted in Brief for Appellees at 33, Merrick v. N. W- Halsey & Co., 242 US. 
568 (19 17) (No. 413) in J.R- Macey and G.P. Miller, "Origin of the Blue Sky Law", 
(1991) 70 Tex.L.Rev. 347 at 360 n. 59, The authors vetted some other materials, but 
failed to find the exact time and place of the origin of the term. At last they reached the 
conclusion, though "highly speculative", that 
the phrase could not have been newly minted in 1910 without some 
explanation appearing in the historical record. Since the term evidently 
came out of Kansas, it seems most likely that it had long been in use there 
to describe some other type of fraudulent conduct outside the securities 
area, rnost likely fraudulent land promotions during pioneer days, and was 
sirnply borrowed for the context of securities fraud laws. (at 360) 
212 Kansas is said to be the mother place of the blue sky legislation because in USA it 
was first to enact the statute of c'comprehensive'7 type. Otherwise, Connecticut would 
have deserved that credit since it had a blue sky act in 1903, but that was a brief one- : see 
L. Loss and E. M. Cowett, Blue Sky Law, (Boston: Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1958) 
at 5 and 7. The Kansas statute came into force after the Populist Party had won election in 
1910. In that election J.N. Dolley, a retired grocerer and a bank director, gave support to 
and worked hard for the said Party. In recognition to his contribution Dolley was 
appointed Bank Cornrnissioner by the newly elected government. With the knowledge 
that many "unsophisticated" investors had lost much money in dealings in fiaudulent 
securities he initially established a department in his office to cary out investigation into 
publicly offered securities. People intending to invest in a particular security were advised 
to inquire his office of its soundness. In this process people could be warned beforehand 
of fraudulent security issuer and thereby could Save their hard eamed money. To gain 
better result Dolley felt that his department should have the power to register securities 
and securities salesmen and that power should be backed by a statute. Then followed the 
Kansas act effective from 15 March 19 11, which was known as "An Act to provide for 
the Regdation and Supervision of Investment Companies and providing penalties for the 
violation thereof '. T. Mulvey, Canadian Company Law, (Montreal: John Love11 & Son 
Ltd., 1913) at 733. 
permission the Cornmissioner made a detailed examination of the state of affairs of the 
issuer and its security proposed to be offered. If he or she was satisfied mainly that the 
issuer, with fraudulent intent, was not soivent and the proposed secunty was not sound, 
he or she could refuse the p e ~ ? ' 4  and save the people from losing money in fraudulent 
or "blue sky" con~ems."~ A company, if registered, was obliged to subrnit semi-annual 
reports and to maintain various records with the Commissioner who could cancel the 
registration for "sufficient" cause.'16 Thus the Cornmissioner "fathered the paternalistic 
approach to state security regulation"217. 
Later on, the concept of "blue sky law" became popular and entered other 
jurisdictions of US and Canada. As of today, it has been borrowed almost in ail States of 
Arnerica and al1 provinces of Canada. Manitoba was fnst to introduce it through the 
"3 37 S.Ct. 217 (1916) at 221-222. 
214 '6 But, if said bank commissioner finds that such articles of incorporation or 
association, charter, constitution and by-laws, plan of business or proposed contract, 
contain any provision that is unfair, unjust, inequitable or oppressive to any class of 
contributors, or if he decides from his examination of its affairs that said investment 
company is not solvent and does not intend to do a fair and honest business, and in his 
judgment does no? promise a fair return on the stocks, bonds or other securities by it 
offered for sale, then he shall not ie  such investment company in writing of his findings, 
and it shdl  be udawful for such company to do any further business in this state.. . .": 
Kan. L. 1911, c. 133, s.5, quoted in Loss and Cowett, supra note 212 at 8 n. 24.(emphasis 
added) 
J.N. Dolley revealed that '4 estimate that it (Kansas Blue Sky Law) has saved the 
people of this state at least six million dollars since its enactrnent". : The report of the 
State Banking Commissioner, published Sept. 1, 19 12, quoted in supra note 172 at 38. 
But "(t)here were no statistics or other evidence in the office of the Bank Commissioner 
in May, 1913, upon which such a statement could be founded". Mulvey, supra note 199 
at 39. 
"6 Supm note 180 at 12. 
"7  LOSS and Cowett, supra note 2 12 at 9. 
passage of the Sale of Shares Act of 1 9 1 2 ~ ' ~  which was "an exhibition of paternalism"'*g 
for other provinces of Canada That "exhibition" impacted on the subsequent legislation 
of other provinces. Ontario incorporated blue sky provisions in the Securiy Frauds 
Prevention Act of 192g~'. It typically contained provisions concerning deterrence of 
h u d  in security trading, and Licensing of traders. It did not cover the issuing aspect of 
new securiw, which stiii rernained in the Company law area"' 
However, a landmark development in securities legislation took place in 
1945. When in 1940s "(f)raudulent stock promotion was getting out of hand and the 
govemment was faced . . .with c r i t i c i ~ m " ~  within and without, Ontario passed the 
Securities Act of 1945~" which was, in fact, the first modem security statute for 
s ana da-^^ It followed the Urquhart lZepor? prepared in 1944. The striking feature of 
'18 S.M. 1912, C. 75. 
219 Muivey, supra note 212 at 734- 
S.O. 1928, c. 24. 
"' Goulet, supra note 16 at 88. 
732 
Williamson, supra note 180 at 30. 
S.O. 1945, c. 22. 
224 Supra note 222. 
225 Report of the Royal Ontario Mining Commission, 1944 (Urquhart Report) In early 
1940s the Ontario govemment paid special attention to rnining industry given its 
prominent role in the economy and formed this commission headed by N.C. Urquhart, a 
director of Noranda Mines, to study problems it was facing . It found out, inter alia , that 
lack of governrnent encouragement and failure of the prevailing securities act to prevent 
frauds were the main causes of decline of the mining industry in Ontario. Its main 
recommendation was to repeal the existing securities legisiation and enact a new act with 
provisions relating to, among others, full, tme and plain disclosure of information to the 
investing public and curbing down the powers of the Securities Commission. The Ontario 
Legislature, however, accepted its disclosure motif only, and rejected the proposa1 about 
circumscribing the OSC. M. G. Condon, Making Disclosure: Zdeas and Znterests in 
Ontario Securities Regulation, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998) at 17-24. 
the act is that it adopted full, tme and plain disclosure provision"6 on the one hand, and 
entrusted the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) with a discretion to enforce that 
provision, on the other."' The discretion provision, in addition to disclosure, allowed the 
OSA. 194.5. c.22, S. 49(1) lays down the disclosure provision as follows- 
No broker or salesman shall trade in any security either on his own 
account or on behalf of a person or company where such trade would be in 
the course of a primary distribution to the public of the security until, 
(a) a clear and concise statement in the form prescnbed by the 
regulations dated and signed by every person who is, at the 
time of the filing, a director or promoter of the person or 
company issuing the security or an underwriter or optionee of 
the security, containing ajùll, tme and plain disclosure of al1 
material facts including details of al1 options and any other 
information that rnay be prescnbed by the regulations, has been 
filed with the Commission and a written receipt therefor 
received from the registrar; (emphasis added). . . . . . . .. .. 
(b) 
227 Zbid., S. 52 provides for the discretionary power of the OSC as follows: 
The Commission rnay in its discretion accept for fduig any statement or 
correcting statement, balance sheet, profit and loss statement or report 
submitted for filing under section 49 and direct the registrar to issue a 
receipt therefor unless it appears to the Commission that,- 
(a) the statement or any balance sheet, profit and loss statement or 
report which is required to accompany the statement, 
(i) fails to comply in any substantial respect with any of the 
requirements of section 49; 
(ii) contains any statement, promise or forecast which is 
misleading, fdse or deceptive; or 
(iii) has the effect of concealing material facts; 
(b) an unconscionable consideration has been paid or given or is 
intended to be paid or given, 
OSC "to enter the realm of substantive regulation of issues of securities""*.~hus for the 
first tirne, through this enactment, a compromise between the disclosure and blue sky 
theories was worked out by the Ontario Legislature. This rendered the act "more than a 
(i) for promotional purposes; or 
(ii) for the acquisition of property; or 
(c) the proceeds from the sale of the securities which are to be paid 
into the treasury of the company, together with other resources 
of the company, are insuEcient to accomplish the objects 
indicated in the statement; or 
(d) such escrow or pooling agreement as the Commission deems 
necessary or advisable with respect to securities issued for a 
consideration other than cash has not been entered into. 
This discretion provision has been retained in the subsequent arnendments of the act with 
some additional situations of exceptions. A literal interpretation of the section may Iead to 
the conciusion that if the exceptional situations existed, the OSC would not have any 
discretion, rather it must refuse to accept the prospectus: see Baillie, "The Protection of 
the Investor in Ontario", (1965) 8 Cm. h b ,  Adm. 172 at 220. This interpretation has 
some inherent problems with regard to the exercise of the discretion by the OSC director. 
Baillie, whiie interpreting the discretion provision contained in s 44 of the OSA, R.S.O. 
1950, c.35 1 said, " since many of the circurnstances are matters of opinion rather than 
determinable fact, it rnakes jurisdiction dependent upon his own state of mind, although 
he is the person exercising the jurisdiction; aud it places upon him the responsibility for 
deciding new criteria, other than the circumstances spelled out in the section, upon the 
ba i s  of which to exercise his discretion." Baillie, (1965) 8 Can. Pub. Adm. 172 at 220. 
Then he refers to the OSC's perception that "it has a discretion only as to the existence of 
the circumstances" specified in the section. (at 220). However, the purpose of such 
discretion is to "insure from the outset that the pubIic offering is being made on a fair and 
equitable basis". : O.E. Lennox, "Securities Legislation and Administration", in Law 
Society of Upper Canada, Special Lectures- Company Law, (Toronto: Richard De Boo 
Limited, 1 950) 8 1 t 85. 
228 Baillie, ibid., at 175. 
full disclosure s t a t ~ t e " ~ ~ .  Recently an author has reflected on this development as 
foliows: 
Disclosure of corporate information to shareholders had been a feature of 
Company legislation pnor to 1945. The significance of the Securities Act 
of that year lay in the fact that power to enforce the provision of 
information to prospective investors in the course of a prirnary distribution 
of securities was granted to an administrative agency. The 1945 act was 
the first piece of secwities legislation in Canada to adopt as a guiding 
principle the requirement that those wishing to make an initiai distribution 
of securities to the public provide 'fiill, true and plain disclosure' of ali 
material facts relating to the issue. The OSC then had to embark on the 
task of forging its authority and identity in this new realm of 
administrative activity, involving control over issuers of securities as well 
as market inter me dia rie^.^^^ 
The aforementioned new theoreticai standing of Ontario, which may be 
coined as the "Amphibianism", has been carried forward to underpin the subsequent 
legislative changes till today. After 1945, the most remarkable reform to the OSA 
occurred in 1966 at the backdrop of securities ~ c a n d a l s ~ ~  of 1960s as they were worthy of 
"commanding substantial public attention"? Before the amendment, several 
Commissions were formed to study different problems having bearing, direct or indirect, 
229 Ibid. at 232. 
Condon, supra note 225,at 4 1. 
231 Two events taking place in early skties may be referred to. The first concerned the 
insider trading of Canadian Oil Company's shares before its takeover by Shell Oil in 1962 
in absence of any law governing insider trading. Second, there was a decline in the price 
of shares of WindfaIl Oils and Mines Ltd. in July, 1964. The price fell from $5.60 to 80 
cents in one day whereas it rose from 65 cents o d y  at the beginning of that month "amid 
rumours of an important mineral find in the area near Timmins, Ontario,. . . which proved 
fdse." Both the events "underlined the principle that a free and efficient marketplace 
could operate only in an atmosphere of full public disclosure".Toronto Stock Exchange 
(TSE), Toward an Ideal Market (Toronto: TSE, 1983) at 15- 16. 
on the securities market. Those Commissions in their reports"3, despite the differences of 
their investigation areas, emphasized commonly on more disclosure provisions in the 
OSA, though they linked it (disclosure) to different regulatory ~bjectives?~ Thus 
disclosure was suggested as "a testament to its versatility as a regulatory strate&'? 
While underlining the importance of disclosure as a means of attaining the various 
regulatory objectives, al1 but the Kimber Report refused to concede a role to the OSC 
anphing more than a facilitative one? The Kimber Report advocated for broader 
discretionary powers of the OSC. For example, it suggested that the OSC be granted 
powers to refuse acceptance of a prospectus for filing by a company if it (the company) 
232 Condon, supra note225 at 55. 
233 Report of the Royal Commission on Banking and Finance (Porter Report), (Ottawa: 
Queen's Printer, 1964), Report of the Attorney General's Cornmittee on Securities 
Legislation in Ontario (Kimber Report), (Toronto: Queen' s Printer, l965), Report of the 
Royal Commission to Investigate Trading in the Shares of Windfall Oils and Mines 
Limited (Kelley Report), (Toronto: Queen's Pnnter, 1965), and Report of the Royal 
Commission Appointed tu Inquire into the Failure of Atlantic Acceptance Corp. (Hughes 
Commission), (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1969). Porter Commission's main concern was 
to review the fünctioning of the financial system of Canada. Securities market was a 
comgonent of the broad subject of inquiry. In its study the Commission focused on the 
developrnent of the secondary securities markets with emphasis on the public confidence 
so that stock ownership increase. Kimber Cornmittee was entnisted with a study to review 
the "the provision and working of securities legislation in Ontario" in general and to look 
into the problems of takeover bids, insider trading, degree of disclosure, etc. in particular. 
The Kelley Commission was constituted to find out what caused the fa11 of share price of 
the Windfall Oils and Mines Ltd. in 1964, and whether there was any breach of the iaw. 
The Hughes Commission embarked on an inquiry into the activities and bankruptcy of the 
Atlantic Acceptance corporation. 
234 The Porter Report connected it with increased ownership of shares and investor 
protection, Kimber with public confidence and market efficiency, Kelley with public 
protection and Hughes with public confidence and stability. Condon, supra note 225 at 
62-63. 
Condon, supra note 225 at 63. 
f d s  (a) to provide insider trading reports,=' (b) to cornply with the requirements of 
annual and interirn reportingx8 and (c) to comply with proxy provisions.'39 
The rationale of the Kimber Report's proposal for broader powers of the 
OSC may be sought in its argument for its (OSC's) independent status as an 
administrative agency instead, under the erstwhile arrangement, of its subordination as a 
branch of the Department of the Attorney ~eneral.'~' It argued that such relationship 
might be justified during the early years of the securities legislation when its (securities 
legislation) main purpose was the prevention of f r a ~ d s . ~ ~ '  It observed that "(t)he 
administration of securities legislation should not be directed pnmarily to criminal and 
quasi-criminal law enforcement but rather to the enhancement of the position of the 
-- - -  - - - - - .- -- 
a' Ibid. at 63. 
237 Kimber Report, supra note 233 para. 2.3 1 (e). 
"' Ibid. ara. 4.07(0. 
~ 4 '  Ibid. para. 6.27(0. 
The OSC, established in 1937, was a component of several government bodies like 
the Legislature and the Department of the Attorney General- It was converted into a 
branch of the latter alone by securities act amendments of 1962-63. Such subordinate 
status of the OSC accompanied different hazards in its smooth functioning. For instance, 
it could not appoint experienced people fiom the security industry because the d e s  of the 
parent department conceming recruitment and salary did not pennit so. Secondly, people 
had to face hassles in discharging their offîcial responsibilities. Investigation procedure is 
worth mentioning. When a concemed OSC personnel wanted to rnake investigation, h e  or 
she had to have an order fiom the Attorney General in that respect. On completion of the 
investigation the decision of fiamuig charges depended on the Director of Public 
Prosecutions. The OSC's recommendations in this regard were not heeded to always. : 
See Baillie, supra note 227, at 21 1-12 and n. 152. However, in 1966 the OSC was set up 
as an independent government agency following the recommendation of the Kimber 
Report. It is now a corporation without share capital. It, as an agent of Her Majesty the 
Queen in right of Ontario, is entitled to exercise its powers. It is an administrative 
tribunal. It has been given more autonomy with self-finance in June 1997. : See OSA, ss. 
3(1), 3(12), 141(1), and OSC 1997-Annual Report, supra note 53 at 2. 
securities industï-y in the economic life of the province"'4'. Simply stated, the Kimber 
Repon envisaged that the OSC have a broader role pnmarily meant for the improvernent 
of the securities industry. To that end it seemed to have suggested for the said 
discretionary powers as the administrative mechanism of the OSC. Condon maintains this 
view in interpreting the Kimber Report: 
Since these discretionary powers could operate as controis over the 
activities of corporations or industry members, it may be assumed that 
Kimber, in rejecting the use of 'criminal and quasi-criminal law 
enforcement,' saw discretionary sanctioning powers as more effective 
tools to achieve 'the enhancement of the position of the securities industry 
in the economic life of the province.'43 
Ultimately, in spite of the antipathy of the other reports for discretionary 
powers side by side with disclosure, the KNnber Report's recommendations blending the 
two (disclosure and discretion) were accepted by the legislature and the Securities Act of 
1 9 6 P  was passed?45. Thus "Amphibianism", introduced in 1945, and reinforced and 
"' Kimber Report, supra note 233 para. 8.03. 
242 Ibid. .(emphasis added). 
243 Condon, supra note 225 at 74-75. (emphasis added). 
244 OSA, S.O. 1966, c. 142. 
245 The OSA of 1966 has thus been cornmented to be "the faithful conversion of the 
(Kimber) report's recommendations" H.S . Bray, "Recent Developments in Securities 
Administration in Ontario: The Securities Act, 1966" in J.S. Ziegel, ed., Studies in 
Canadian Company Law, vol. I (Toronto: Buttenvorths, 1967) 4 15, at 418. Following the 
1966 Ontario Securities Act amendments have been effected to the securities legislation 
in other provinces. Hence, the Kimber Repor? is said to form the foundation of the 
modem securities regulation in Canada, "even though it did not provide any greater 
degree of permanence or of uniformity than the earlier instance of Ontario's leadership in 
1930". : P. Anisman, "The Regulation of Securities Market", in R. Cumming, ed., 
Hannonizution of Business Law in Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986) 
at 78 (footnotes omitted). 
confirmed in 19643, was retained as the theoreticai base of modem securities Iaw of 
Ontario and also of other provinces of As to why the legislature of Ontario has 
accepted this theoretical position Johnston wrïtes- 
Presumably the legislative draftsman sought what he conceived to be the 
best  of both worlds: the director should not be made to appear as an 
irmplied guarantor of the success of a promotion but the statute should 
emsure that he retains the power to nip in the bud a venture which he had 
reason to believe would be wasteful and not financially viable.'47 
Thus the legislatinre has intended to give the investing public the benefits of the both 
theories. It enactezd the OSA primarily as a disclosure statute requiring the OSC to 
emphasize disclosure so that the investors can make their own investment de ci si on^.'^^ 
The OSC is not d lowed generally to decide, on behalf of the investors, the ment of an 
offering and thereby to provide fdl paternalistic protection to them.249 It may interfere 
only in extreme cases affecting public interest?' If the OSC were granted the full blue 
sky jurisdiction, ir.t wodd encounter at l e s t  two formidable problems. First, the OSC 
would have to appoint experts of various fields concerned with security. 'The result 
would be an econiomy heaviiy subject to public regulation, to a much greater extent than 
Canadians have k e n  accu~tomed."~' Second, since the public would rely on its 
-- - 
'46 For the brief history of adopting "Amphibianism" in other provinces of Canada, see 
Goulet, supra noce 16, at 83-89. 
247 D.L. Johnstom. Canadian Securities Reguhtion, Toronto: Butterworths, 1977), at 
159. 
248 See the text a~companying infra note 5 1 1. 
249 See the text aaccompanying infra note 5 11. 
2x1 See the text aaccompanying infra note 5 10. 
25 1 Supra note 247, at 160. 
judgrnent, it could claim compensation from the OSC in the event of such assessment 
proving wrong with resultant loss to the public.'5' 
However, under the new theoretical arrangement the investing public is 
not totally deprived of the advantage of ment determination. For this purpose it may rely 
on the underwrïtep3 of an issue who passes on the soundness of the issue before entering 
into an (underwriting) agreementz4 with the issuer. An undemriter does not take the 
prospectus discIosures as me. He rather is supposed to check and c o n f m  the tnith in 
them. Based on extensive inquiry he then certifies the cornpleteness and accuracy of the 
information disclosed in the prospectus.35 A good underwriter will, after such inquiry, 
underwrite an issue of a company "with a solid record of earnings, good management, 
9 7 2 5 6  and better than average growth prospects . He does so because bis success in the 
security world depends on "a reputation for making good investment 
252 Supra note 247, at 19. 
253 An underwriter is defined as "a person or company who, as principal, agrees to 
purchase securities with a view to distribution; or who, as agent, offers for sale or sells 
securities in connection with a distribution; or who has a direct or indirect participation in 
the distribution. Accordingly, an undenvriter may be a principal or an agent." : supra note 
16, at 586. 
254 "An "underwriting agreement " is an agreement pursuant to which an underwriter as 
principal agrees to purchase securities with a view to distribution, or as agent agrees to 
offer for sale and to seU securities in connection with a distribution." : supra note 16, at 
586. An agreement by the underwriter of a f d y  underwritten issue is know 
"underwriting agreement", whereas a best efforts underwriter's agreement as "agency 
agreement". : supra note 16, at 2 1% 
"5 See the text accompanying infra note 463. 
E. L. Winter, A Complete Guide to making o Public Stock Offering (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962, at 28, 
reco~nrnendations".~~ Because of this role the underwriter is called "the gatekeeper of 
public interest,'.">' But the fact of the underwriter's role does not nullify the need of blue 
skying by the OSC. There rnay be circumstances requiring administrative interference. 
For example, the OSC rnay require officers' and directors' or promoters' shares to be held 
in escrow and rnay impose an embargo on the transfer of shares without its permission so 
that they cm equaily share the nsk in the market with the shareholder~?~ Administrative 
interference rnay also be necessary to impose limits on the undenvriting commission, if it 
is not futed by In addition, such interference rnay be necessary where a 
unreasonable advantage is given to the underwrïter by the issuer, e.g., the issuer rnay 
agree to sel1 securities to the underwriter, in the event of the issue being undersubscnbed, 
at a price less than the public offenng pnce.'61 Probably in contemplation of such 
situations the legislature felt the need to equip the OSC with discretionary powers in 
respect of prospectus registration with a view to enswing that "the public offering is 
being made on a fair and equitable b a ~ i s " ' ~ ~  As to how the OSC is equipped to 
accomplish the given task Bray writes, 
(t)he Iegislation provides the body, the regdations the clothing, while life 
and purpose are given to the whole by the guide lines within which the 
Commission (OSC) exercises its discretionary powers. These guide lines 
Ibid., at 28-29. 
'58 Supra note 16 at 238. 
259 See the text accompanying infra note 3 1 1 and 3 12- 
W . M .  Prifti, Securities: Public and Private Offerings, ( S  t- Paul, Minn.: West 
Publishing Co., 1974), at 42. 
See ibid. at 36 and 40. 
262 Lennox, supra note 227. 
are to be found in its published decisions and policy declarations. . . .since 
1 949 -263 
2-2.3.2 Bangladesh 
Bangladesh is a component of erstwhile British India. During their 200- 
year reign the British introduced their laws and legd system in this c ~ l o n ~ . ' ~  When they 
wound up their Rule in 1947, two countries, India and Pakistan, came into being under 
the Indian Independence Act of 1947'~' with the same laws and legal system. East 
Pakistan, the eastem wing of Pakistan, achieved independence as the People's Republic 
of Bangladesh in 197 1. After independence, it adopted aU laws that were in force on the 
day of declaratïon of independence, 25 March 197 1, by the Lows Con~irtuance 
Enforcement Order, 1971. Thus Bangladesh succeeded the laws and kgal system of 
English or common law ongin which were adopted in the Indian sub-continent.'66 
After independence, in the area of corporate and securities laws 
Bangladesh adopted The Cornpunies Act. 1913267, The Capital Issues (Continuance of 
Control) Act. 1 94fm and Securities and Exchange Ordinunce, 1 96P9. Of them The 
Cuvanies Act. 1913 was the almost verbatim reproduction of the (English) Cornpunies 
263 Bray, supra note 245, at 447. 
For the details of the Indian legai system, see V.D. Kulshreshth, Landmarks in Indian 
Legal and Constitutional History, (Lucknow: Eastern Book Company, 1981); M.P. Jaïn, 
Outlines of Indian Legal History, (E4ombay: N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd., 1972). 
265 10 & 1 1  Geo. VIc. 30. 
266 See, for a brkf account of the Bangladesh laws and legal system, A.B.M. Mafizul 
Islam Patwari, Legal System of Bangladesh, @haka: Hurnanist and Ethical Association of 
Bangladesh, 199 1). 
267 Act NO. WC of 1913. 
268 Act NO. XXM. of 1947. 
(Consolidation) Act of 1908.270 Since the latter, as described above, was based on 
disclosure theory, the former had the same basis. The Capital Issues Act, 1947 was passed 
by the British authority during the second World War "to channelize investment into war 
related industries"271. The Compnies  Act 1913 contained provisions conceming the 
contents of a prospectus while The Capital Issues Act pïovided the procedure of its 
approval by the Controller of Capital Issues (CCI). With regard to approval, however, 
there occurred a shift from the original position of English law. If an issuer filed a 
prospectus with required contents, the CCI, as a policy, reviewed the merit of the issue."' 
This approval procedure continued even after the repeal of The Capital Issues Act in 
1993, when the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)"' was established in place 
269 Supra note 157. 
270 In re Mina Ahmed, 1924 M. W N .  582 cited in Patwari, supra note 266, at 77. 
"' M.F. Ahmed, Stock Market Behavior in Bangladesh, @haka: Bureau of Business 
Research, University of Dhaka, 1992), at 12. 
"' See ibid, at 15. 
273 Before 1993 the securities market in Bangladesh was regulated jointly by the 
Controller of Capital Issues, the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies, the Bangladesh 
Bank and the Chief Controller of Insurance. The development of the capital market was 
faltering under that system. For instance, as of 3 1 December 1989 the market 
capitalization of secunties in proportion to the Gross National Production (GNP) stood 
only 2.5%, whereas it was 9% in India The administration was in a very lax state. The 
investors got neither the information about the present fmancial position nor of the future 
prospects of the cornpanies. The companies did not even file their annual financial 
statements to the stock exchanges. Nor did they allot shares timely in the event of initial 
offerings. AU these and others sapped down the investors confidence in the secunties 
market. Given these circumstances it was felt necessary to establish a single body to 
regulate the security industry in Bangladesh. This gave the way fo the Secwities and 
Exchange Commission Act, 1993 under which the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), the present regulatory body, was established. SEC, a corporation without share 
capital, is the administrative tribunal with respect to the security industry in Bangladesh. : 
see supra note 27 1, at 22-24. 
of the CC1 through passage of the Securities and fichange Commission Act, 1993.27" In 
the sarne year an amendment was brought to the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 
1969 incorporating the provision of prospectus approval procedure as contained in The 
Capital Issues Act, 1947.275 
After the establishment of the SEC in 1993 it was expected that it would 
be able to effectively regulate the share market. But that expectation remains unfulfded 
mainly because of the fact that it is composed mostiy of retired civil servants without 
knowledge of or experience in replation of securities market? Hence, from the very 
beginning it was the subject of public criticism, e.g. it takes an unreasonably long tirne to 
review a prospectusm, its assessrnent of an issuer's financial projections very often tums 
out to be wrongn8, and its oficers registering securities are c o r r ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ .  The cnticism 
culminates with the occurrence of the 1996 share market s ~ a m . ' ~ ~  With this backdrop the 
Govemment of Bangladesh directed its attention to improving the share market and, to 
that end, adopted the Capital Market Development Program (CDMP) supported by the 
"4 Act No 15 of 1993. 
The amendment was made by the Securities and Exchange (Amendmen?) Act, 1993 
(Act No. 16 of 1993). By this amendment sections 3-8 of The Capital Issues Act, 1947 
were inserted, in effect, as  sections 2A-2F into the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 
1969. 
"6 See the Muktokantho (a Bengali national daily), (17 July 1998) at 9. 
277 Supra note 38. 
Supra note 39. 
279 Supra note 40. Also see supra notes 41-43 and the accornpanying texts. 
280 Supra note 11. 
loan of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) .~~ '  The SEC paid heed, with regard to 
primary market reform, to the following finding of the ADB Report: 
Market participants claim that there is considerable delay in securing 
approval for IPOs fiom SEC. This is caused principdy by SEC still 
applying a system based on merit regulation, insisting on fixing the pice 
of new securities issues. A Xarge number of applications have k e n  stuck 
up in processing, at one point reaching as many as 60 proposed 1~0s.'~' 
As such, the SEC has given up its policy of merit regulation and has adopted instead the 
full disclosure philosophy as the basis of securities regulation in ~ a n ~ l a d e s h . ~ ~ ~  
2.2.4 CONCLUSION 
Bangladesh followed the blue sky theory of securities regulation until 
1998. Since then it has radically changed its theoretical position and has been following 
the disclosure theory. On the other hand, Ontario law is based on a mixture of the 
disclosure theory and the blue sky theory. Both the jurisdictions have taken their 
respective stands to boost public confidence in the markets. The theoretical position of 
Bangladesh advocates that investment decisions be made by the investors thernselves in 
light of the information disclosed and that the securities commission do not interfere 
under any situations. The latter, however, requires that while the investors decide their 
own fate considenng the disclosures the securities commission be vigilant at the same 
time, lest public interests be hampered. Thus the fundamental distinction between the 
' Supra note 1 O. 
282 Supra note 10, at 13-14. 
theoretical footings of Ontario and Bangladesh centers around the role of the respective 
securities commissions apropos of prospectus registration. 
2.3 PROSPECTUS DISCLOS= AND THE ROLE OF THE OSC 
AND THE SEC- COMPARISON OF THE LAWS 
23.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this Sub-Section a discussion will be undertaken, from a comparative 
perspective, of the laws of Ontario and Bangladesh relating to prospectus disclosure and 
the role of the respective securities commissions. The basic d e s  of disclosure are 
considered fust, Second, prospectus contents and their enforcement provisions are 
compared. Finally, a comparative discussion of the role of the OSC and the SEC with 
regard to prospectus disclosure is made. 
2.3.2 PROSPECTUS DISCLOSURE 
23.2-1 Basic Rules of Disclosure 
Section 56 of the  OSA'^^ contains two basic principles of prospectus 
disclosure. First, a prospectus must provide "full, true and plain" disclosure of al1 
283 The texrs accompanying supra notes 44 and 45. 
284 OSA, R.S.0.c. S.5, asarn.S.0. 1994,~. 11, S. 367. 
"material facts" concerning the securities issued or proposed to be distrib~ted. '~~ A 
"material fact" means "a fact that significantly affects, or would reasonably be expected 
to have a significant effect on, the market price or value of such s e ~ u r i t i e s . " ~ ~ ~  The term is 
of undefined scope because whatever fact has actual simcant effect or is likely to have 
such effect on the price or value of securities must be subject to disclosure. Whether a 
particular fact bas such actual or probable effect depends on the circumstances of every 
particuiar case. Though such facts have been specified for disclosure e l~ewhere ,~~ '  they 
are not exhaustive- The responsibility lies on the issuer to ensure disclosure of al1 such 
facts, specified or not, accurately and in an understandable manner. Second, the 
prospectus must comply with the requirements of the  OSA'^^, and must contain or be 
accompanied by financial statements, reports or other documents that are required by the 
OSA or regulations.'89 This means that a prospectus must, in order to fulfill the 
requirement of full, true and plain disclosure, conform to the prescribed form and contain 
the facts, information and reports, etc. required by the securities  la^.'^^ 
Unlike the OSA, the securities regulation in Bangladesh does not lay down 
any general provision relating to prospectus disclosure requirements. While it requires an 
issuer to publish a prospectus to offer securities to the public, it does not clearly Say how 
285 Zbid., S. 56(1). 
286 OSA. R.S.0 C. S.5, S. l(1) "material fact". 
287 See Ontario Securiries Acr Regularion (OSAR), R.R.O. 1990, Regdation 10 15, Forms 
12-15. 
288 OSA, R.S.O. C. S.5, as am. S.O. 1994, c. I l ,  S. 367, S. 56(1). 
289 Zbid., S. 56(2). 
2* See Alboini, supra note 77, at 15- 1 1. 
much disclosure the issuer should make through the prospectus. With regard to the 
responsibility of the SEC in this connection the HR, however, provides that the SEC 
shall "ensure that full and fair disclosures are made in the prospectus.. . ."29' From this 
provision it may be gathered that an issuer is obligated to make full and fair disclosure 
and the SEC shall ensure it only. However, the meaning of "full and fair disclosure" is 
not defmed. The word 'W" meaning "complete"'g2 also occurs, as seen above, in the 
general (prospectus) requirement principle of Ontario Iaw. The word "fair" does not 
appear in the said Ontario principle which instead contains the words, "true and plain", in 
addition to "Ml"- Does the Bangladesh requirement of "full and fair" disclosure stand, in 
the sarne sense, for the Ontario's "full, true and plain" disclosure? Kinney's Law 
Dictionary uses the word "fair" to mean "Just; equitable; equal; proper"'93 and Black's 
Law Dictionary defines it as "Having the qualities of irnpartiality and honesty; free from 
prejudice, favoritism, and self-interest. Just; equitable; even-handed; equal as between the 
conflicting inter est^."^'^ In the present context, having regard to the policy reason of 
disclosure provision (investor protection)295, it may be argued that it would be appropriate 
29 1 PZR, r. 7.B(i). 
292 J. Kendrick Kinney, Law Dictionary and Glossnry. (Colorado: Fred B. Rothman & 
Co., 1987), S.V. "Full". 
293 Zbid. S.V. "fair". 
294 Supra note 172, s.v, "fair". 
295 This interpretation is based on the principle of hterpretation that "(a) statute should 
be construed to harmonize with the intention of the Legislature and the aim and object of 
the statute." Re Ontario Securities Commission and Brigadoon Scotch Distributions 
(Canada) Ltd., (1970) 3 O.R. 7 14, at 7 17 (per Hartt J.) quoting Maxwell as follows: 
to take "fair" to mean "justy' or "proper" or "impartial and honest", each of which is 
synonymous or close to synonymous with the word "true". But neither of the dictionaries 
uses "fair" to connote "plain7' or clearly understandable, a word that occurs in the generd 
principle of Ontario law. Thus it may be said that the phrase '%Il a d  fair" disclosure 
under Bangladesh law means full and true disclosure, but not plain disclosure. 
But full and true disclosure of what? Although there i s  no general 
provision in Bangladesh law as in Ontario law in this regard, the PZR provides at one 
place that 
In addition to the information specifically required by this d e ,  the 
prospectus shall contain all material infornation necessary to enable 
investors and their investment advisers to make an inIformed assessment of 
the business engaged in, or to be engaged in, by the Company, its assets 
and liabilities, its financial position, its profits and losses and its future 
prospects and the rights attaching to the secunties being offered.. . . 296 
The draftsman has specified a set of information297 necessary for the purpose of enabling 
the investing public to make investment decisions and has kept it open for the issuer to 
include al1 other information provided it is "material" for the sarne purpose. In other 
words, the drafisman has specified that information which, in his oplnion, is "material" 
The tnie meaning of any passage, it is said, is to be found not merely in the 
words of that passage, but in comparing it with other parts of law, 
ascertainhg also what were the circumstances with reference to which the 
words were used, and what was the object appearing from those 
circumstances which the legisiature had in view. : Maxwell on 
Znterpretation of Statutes, 11" ed. (1962), at 19. 
296 PZR. r. 7.A.(1). (emphasis added). 
and has made it obligatory for the issuer to include in the prospectus a l l  b'materiai" 
information which is in the knowledge of the issuer but was not visualized by the 
draftsman at the time of making the law. Thus it may be argued that al1 information, both 
specified and unspecified, must be "matenai" for the decision-making by the investors. 
In other words, in Bangladesh a prospectus must make full and tme disclosure of d l  
material information. 
The P I .  refers to the purpose of "material information", but does not 
defme the tenn. As stated above, the purpose of such information is to help the investors 
assess the issuer's business, assets and liabilities, financial position and so on, but what is 
the ultimate effect of such assessment? Afier assessment of the issuer's business, etc. in 
light of the information disclosed in a prospectus, if an investor thinks it to be profitable 
to make an investment in securities, the investor can be expected to purchase the 
securities offered at a fixed price. But if the assessment gives them a different idea (Le., 
the investment would not be profitable), an investor may not be prepared to invest at dl. 
Thus the "material information" has direct bearing on the price or value of securities 
offered by the issuer and, therefore, resembles the term "matenal factYa8 defined by the 
OSA. 
Like the OSA the CA enjoins every issuer to cornply with the form and 
contents of prospectus prescnbed by it. Under the merit review system the CA was the 
297 For discussion of the specific information required by the PIR, see Section 2.3.2.2, 
below. 
298 See the text accornpanying supra note 286. 
only the law providing for prospectus form and contents. But it does not provide for full 
disclosure. To bridge up this gap the PIR has been made, It is a piece of delegated 
legislation and, therefore, subordinate to the Conzpanies Act. 1994.2'' With respect to 
prospectus disclosure these two should be read together. 
In view of the foregoing discussion it may be concluded that with regard to 
the first generd rule the laws of Ontario and Bangladesh differ in that while Ontario law 
requires full, me and plain disclosure, Bangladesh law calls for, in effect, full and true 
disclosure only but not plain disclosure. Apropos of the second d e ,  namely cornpliance 
with the securities regulation, the laws of Ontario and Bangladesh are similar. 
2.3.2.2 Contents of Prospectus 
The OSA prescribes four different foms for different types of companies 
specifying, in particular, various non-financial matters to be contained in a prospectus. 
Those are forms 12, 13, 14 and 15, applicable to industrial, finance, natural resources and 
mutuai funds companies respectively. It also calis for frnancial staternents and reports to 
be added in the prospectus.3w In Bangladesh, as aforesaid, Parts 1 and II of Schedule III of 
the CA in combination with the PIR provide the form and contents of a prospectus, both 
non-financial and financial. The SEC may, however, ask for information in addition to 
p p p p p  - 
While the Cotnpanies Act, 1994 is enacted by the legislame the Public Issue Rules 
(PIR) is made by the SEC "(i)a exercise of the powers conferred (on it) by section 33 of 
the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 (Ordinance XVII of 1969), and in 
suppression of al1 guidelines and orders made in this behalf . . .". :The Preamble to the 
PZR. 
3" Supra note 288. 
that provided in a prospectus füed by an issuer for its approval. 301 The following wiil 
compare the contents of a prospectus in Bangladesh with those of an Ontario prospectus 
of an industrial Company, which is prepared according to Form I ~ ~ O ' ,  because Form 12 is 
the most comrnonly used format in ~ n t a r i o . ~ ' ~  The purpose of this section is to show 
whether both laws, though broadly requiring full disclosure, provide for the disclosure of 
similar categories of particdar information. 
23.2.2.1 Non-financial Matters 
The prospectuses in Ontario and Bangladesh contain some broad 
categories of information-items.3M In the following unnecessary details of the items 
similar in both laws will be avoided; rather emphasis will be placed on the differences 
between them. 
Category 1: Share, Price, Market And Underwriting 
With regard to this category both the laws, despite some minor differences, 
are similar principally as follows: 
(a) Under the Ontario law the fust page of a prospectus musc set out the selling price, 
underwriting discounts or commissions and proceeds to the issuer both per unit and in 
301 PIR. r. 7.A.(2). 
302 OSAR,, R.R.O. 1990, Regdation 1015, S. 40. 
303 See supra note 57, at 73. 
304 For the broad categorization of items occurring in Form 12, see supra note 57, at 75- 
76. 
total arnount? In Bangladesh the sarne information is asked to be disclosed in the 
cover page of a prospectus.306 The main purpose of this item is to help the potential 
investors assess the degree of risk involved in the issue offered. For example, 
investors can assess nsks involved in an issue from the underwriting commissions 
stated in a prospectus. It is a principle of detemiinhg underwriting commission that 
"the more difficult the issue is to seU, the larger wilf be the percentage of the issue 
,7307 proceeds paid to the underwrïter for his services - 
(b) Both laws ask for description of shares, debt obligations or any other securities being 
offered by the prospectus. For exarnple, Ontario law requires that the prospectus must 
provide an account or specification of the ciass of shares offered, together with the 
details about various rights attaching to them, viz. dividend rights, voting rights, 
liquidation or distribution rights, pre-emptive rights, conversion rights, redemption 
rights, provision as to variation of theses rights and liability to further calls by the 
i s s ~ e r . ' ~ ~  If any of these rights is subject to any restriction or qualification imposed by 
any rights of any other class of securities, information of such other securities must be 
himished in the prospectus.309 Bangladesh law calls for description of sirnilar rights to 
and limitations on shares being offered?1° 
305 OSAR. R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 1015, Form 12, Item 1-Distribution Spread. 
3M PIR, r. 7-B-(1). 
307 P. E. McQuillan, Going Public in Canada, (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of 
Chartered Accountants, 197 l), at 1 18.. 
'O8 OSAR, R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 1015., Form 12 Item 17(a). 
'O9  Ibid., Form 12 Item 17 Ins. 2 
''O PIR. r. 7.B.(18). 
(c) An Ontario prospectus is required to provide information about sale of the securities 
among the sponsors (e-g. directors and oficers of the issuer c ~ r n ~ a n ~ ) . ~ ~ '  In this 
respect, it also requires disclosure of particulars of escrowed shares. The particulars 
include classes of the shares held in escrow, their designation, number and 
percentage. The name of the depository, and the date of and the conditions of the 
release of the shares from escrow must be dis~losed?~' It may be noted that shares 
held in escrow cannot be transferred without the 0SC7s  permission. In Bangladesh a 
description of securities sold to the sponsors is r e ~ p i r e d ? ~  Such securities are subject 
to a lock-in period for three years fiom the date of publication of a prospectus or from 
the start of commercial operation, whichever is latere3l4 By virtue of this provision 
securities held by the issuer's promoters, directors and officers are kept in abeyance 
for three years. During that period such persons are prohibited from freely transferring 
their shares. They have to bring the fact of any transfer of such securities to the 
knowledge of the SEC within seven days of such transfer? This is to prevent any 
sudden unloading of a huge number of securities held by the sponsors who are in a 
better possession of market information (including issuer's inside information) 
compared to the general investors. This mechanism keeps the SEC infonned of any 
transactions made by the sponsors, which may help it detect if any insider trading has 
311 OSAR, R.R.R. 1990 Regulation 10 15, Form 12 Items 24 and 28. 
3'2 Ibid.. Item 25. 
313 PIR, r. 7.B,(14)@). 
314 PIR, r. 9. 
315 Order No. SEC/Section-7/98- 136. 
taken place. It may be noted that the lock-in provision like the screw provision of 
Ontario evidences that the SEC has some blue sky jurisdiction in this regard, albeit it 
relates mainiy to the control of the secondary securities market. 
(d) In Ontario Item 26 of Form 12 requires a disclosure of the names, addresses and 
holdings of the principal holders of each class of voting s e c ~ r i t i e s ~ ~ ~ .  A principal 
shareholder rneans a shareholder (a person or company) who owns of record anaor 
b e n e f i ~ i a l l ~ , ~ ~ ~  directly or indirectly, more than 10% of any class of voting securities. 
If any such shareholders are &diates '18 or a ~ s o c i a t e s ~ ~ ~  of the any other person or 
company, details about such relationship must be d i s c l ~ s e d . ~ ~ ~  In addition, the 
prospectus must disclose the percentage of each class of voting securities held, 
directly or indirectly, by the issuer's directors and senior officers, as a group, without 
specifics about them- The purpose of such disclosure is to inform the public how the 
principal shareholder(s) will control the voting of the issuer and thereby Save them 
'16 Section l(1) of the OSA. R.S.O. 1990, c.S.5 defines voting security as "any security 
other than a debt security of an issuer carrying a voting right either under al1 
circumstances or under some circumstances that have occurred and are continuing." 
317 Vcting shares held by a person or company as a trustee for the benefit of the children 
of a settler of the trust may be an example of beneficial ownership of shares. 
'18 E-g., a company which is a subsidiq  of some other company or both are controlled 
by same person or company.: see Goulet, supra note 16, at 563. 
319 E-g., relative, spouse of a person, or a partner of a person or company.: see OSA. S. 
W. 
330 The purpose of asking for such information is to unearth the identity of any person or 
company who controls the principal shareholder. Therefore, it has been observed by the 
OSC that "generaily a receipt should not be issued for a prospectus if the issuer is unable 
to identiQ the individual, if any, who controls a principal security holder of that issuer." : 
Interpretation Note 2- 1983 O.S. C.B. 4536 cited in T&or Holdings Co. Ltd, [October 
19881 11 OSCB 4059 at 4088. 
from manipulation, the primary purpose of securities laws? In Bangladesh similar 
kinds of information are asked where a person owns, beneficially or of record, 5% or 
more of the securities of the companyF There is no provision calling for the 
disclosure of the relationship where such a principal shareholder is an affiliate or 
associate of any other person or Company. 
(e) Item 2 of Form 12 requires setting out of the plan of distribution, that is, whether 
securities are being offered through underwriters or by the Company as a security 
issuer. If they are offered through underwriters, the prospectus must name them, 
describing briefly the nature of their obligations to take up and pay for the securities, 
speciQing the date by which they will do that.'= The prospectus rnust disclose 
whether the underwriters, as principals, are committed to take up and pay for al1 of the 
securities, or whether they, as agents under a "best efforts" arrangement, will take up 
and pay for only such securities as they may sel1 to the public.3" If the undenvriting, 
based on finn commitrnent or "best efforts" method, is subject to a "market out" 
clause, the prospectus must contain a staternent to that effect.'= A "Market out" 
clause is a statement to the effect that the underwrïter's obligation may be tenninated 
321 T h r  Holdings CO. Inc. &id. 
3" PZR? r.7.B .(l4). 
323 OSAR, R.R.O. 1990, Regdation 1015, Fom 12 Item 2(a). 
'*' Zbid. Ins. 1. "A "best efforts offering" is an offering of securities of an issuer by an 
underwriter, acting as agent, which agrees to use its best efforts to sel1 the securities, but 
which is not bound to purchase any securities for its own account and normally does not 
guarantee the successfûl placement of all of the offered securities".: Goulet, supra note 
16, at 565. 
at its own depending on the market condition or otherwise. From this item the 
investors can know of the type of underwriting and thereby determine the risk in their 
investments- When it is a "best efforts" issue, the investors may find "generally more 
n,k"326 in purchasing the securities, "since the underwriter has no contractual 
obligation which might help to steady, at least temporady, an after-market price".327 
SimilarIy, although a "market out'' clause in a prospectus has become pretty much 
standard in Canada, it may be a matter of concern for the investors in apprehension of 
the fate of their investrnents after the termination of the underwriter's obligations- 
In Bangladesh a Company making an 1 . 0  is required to appoint one or 
more undenilriters to underwrite the secwities on a fm cornmitment b a ~ i s . ~ ' ~  A 
prospectus must refer to the name(s) of the underwriter(s), foflowed by a guarantee by the 
directon of the underwriters financial ability to meet their 0bli~ations.3~~ It does not 
require any "market outy7 clause. AIthough from these provisions it seems to appear that 
Bangladesh law does not envisage "best efforts" underwriting, a close reading of clause 
5(a) of Schedule III Part I of CA, 1994 reveals that there is scope of "best efforts" 
underwriting as well. Clause 5(a) requires that where securities are offered to the public 
for subscription, the prospectus must state "the minimum amount which in the opinion of 
the directors or of the signatones of the memorandum must be raised by the issue of those 
325 OSAR, R.R.O. 1990. Regulation 1015, F o m  12 Item 2 Ins. 2, supplemented by 
National Policv No. 12. 
326 P. E. ~ c ~ ; i l l a n ,  supra note 307, at 119. 
327 Ibid. 
shares . . . ."330 A statement of minimum arnount requirement in a prospectus is made 
when an issue is underwritten on best efforts basis. Thus in explaining Item 5 (the "Use 
of Proceeds" derived by the issuer from the sale of the securities) one Canadian author 
writes, "If the offering is not f d y  underwritten, but is a best efforts offering, the 
minimum amount required to accomplish the purposes in the prospectus must be 
specified,. . ."33'. This means that when an issue is fblly underwritten, there is no question 
of c'minimum arnount". From this discussion it may be concluded that in Bangladesh law 
there is scope for making both f m  cornmitment and best efforts underwritings. 
Category II: Surnrnary Of Prospectus 
Item 4 of Ontario Form 12 underlines the need of a summary of 
information contained in the body of the prospectus. It is usudly given immediateIy after 
the cover page. The summary must highlight the merits and risks of the in~estment.~~' 
This includes risk factors and the governing state of &airs of the issuer of the 
secuntiesY3 The sumrnary page is usually followed by a table of contents of the 
prospectus which can lead the readers to the text. Bangladesh law, on the other hand, does 
not provide for inclusion of any summary in the prospectus. In practice, however, 
- - 
329 CA.  SC^. mpt .  ICI. 11. 
330 Ibid., cl. 5(a) (emphasis added). 
331 Supra note 16, at 145. (emphasis added) 
332 OSAR, R.R.O. 1990, Regdation 10 15, Form 12 Item 4 Ins. 1. 
333 Ibid. 
"Summarized Information" is provided, though in very short compared to Ontario. Such 
information includes particulars of the Company, risk factors and use of proceeds.334 
Category III: Use Of Proceeds 
Item 5 of Form 12 requires a prospectus to bear a statement of the 
estirnated net proceeds after deducting the undewriting costs, which the issuer will gain 
fkom the sale of securities to be offered. As well, be it a f d y  underwritten or a best 
efforts offering, it is required to reasonably spec* the principal purposes for which the 
said proceeds are intended to be used and the roughly estimated arnount for each purpose 
In case the actual proceeds are insufficient to serve those purposes, a statement is 
necessary defining how the funds will be used dong with the order of pnority of their 
use?" If any other funds, in a material arnount, are to be applied concurrently with the 
sale proceeds, the arnount and sources of those other funds rnust be made 
Although Bangladesh law asks for an account of how the Company will use the net sale 
proceeds to meet the purposes of an offering, be it a f d y  underwritten offering3" or 
334 See prospectus, Samata Leather Complex Limited, The Daily Star (a national daily), 
(29 June 1998) 17. 
335 OSAR, R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 1015, Forrn 2 Item 5 Ins. 2. 
336 Ibid.. hs. 3. 
337 PIR. r. 7.B. (4)(a). For instance, the prospectus of Samata Leather Complex Limited 
discloses the utilization of the P O  proceeds, in the Summarized Information, as follows: 
Particulars Tk. in .O00 
Plant, machineries and equipments 20,000 
Working Capital 27,600 
Preliminary and IPO expenses 4,OOo 
--------- 
best efforts o f f e ~ n ~ ~ ~ * ,  it lacks any provisions requïring an explmation of how they will 
be expended to fulfill the purposes in order of priority in the event of a shortage of funds 
compared to the actual needs. 
Under Ontario law, where any material amount of the sale proceeds is 
designed to be used to meet indebtedness, the prospectus must clarifi the use of the debt 
money provided that money was borrowed within two years back fiom the date of the 
issueTg If a material part of the said proceeds is to be expended to acquire assets outside 
the ordinary course of business, it must give a brief description of the paaiculars of such 
assets, their purchase price and their vend or^?^^ If the securities partiaily constitute the 
consideration for acquisition of any of such assets, it must also provide, inter alfa, "brief 
particulars of the designation, nurnber or amount. voting rights (if ~ I I ~ ) " ~ ~ ' .  By contrast, 
Bangladesh law does not contain any provision calling for disclosure of the use of debts 
where the proceeds WU be expended to repay such debts. Also, it does not require the 
particulars of any assets, if purchased with the money raised by the sale of securities. 
However, its asks for the disclosure of the terms of contracts covenng the Company 
Total Utilization of Fund.. .. 5 1,600, supra note 334. One 
recent prospectus merely States, without details, that "The 
proceeds will be utilized for expanding our banking 
business over a penod of two years, : prospectus, Prime 
Bank Limited, (Dhaka: 29 August 1999). at 5. 
CA 1994, sch. III pt. 1. cl. 5(a). 
339 Ibid. 
340 Ibid. Ins. 4. 
341 Ibid. 
affairs, such as land purchase. 342 Where any propexty is purchased and any part of the 
consideration consists of securities, Bangladesh Iaw, like its Ontario counterpart, requires 
that particulars of the vendors, the amount so payable in kind, nature of title or interest in 
that property, etc. must be d i s c ~ o s e d ? ~ ~  
Item 5(b) requires a prospectus to embody a statement of "the particulars 
of any provisions or arrangements made for holding any part of the net proceeds of the 
issue in trust or subject to the fûlfillment of any conditions". In cornpliance with this 
requirement, if an o f f e ~ g  is a best efforts one, the prospectus must mention the required 
minimum arnount, and any subscriptions received must be held by a trust company or 
other acceptable depository until the minimum amount is received3". The purpose of 
such provision is to assure the investors that if the minimum subscription is not received 
within a particular time limit stipulated in the contract between the trust company and 
issuer, the investors money will be r e t ~ r n e d . ~ ~ '  Bangladesh law does not, however, 
provide for depositing of subscription b d s  in any depository until the minimum amount 
is received and, therefore, there is no system of retuming money to the subscribers when a 
particular issue is undersubscribed. 
- -  - 
342 PIR, r. 7.B.(4)(c). 
343 CA 1994,  SC^. m pt. 1, ci. 12(1). 
344 OSC Policies, S. 5.1. 
345 Ibid. 
Where the issuer is a related issueP6 or connected issue? of the 
underwriter, an Ontario prospectus must disclose what type of relationship or connection 
exists between the issuer and the underwriter and how much of the saIe proceeds of 
securities "will be applied, directly or indirectly, for benefit of the underwriter or any 
related issuer of the u n d e r w r i t e ~ ~ ~ ~ .  A cross-reference to Item 30 must also be made in 
this connection. It requires, inter alia, details about the arnount of indebtedness and 
security for it, "where the issuer has any indebtedness to the undexwriter or any related 
issuer of the underwriter and that indebtedness is the basis on which the issuer is a 
connected issuer of the ~ndenvriter"'~~. Though there is no similar specific provision in 
Bangladesh law, it contains a general provision calling for information about any loan 
taken by the issuer, either from a subsidiary or associate concern or from any other party 
346 The term "related issuer" has been defined to mean, "in respect of a person or 
Company, 
(a) any other person or company that influences the person or company, 
(b) any other person or company that is influenced by the person or company, 
(c) any other person or company in like relation to a person or company referred to in 
clause (a) or (b) or any such other person or company, or 
(d) any person or company designated by the (Ontario Securities) Commission as a 
related issuer of the person or company in accordance with subsection 220(1)".: 
OSAR, R.R.O., Regulation 1015, S. 219. 
347 Tonnected issuer" is defined to mean, "in respect of a registrant, an issuer that ha, 
or any related issuer of which has, any indebtedness to, or other relationship with, the 
registrant, a related issuer of the registrant, or a director, officer or partner of the 
registrant or a related issuer of the registrant, that, in connection with a distribution of 
securities of the issuer, is material to a prospective purchaser of the securities". : Ibid. 
348 Ibid. Form 12 Item 5(c). 
349 Ibid. Fonn 12 Item 30 Ins. 2. 
or parties, giving fidl details of al1 related parties to the transa~tion?~~-The words "any 
other party" may include the underwriter or any other person or institution having control 
over the underwriter. Thus this provision seems to have the same effect of the Ontario's 
related or connected issuer provision, but it Iacks the methods of meeting such 
indebtedness. 
In summary, Bangladesh Iaw requires the disclosure of the methods and 
purposes of the use of proceeds and thereby conforms to Ontario law. However, it lacks 
provisions that require the depositing of the subscription money in a trust Company for 
returning to the investors in the event of a %est efforts" issue being undersubscnbed. 
Category IV: Risk Factors 
To help investors clearly comprehend the nsks involved in and the 
speculative nature of the investment enterprise, the Ontario Securities Act Regulation 
requires disclosure of the factors that render the investrnent in securities a risk or 
~ ~ e c u l a t i o n . ~ ~ '  Such factors include relevant govemment regulations, environmental 
requirernents, the risk of product Iiabiiity, the necessity for and possible shoaage of 
fuaher funding and so on."' Such factors are mentioned in the Summary and then 
detailed under a separate caption."" Likewise, Bangladesh law requires disclosure of the 
nsk factors to the potentid investing public, which include, among others, poor financial 
PIR. r.l.B.(7)(7). 
' OSAR, R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 1015, Form 12 Item 10. 
352 Supra note 16, at 148. 
conditions, industry risks, market and technology-related risks and potentid or existing 
governent  regulations.'" However, in practice, such factors are ofien presented in a 
summary and incomprehensible manner. For instance, sarnple risk factors contained in a 
prospectus includes the following: 
ii) The company has full reliance on export in the international market. 
iii) Any new technology which drastically reduces the labour input rnay 
change the competitiveness of ~ a a ~ l a d e s h ? ~  
What can investors discern from this? If the company has full reliance on international 
market, how can it be an investment risk? The statements require some clarification so 
that investors, particularly lay investors, can understand the investment risks involved- 
For example, as higldighted, new technology reducing labor input may change the 
competitiveness of Bangladesh, but as a result of whose use of technology? How does it 
affect the issuer in particular? These questions are important to the investing public, but 
answers are not available here as the language and meaning are vague. 
Category V: Current Status And History 
Share And Loan Capital Stmcture 
Item 7 deals with share and loan capital structure of the issuer. It calls for 
detailed partïculars about the equity capital, secured loan, and unsecured long-term loan 
353 See prospectus, Husky Injection Molding Systems, 28 Oct  1998, at 34-35. 
354 PZR, r. 7.B.(3). 
3" Supra note 334. 
capital which extends beyond one year?56 A prospectus must contain, among other 
things, a description of the priority of indebtedness, the terms of their repayment and the 
security against the loans? In addition, it must state the minority interests in preference 
shares , if any, and common shares of the issuer and in its consolidated and 
unconsolidated s~bsidiaries?~~ Under Bangladesh law there is no requirernent to give an 
equity capital structure, though description of loans borrowed by the issuer is calIed 
for?' In practice, a section furnishing information about both equity and loan capital is 
included in prospectuses.360 
Description Of Business And Property 
In Ontario, according to Form 12 Item 9, it is necessary for a prospectus to 
describe the issuer's and its subsidiaries' past and future business, with the general 
development of the business for the last five years. It must include an account of the 
principal products or services, as the case may be. It must also contain a bnef description 
of the principal properties ( e.g., plants, buildings, sales headquarters, etc.) of the issuer 
and its subsidiaries defining the nature of title or encumbrance (e-g., mortgage), where 
'" OSAR, R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 1015, Form 12 Item 7(1) Ins. 1. 
357 Zbid., Ins. 1 and 4 together. 
'" Zbid., Item 7(3) and 7(4). 
359 PZR, r. 7.B .(7)@)(7). 
'O See for instance, the prospectus of Samata Leather Complex Limited, which contains 
a very brief description of share capital only under the caption of "Capital Structure".: 
Supra note 334, at 17. At two other places it mentions only the arnount of long term loan 
under the sub-head of "Means of Finance". It does not even refer to the kind of loan, i.e. 
whether secured or unsecured, the tenns of their repayment and particulars of security 
against hem, if any. Nothing is also said about the minority interest in the share capital. 
supra note 334 at 20. 
any of them is not held in fee or is held subject to any en~umbrance.'~' The purpose of the 
description of business is to inforrn the investors about what goods are produced or what 
services are rendered by the company. The statement about the issuer's property is 
intended to "reasonably inform investors as to the suitability, adequacy, productive 
capacity and extent of utilization of the facilities used in the en te rp r i~e"~~~.  Sirnilarly, a 
Bangladesh prospectus must give a general description of the development and operation 
of the issuer's business, which include its products or services, sources of raw materials, 
sources and requirement of power, gas and water, It also must describe the issuer's 
property with particulars of its location, nature of the issuer's title in it and encumbrances, 
if any, to which it is s u b j e ~ t ? ~ ~  
Material ~ontrac t s~~ '  
Item 33 of Ontario Form 12 calls for particulars of di  material contracts ( e.g., 
underwriting agreements) entered into by the issuer or its subsidiaries within the two 
years fkom the date of the prelirninary prospectus or profonna prospectus. Particulars so 
required cover the dates of, parties to, consideration and nature of the con tract^"^^ The 
prospectus must give a reasonable time and place for inspection of such contracts during 
361 OSM,  R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 1015, Form 12 Item 12. 
36' Ibid., hst. 
363 PIR. r. 7.B.(5). See the prospectus, Bionic Seafood Exports Ltd., @haka, 25 August 
1999), at 7-9. 
364 Ibid., r. 7.B .(6). See Prospectus, ibid. 
365 A ''mateTial contract" refers to "'any contract that can reasonably be regarded as 
presently material to the proposed investor in the securities king offered". : OReg., Form 
12 Item Ins. 1. It, however, does not include a contract made in the ordinary course of 
business of the issuing company. : Ibid., Ins. 2, and CA, sch. III pt. II cl. 16(2). 
the distribution of the securities being offered. Such disclosure may, however, be 
dispensed with by the Director of the OSC, if he or she thinks it to be unnecessary for the 
protection of i n v e ~ t o r s ? ~ ~  In Bangladesh a prospectus must describe the date of, parties to 
and general nature of every material contract entered into within two years o r  more than 
two years before the date of the prospectus.368 It must aiso indicate a reasonable time and 
place for their inspection.'" U m e  those of Ontario, Bangladesh prospectuses are not, 
however, required to disclose the consideration of material contracts. In practice, the 
required particulars of material contracts are not usually discl~sed.-"~ 
Promoters 
An issuer in Ontario is obliged to give the name of any promoter, the 
nature and amount of value received or to be received by him or her or it from the issuer 
366 OSAR., R.R.O. 1990, Regdation 1015, Form 12 Item 33 Ins. 3. 
367 Ibid., Ins. 4. 
CA 1994, sch. III pt. 1 cl. 16(1) and cl. 16(2). 
369 Ibid., cl. 16(3). 
370 For instance, one prospectus reads as follows: 
The following are material contracts not being in the ordinary course of 
business which have been entered into by the Company. 
#Underwriting Agreement between the Company and the Underwriters. 
# Issue Management Agreement between the Company and the Manager 
to the Issue, AAA Consultants & Financial Advisers. 
Copies of the aforementioned contracts and documents.. .may be inspected 
on any working day during office hours at the Company's Registered 
Office. supra note 334, at 9 
It does not give the dates of the contracts, the name of the underwriters, nor the 
consideration of the contracts as it is not requùed by the concemed law. 
or from any of its subsidiaries? The issuer must also state the nature and arnount of the 
consideration received or to be received by it or its subsidiary from the promoter for that 
am~unt.'~' In addition, if the issuer or any of its subsidiaries has received or will receive 
any property from the prornoter, it will be incumbent on it to state the acquisition cost and 
the principle of determination of that ~ost."~ In Bangladesh, as in Ontario, the issuer must 
state the amount or benefit paid or given, or to be paid or given to any prornoter and also 
the consideration for that amount or In addition, it must disclose if it has 
received any assets frorn the promoters who provide the pnce and the rnetbod of 
determinhg that price."7s In this respect the requirements under both jurisdictions are 
similar with the effect that the investors will have knowledge of the issuer's interest and 
obligations in relation to the promoters. 
As discussed above, the Items falling within the category of "Current 
status and History", seem to cd1 for sirnilar kinds of information. However, in respect of 
some matters Bangladesh law lacks provisions, e-g., equity capital disclosure, but in 
practice such information are provided.376 6 e r e  are some other items under both laws, 
which have not been discussed, but are similar in effect, e-g., "Intercorporate 
371 OSAR, R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 10 15, Form 12 Item 15(a). 
372 Zbid. 
373 Ibid.. Item 15@). 
374 CA, sch. III p. 1 cl. 15, and PZR. r. 7.B.(13)(a). 
PZR, r. 7.B.(I3)(b). 
376 See supra note 334 and the accompanying text. 
~ela t ionsh ip"~~~.  But an important Item, namely "Dividend ~eco rd"~ '~ ,  is missing in 
Bangladesh law, and is not disclosed in practice either. From the Dividend Record the 
investors can know how much dividends or what percentage of dividends the issuer has 
declared and given in previous years and if there was any discrepancy between the 
declaration and actual disbursement. 
Category VI: Management 
Directors And Oficers, Executive Compensation And Indebtedness 
An Ontario prospectus is required to list the names and home addresses in 
full of ai l  directors and ofticers of the i s ~ u e r - ~ ~ '  Alternatively, it must give solely their 
municipality of residence or postal addresses. It must indicate ali positions and offices 
held by such people and their principal occupations within five preceding y e a r ~ ? ~  
Sirnilarly, in Bangladesh a prospectus must contain the names, addresses, descriptions 
and occupations of the directors and ofticers, their positions and offices in the Company, 
expenence in business and family relationships arnong themselves, if any."' According 
to Item 22, an Ontario prospectus must add a Statement of Executive Compensation as 
per Form 40, which includes annual compensation (salary, bonus, etc.) and long-term 
377 See OSAR, R.R.O. 1990 Regulation 1015, Form 12 Item 27, and CA 1994, sch. III pt. 
1, cl. 22 and PIR, r. 7.B.(7)(b)(17). In connection with Bangladesh law, see for practice, 
supra note 3 10 and Prospectus, Beximco Knitting Limited, in the Inefaq,(25 June 1994) 
15- 
"* OSAR, R.R.O. 1990 Regulation 1015, Form 12 Item 20. 
379 Ibid., Form 12 Item 2 1. 
380 Ibid. 
compensation (stocks under option, compensation for retirement , mesignation or other 
termination of employment) of the chief executive officer (CEO) axnd other "Named 
Executive ~fficers"~~'. Bangladesh law requires a prospectus to s t a e  the yearly 
rem~nera t ion~~~ and compensation for the loss of of officers and directors. But 
nowhere has "remuneration" been defmed? 
Item 23 of Ontario Form 12 asks for detailed disclosure of the 
indebtedness of directors, executive officers, senior officers, nornimee directors, and their 
associates and affiliates to the issuer or any other entity. A Bangladesh prospectus must 
disclose in detail if any loan has k e n  given by the issuer to or takem from any director or 
any person connected with the dire~tor."~ Unlike an Ontario prospoectus it does not 
require the disclosure of any fact of indebtedness of such persons t o  any entity other than 
the issuer. 
Interest Of Management And Others In Material Transactions : 
CA 1994,  SC^. III pt. 1 cl. 3(1) and PIR, r. 7.8.(8). 
According to Item 1.3 of Form 40, other "Named Executive O ~ c e r s "  refer to- 
four most highly compensated executive officers of the issuer, other than the CEO, 
who were serving as executive officers at the end of most recenrdiy completed 
financial year, provided such an officer's total salary and bonus . exceeds $100,000; 
those executive oficers for whom disclosure under paragraph (a) would have been 
required but for the fact that they were not serving as officers o f  the issuer at the end 
of the most recently completed financial year. 
PIR, r- 7.B.(ll). 
CA 1994,  SC^. m Pt. I CI. 3(2). 
In practice, remuneration paid to executives and aggregate amoauit of rernuneration 
paid to the oficers and directors are stated in corporate prospectuses. See, for example, 
supra note 337 at 24, and supra note 363, at 16. 
386 PIR. r. 7,B.(lO)(f). 
Under Item 29 of Ontario Form 12, a prospectus is necessary to provide a 
bief description of any materiai interests of the company management and othen in any 
material transaction during the last three years or in any material proposed transactions, to 
which the company or any of its subsidiaries was or will be a party. "Management" is 
defmed to include any director, senior offi~cer of the issuer, principal shareholder, and 
their associates or affiliates. While this item requires disclosure of any material interest 
received or to be received by the company management and others in any material 
transaction in general, under Bangladesh law only the interests received or to be received 
particulariy by directors or promoters in the promotion of the company or in any property 
acquired by the cornpany must be made Thus a provision requiring disclosure 
of interest of the management in various transactions is absent in Bangladesh law. 
Miscellaneous Category 
Item 34 requires disclosure of al1 other material facts than those 
categorized in rest of the items discussed above. This is "the catch-all provision, to ensure 
that no information is omitted merely because it cannot easily be ~ate~orized"~". 
Likewise, Bangladesh law, as already discussed, contains a provision requiring other 
material information in addition to those specified therein?' The non-cornpliance with 
environmental laws by the issuer may be an example of such information. In both 
"' ~bid.. cl. 18. 
388 Johston and Rockwell, supra note 57, at 76. 
389 See the texts accompanying supra notes 296-298. 
jurisdictions a corporation or its management is liable with heavy penalties for breaching 
environmentai obligations ( e.g, by polluting air, ~ ~ i l l s ) ~ ~ ~ ,  which h m s  the reputation of 
the corporation's business. Such penalties and disrepute are shared by the securities 
holders in that damages are paid out of the corporate earnings which affect the amount of 
390 In Ontario corporate environmental Liability arises under common law and statutory 
laws. Under common law a Company rnay be held liable applying the tort principles of 
strict Iiability (e-g. for escape of noxious gases), negligence and nuisance (e-g. 
discharging noxious fumes). Under the Environmental Protection Act (EPA), R.S.O. 
1990, c. E. 19, a discharge of contaminant or causing or permitting discharge of 
contaminant into naturd environment below a prescribed limit (S. 14(1)) or above that 
limit (S. 6(1)), and "spills" into environment (ss. 9 1-93) by a company gives rise to its 
liability. In Bangladesh, on the other hand, environmental wrongs committed by a 
company rnay be redressed under common law, national constitution and statutes. A 
company rnay be held Iiable for committing environmental negligence or nuisance under 
common law. If such a wrong amounts to an infringement of any of the fundarnental 
nghts to life (Arts. 3 1 and 32), property (Art. 40) and trade (Art. 42) entrenched under the 
Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, then it will attract the wrÏt 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. ( Art. 102). Thus, for instance, 
environmental matters were addressed in the garb of fundamental nghts in Dr, Mohiuddin 
Farooque v. Bangladesh and others, 1 B.L.C. (AD) (1996) 189-2 19, and Dr. Mohiuddin 
Farooque v. Bangladesh, 48 D.L.R.. 438-446. A rnischief of discharging pollutants by a 
company in excess of prescribed Limit will corne within the purview of S. 9 of The 
Bangladesh Environmental Conservation Act (BECA), 1995. On being found guilty an 
Ontario company rnay be fined a maximum amount of $ 5 0 , 0  for the first convictions 
and $100,000 for the subsequent convictions for each day the offense occurs. (EPA, 
R.S.O. 1990, c. E. 19, S. 186). Moreover, the courts rnay impose additional penalty equal 
to the monetary benefit received by or accmed by the a corporation. (EPA, R.S.O. 1990, 
c. E. 19, S. 189. The courts rnay also order such a company to prevent or decrease or 
eliminate the effects on natural environment of the offence. (EPA, R.S.O. 1990, c, E.190). 
Where the management is liable, corporeal punishment rnay be imposed (EPA, S. 193). In 
Bangladesh, on the other hand, there is no defined amount of fines for commission of 
environmental wrongs other than discharging pollutants in excess of the prescribed limit. 
It depends on the discretion of the courts. In respect of discharge of pollutants exceeding 
limit the concemed personnel of the company will be liable to be punished with 
impnsonment for a period not more than five years or with fme not more than 1ûûûûû 
taka (approx. Can. $3000) (BECA, ss. 15 and 16). 
their dividends and the disrepute hampers the business resulting in Iess earnings. 
Furthemore, they adversely impact the secondary market and, as result, the value of the 
securities is likely to decline. Thus it rnay be concluded that corporate environmental non- 
compIiance has an effect on the price of securities and, therefore, is subject to discIosure: 
"[EJnvironmental non-cornpliance would likely be considered a material fact under 
Canadian Securities legislation if the non-cornpliance had a significant effect on the value 
9, 391 of the securities Therefore, an author observes in this connection that "Material facts 
are, however, broader than just balance sheet considerations and will clearly encompass 
environmental factors. 9,392 
It may be summarized that the laws of Ontario and Bangladesh require, in 
general, disclosure of al1 material facts and, in particular, sirnilar categories of facts. An 
issuer is solely responsible to disclose each and every piece of information, specified or 
not, having a bearing on the price or value of securities. That a particular matter is not 
specified in the law does not mean the matter need not be d i ~ c l o s e d . ~ ~ ~  
2.3.2.1.2 Financial Matters 
Financial S tatements 
391 M. E. Deturbide, "Corporate Protector or Environmental Safeguard? The Emerging 
Role of fie Environmental Audit", 5 J.Env..L.& Pract.. 1 at 10 note 29. To meet the full 
disclosure requirement environmental auditing is suggested by this author as a due 
diligence defence for corporations in Canada 
392 S.H.T. Denstedt and S.R. Miller, "Due Diligence in Disclosing Environmental 
Mormation for Securities Transactions", (1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 23 1, at 239- 
In addition to the non-financial rnatters discussed above, a prospectus both 
in Ontario and Bangladesh must contain certain financial statements. In Ontario such 
statements are prepared according to the generally accepted accounting pnnciples 
(GAAP) in canaddg4, which are defined in the Canadian Znstitute of Chartered 
Accountonrs (CZCA)   and book^^' The financial statements required of an Ontario 
prospectus include an income state~nent~'~, a statement of surplus397, a statement of 
changes in financial position3g8 and a balance sheet?" The OSC Director may, however, 
exempt the issuer from the requirernent of any of these statements? In Bangladesh the 
requisite statements include a summary statement of earnings401, balance sheets4O2, profit 
& loss staternents and cash flows statements? They are to be prepared and presented as 
per international accounting standards (IAS) adopted by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB)!'~ 
In Ontario a prospectus contains together, in a consolidated form, the 
statement of income for each of the last five financial years and the statement of retained 
393 For the liability of an issuer with respect to prospectus misrepresentation, see 
Johnston and Rockwell, supra note 57 at 179-183. 
394 OS& R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 1015, S. 2(1). 
395 Nafional Policy NO. 27, sub-pts. 3.1 and 3.2. 
396 OSAR. R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 1015, S. 53(l)(a). 
397 Ibid., s.53(1)@). 
398 Ibid. S. 53(l)(c). 
399 Ibid., S. 53(l)(d). The financial statements required of a mutual fund prospectus are 
somewhat different.: see ibid., S. 54. 
400 Ibid.. S. 53(6). 
"' PIR, r. 7.B.(20)(a). 
402 Ibid., r- 7B.(20)@)(i). 
403 Ibid., r. 7.B .(20)@)(ii). 
earnings. They include income from sales and other sources, expenses under different 
heads, arnount of dividends, if any, and the surplus or deficit at the end of each year. 405 I, 
Bangladesh each of the income statement, and the profit and loss statements, is prepared 
for a period of the last five fmancial years and their contents are similar with those of an 
Ontano prospectus.4" The Ontario prospectus discloses cash-flows of the issuer from the 
operating, investing and financing activities. 407 The Bangladesh prospectus aiso contains 
a cash-flows staternent for the same period with cash-flows from sunilar broad sources.408 
The balance sheet in the Ontario prospectus must be as at a date not more than 120 days 
prior to the date of issuance of the receipt of the preliminary prospectus or other date 
permitted or required by the ~irector.~* It must be accompanied by a balance sheet for 
the corresponding date of the previous financial year.410 Where the balance sheet is as  at a 
date other than the financial year end, the said balance sheet as at the corresponding date 
of the previous year may be omitted if the prospectus contains comparative balance sheets 
as at the most financial year end and as at the immediately preceding financial year 
end.411 Bangladesh law differs from Ontario law in this respect. A Bangladesh prospectus 
must provide balance sheets for the five preceding financial years?12 Al1 these financial 
Ibid., r. 7.B.(20). 
40' See supra note 353, at 40. 
406 For contents of profit and loss accounts, see supra note 334, at 19. 
40' See supra note 353, at 41. 
408 For contents of cash-flow statement, see supra note 334. 
409 OSAR, R.R.O. 1990, Regdation 1015, S. 53(l)(d)(i). 
410 Ibid., S. 53(l)(d)(ii). See supra note 253, at 39. 
41 1 Ibid., S. 53(2). 
4'2 PIR, 7-B.(20)@)(i).. 
statements, under both the systerns, are followed by notes thereto explaining the items 
and figures, where ne~essary.~" 
Both the laws of Ontario and Bangladesh require that the financial 
statements be audited and the audited statements to be accompanied by auditor's 
reports.414 The Ontario auditor's report must be prepared in accordance with the generally 
accepted auditing standards (GAAS) recommended in the CICA andb book"^ and any 
applicable provision of the Ontario securities regdation. The CICA Handbook requires 
that "(t)he examination should be performed and the report prepared by a person or 
persons having adequate technical training and proficiency in auditing, with due care and 
with an objective state of mind'*16. In addition to this condition, an auditor must not be 
unacceptable to the ~ i r e c t o r ? ~  National Policy No. 3 defines who is unacceptable as an 
auditor. An auditor is unacceptable if he/she or hisher partner, employer, employee, or 
associate is a director, officer or employee or security holder of the issuer or its affiliates. 
In Bangladesh an audit report must be prepared by an auditor who is a regular member of 
the ICAB applying the international standards of auditing (ISA) as contained in the 
Members Handbook published by the ICAB .41 Like Ontario, in Bangladesh an auditor 
413 See supra note 353, at 43-49, and supra note 334, , at 19-20. 
414 OSAR, R.R.0- 1990, Regdation 1015, S. 2(5), and CA 1994, sch. III pt. LT ci. 24 and 
PIR, r.7.B.(20). 
415 Supra note 396.Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, CICA Handbook, vols. 
1-III ( Toronto: CICA, 1997). 
416 CICA Handbook, Zbid., Section 5100. 
417 OSA, sub-sec. 61 (2)(i). 
418 PIR, r. 7.B.(20). Here "international auditing standards" refer to the auditing standards 
issued by the International Auditing Practices Committee of the International Federation 
must be qualified within the meaning of the Companies Act (CA) 1994. Accordingly, 
persons including an officer or empIoyee, partner or debtor of the issuer, director or 
member of its managing agent are disqualified from being the issuer's a ~ d i t o r . ~ ' ~  
From the foregoing discussion it can be seen that the laws of Ontario and 
Bangladesh requke similar kinds of financial statements with similar contents. Financial 
statements in Ontario are prepared applying the G M  contained in the CICA Handbook 
while in Bangladesh those are prepared according to the IASs adopted by the ICAB. 
Audit reports are prepared according to the GAAS and ISAs in Ontario and Bangladesh 
respectively. The (Canadian) Accounting Standards Board, in pursuance of its objective 
of international harmonization of accounting standards, works with the IASC to minimize 
differences between the IASs and the corresponding Accounting Recornmendations 
contained in the CICA  andb book^" A comparison between the IASs and Handbook 
recommendations done by the Board shows that they ''correspond very closely, with the 
result that application of one set of standards often results in cornpliance with the 
~ther.'*~' Simultaneously the Assurance Standard Board (ASB) compares the 
International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) with the corresponding CICA Handimok 
standards.42z Cornpliant with the ISAs the Handbook is modified unless Canadian 
position isfindamentally different fkom the international standing with regard to any 
of Accountants. : The Securities and Exchange Rules, 1987 (am. No. SEUSection- 
7/SER/03/132), sub-ruie 12(2), explanation to sub-rule 2. 
419 CA 1994, S. 212(2). 
420 CICA Hnndbook. supra note 4 15, ss. 1501 -02. 
42' Zbid. S. 1501 appendix. 
panicular  natter.^* Thus the GAAP and the GAAS contained in the CZCA Handbook are 
similar with the IASs and ISAs respectively which, as seen above, are followed by 
Bangladesh in preparing financial statements. In other words, in preparing the financial 
statements and auditing reports both Ontario and Bangladesh follow, at least in theory, 
the same principles and standards. 
It may be noted at this point that the requirement of applying KASs and 
ISAs was introduced in Bangladesh in late 1 9 9 7 ~ ~ ~  following the recommendation of the 
ADB Report-4x The ICAB is still in the process of adopting these standards. It has not 
been able to keep Pace with the latest changes and improvements occurring at the 
international ~ e v e l . ~ ' ~  Also, there remain contradictions between the domestic laws and 
the  standard^.^" Moreover, there are some practical difficulties in the application of IASs 
4" Ibid. S. 5101.04. 
423 Zbid, S. 5101.04. 
424 See No. SEC/Section-7/SERI03/132 dated 22 Oct. 1997. 
425 See ADB Report, supra note 10, at 14. 
426 For example, as of 25 June 1998 the ICAB did not adopt the IAS 7 (revised in 1992) 
on cash-flow statements which was issued by the International Accounting Standards 
Cornmittee (IASC) replacing the original IAS 7 : M.H. Kabir, "International Accounting 
Standards -IAS 1 (Revised 1997)- Presentation of Financial Statements", ( a paper 
presented in a seminar on International Accounting Standards- IAS (Revised 1997), 
ICAE3, Dhaka, 25 June 1998) (unpublished) at 14. 
427 For example, with regard to preparation of a balance sheet IAS l(revised 1997) 
requires current and non-current assets, and current and non-current Iiabilities. It uses the 
term "non-current" to include tangible, intangible and operating and financial assets (e-g., 
investments) of long term nature while "current7' assets include inventories, trade and 
other receivable, etc. On the other hand, the CA 1994 (sch. XI, S. 185) and the Securities 
and Exchange Rules, 1987 (SER) (sch., r. 12.(2) as am. 22 Oct. 1997) use the term 
"fured" assets to include tangible and intangible assets grouping investments, loan and 
advances separate fiom the fixed assets. Thus differ expianations of terms and order of 
presentation as contained in the IAS and the CA and SER. Again, in making cash-flow 
in Bangladesh. For example, often conflict arises between the provisions of LASs and the 
income tax law of Bangladesh triggering double taxation. Additional hassles are created 
by the tax authonties, This is reflected as follows: 
[Tlhe Income Tax Authorities on many occasions, misunderstand and 
misinterpret the disdosure & information presented in FSs. More 
disclosures, no doubt, bring transparency. But more transparency causes 
more trouble, and is costlier in Bangladesh. One will face Ieast trouble and 
pay less for not being transparent (because of practices and mindset of the 
people, particularly in the revenue adrninistrati~n).~'~ 
Zn order to avoid "trouble" companies in Bangladesh, in practice, tend not to present full 
and true financial information notwithstanding the requirement of cornpliance with the 
IAS.~~' This is very natural for a Company noi to "forgo voluntarily the financial 
,430  advantages of avoiding accurate financial reporting . It is a common allegation in 
Bangladesh that companies do not produce full and true fmancial ~taternents.~~' Thus 
"accounting and auditing standards in Bangladesh Vary widely between theory and 
practice.'*32 For this both the issuer and auditors are ~ i a b l e . ~ ~ ~  
statements the IAS encourages to use "direct" or "indirect" method, but the SER requires 
only the "direct" method. : Kabir, ibid, at 12-14. 
428 Kabir, supra note 426. at 16. 
'" For a cornplaint of corporate tax evasion, see Financial Express (a national daily), (17 
July 1998) 1. 
"O Treestyle Not to Let Loose" B. Account. 67, (0ct.-Dec. 1996) at 73. 
43' See the text accornpanying supra note 49 . Also see M.H.R. Khan and S. R. 
Howlader, "Bangladesh Securities Market- Challenges and Prospectus", (1984) D. U. 
Stud., Pt. C, at 132- 
432 Supra note 44 at 6-7. 
433 See M-MeHoque, "Capital Market Development in Bangladesh- Problerns and 
Prospects", Challenges of Market Economy, (Dhaka: The Ins tinite of Chartered 
Accountants of Bangladesh, 1994), at para. 6.04. 
Trading in securities "is one in which opportunities for dishonesty are of 
constant occurrence and ever present'*Y. Ontario is also affected by this tendency of 
securities trading. Recently the Chairman of the OSC, David Brown, reveaied a good 
number of instances of "aggressive" accounting and a u d i h g  practices~35 
In some cases, the issue is overstatement o f  current income, perhaps by use 
of aggressive and inappropriate revenue recognition practices- Ln others, it 
is understatement of current income, whether through excessive "one 
time" charges for reorganizations and restnacturings or unreasonably short 
arnortization penods for so called acquired in-process research and 
development, thus making the future look better? 
The OSC Chair referred to some public comments which reflect the public's concern: 
"the need . . . to sustain equity pices has aMicted corporatie behaviour . . . and there are 
many dubious accounting practices regarding how eamings results are prepared, ,9437 
Financial Forecasts/Projections 
In Ontario, according to National Policy No. 48, a "Future-Oriented 
Financial Information" (FOFI) may be published in a preliniinary prospectus and a final 
prospectus.438 It discloses "information about prospective results of operations, fmancial 
position or changes in financial position (of the issuer), based on assurnptions about 
434 Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795, 803 (8th CU. 1943), cert- denied, 3 19 U.S. 767- 
"' D. A. Brown, "'Public Accounting at a Crossroads", remarks (June 1999) 22 O.S.C.B. 
3507. 
436 Iblii. at 3507. 
437 Ibid. 
FOFI may also be used in other documents, e.g., rights affering circular, some 
offering memoranda, take-over bid circular, issuer bid circular, etc. 
"439 future economic conditions and courses of action , FOFI may either be a forecast or a 
projection.40 Both of them reflect the issuer's planned courses of action normdy during 
a maximum penod of 24 months with the only clifference that " ~ ~ ~ o t h e s e s ' ~ ~  are 
additionally used to prepare a projection.*' A projection, based on hypotheses, is less 
reliableM3 and, therefore, the prospectus with a projection must caution (in bold type) the 
investors that "there is significant rkk that actual results wiil Vary, perhaps materially, 
1,444 fiom the results projected 
Using a forecast or projection in a prospectus is the option of the i s ~ u e r . ~ ~ '  
If, however, FOFI is used in the prospectus, it must be accompanied by an auditor's 
report without any r e se r~a t ions .~  The issuer has an obligation to compare previous FOFI 
to the actual results and to update it and then to disclose both the cornparisons and 
updates? Tt is encouraged that the updates be accompanied by auditor's report-*' The 
issuer is responsible for the publication of FOFI?' In practice, a tendency of fluctuations 
between FOFI and actual results is observed. An OSC survey shows that as of 1994 only 
439 National Policy No. 48, pt. 2. 
440 Zbid. 
"' "'Hypotheses" are defined as "assumptions that assume a set of economic conditions 
or courses of action that are consistent with the issuer's intended course of action and 
represent plausible circumstances". : ibid. 
442 See ibid. pt. 2 and sub-part 4.2. 
443 Ibid. sub-part 5.2. 
Ibid sub-rule 5.1. 
445 Ibid. .. pt. 1. 
446 Ibid., sub-part 9.1. 
447 Ibid. pts. 6 and 7. 
Ibid., sub-part 9.1.  
Ibid. pt. 1. 
23% of the (selected) seasoned i s s ~ e r s ~ ' ~  and 18% of the start-up i s suer~ '~~  were able to 
gain results (net earnings) better than FOE"' 
In Bangladesh there are no legal provisions or guidelines for making any 
financial forecast or projection in a prospectus. There is, however, a liability provision for 
fiaudulent forecast in  CA.^'^ From this a scope of making financial forecast may be 
assumed. In practice, almost al l  prospectuses in Bangladesh carry financial forecasts for 
five subsequent whereas an Ontario FOFI can be for a maximum penod of two 
year~.~" Unlike Ontario, no audit reports on these forecasts are attached to such 
prospectuses. in these prospectuses the terms "forecast" and "projection" are 
interchangably used with a caution at the top ( though not in bold type iike Ontario): 
"These are forecast, not actual. Actual rnay vary from forecast. Prospective investors 
should read the forecast carefully before taking investment decisi~n'*~~. Sometimes a 
forecast is highlighted even without such a ca~tion.~" Again, some prospectuses mention 
450 Seasoned issuers are those who have a significant operating history. 
451 Start-up issuers refer to issuers without a significant operating history. 
"' "FOH in Prospectuses- An OSC Staff Survey", (Jan. 1994) 17 0 . S  .C.B. 6 at 7. 
453 See CA 1994, S. 147. 
454 E g ,  prospectus, Samata Leather Complex Ltd., in The Ittefaq, 29 June 1998, at 9 and 
20; prospectus, Mona Food Industry Ltd., in The Share Bazar (Bengali national 
fortnightly), 3: 17 (1 Nov. 1997) 23; prospectus, Gachihata Aquaculture Farms Ltd., The 
Share Bazar (Bengali national fortnighdy), 3: 17 (1 Nov. 1997) 23., at 34-36. But in some 
recent prospectuses no forecast or projections are found. See for example, Prospectus, 
Bionic Seafood Exports Ltd., supra note 353, and Prospectus, Prime Bank Ltd., supra 
note 337. 
4" Supra note 378 pt. 4.2. 
456 Supra note 334, at 20. 
457 See prospectus, Gachihata Aquaculture Farms Ltd, supra note 454, at 35. 
the bases of the assurnption of the forecastPs8 while others do In practice, 
according to one survey, 95% of the issuing companies failed to gain their projection 
targets during the period of 1993-97.460 This failure rate is sirnilar to that of ontario?' 
OSA requises a prospectus to contain certificates by the issuer, 
underwriter(s) and the auditors. The issuer's certificate signed by the chief executive 
officer (CEO), chief financial offïcer (CFO) and any two directors (other than the CE0 
and CFO) states that "(t)he foregoing constitutes full, true and plain disclosure of ail 
material facts relating to the securities offered by this prospectus" 462. The underwriter's 
ceaificate is sirnilady worded with the difference that the certification starts with "(to) the 
best of our knowledge, information and belief In addition, an auditor's certificate 
must accornpany the prospectus.* It states that "(i)n our opinion, these financial 
statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of the 
"' See prospectus, Sarnata Leather Complex Ltd., supra note 334, at 20. 
459 Supra note 454, at 35) 
Gachihata Aquaculture Farms Ltd, Share Bazar, supra note 38, at 5. 
461 See supra notes 450-452. 
462 OSA, S. SS(1). Also, for specimen, see supra note 353, at 50. 
463 -Ibid., S. 59(1). Also see supra note 353, at 5 1. 
464 OSAR. R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 1015, S. 2(5). 
465 Supra note 353, at 38. 
h Bangladesh, the issuer's and underwriter's certificates are not required 
by law to accompany a prospectus. The only requirement is the auditor's ~ertificate?~ 
Those two certificates are, however, used in p a ~ t i c e . ~ ~ ~  The auditor's report certifies, 
inter alia, that (t)he annexed Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account exhibit a true 
and fair view of the state of the Bank's affairs"? This is similar to an Ontario auditor's 
certificate as both of them attest the "fair" state of the issuer's financial &airs. 
2.3.2.2.4 Statement Of Purchaser's Rights 
In Ontario a prospectus must embody a statement of a purchaser's 
~ i ~ h t s ~ ~ ' ,  namely nghts to prospectus delivery and withdrawal from purchaseoo and 
rights to damages against civil liability:71 Under the fust nght provision, a dealer4" must 
send the latest prospectus or an amendment thereto to the purchaser either before entering 
466 See CA, 1994, sch. III p t  1 cl. 24 and PIR. r. 7.B.(20). 
467 For example, the issuer's certificate as contained in a prospectus States, among others, 
that "(w)e also confirm that full and fair disclosure has been made in this prospectus, to 
enable the investors to make an infonned decision for investmentT' The underwriter's 
certificate reads, inter alia, thus-"We c o n f m  that.. .al1 information as are relevant for Our 
underwriting decision has been received by us and that draft prospectus forwarded to the 
Commission has been approved by us": Prospectus, Prime Bank Ltd., supra note 337, at 
1 and 3. This certification does not, unlike Ontario, directly confirrn the "full, true and 
plain" disclosure. But as it approves the draft prospectus in general and the issuer's 
certificate in particdar as a component of the prospectus, it indirectly endorses the true 
and fair disclosure in the prospectus certified by the issuer. 
Prospectus, Prime BankLtd., supra note 337, at41. 
469 OSA, R.S.O. 1990, c.S.5, S. 60. 
470 Ibid., S. 71. 
471 Ibid, S. 130. 
into the agreement of purchase and sale or by the end of the second day after entering into 
such agreement (excluding weekends and ho~ida~s)!'~ The purchaser then has two days 
to review the disclosure in the prospectus and to decide whether to withdraw from the 
purchase. A withdrawd decision is made by simply giving a written notice to the 
dealer!74 Secondly, the purchaser has also a right of action for damages or, instead of 
darnages, a nght of rescission of the purchase, if the dealer fails to deliver him or her 
(purchaser) a copy of prospectus or amendrnents thereto as required under section 
7 1(1).4~' A prospectus, stating these rights, advises the investors ?O refer to any 
applicable provisions of the securities legislation ..for the particulars of these rights or 
consult with a legal a d ~ i s o r ' ~ ~ ~ .  
Bangladesh law does not require such a staternent of the purchasers' right 
nor is it, in practice, contained in a prospectus. In Bangladesh securities are offered to the 
public publishing the fmal prospectus in two national dailies within ten days from the 
date of receipting by the  SEC.^'^ The public can also procure copies of prospectuses from 
the issuer, stock exchanges, SEC, underwriters and other market intermediaries."' The 
intending purchasers apply in prescribed forms to the issuer for allotment of securities. 
472 "A dealer is a person or Company that trade in securities as principal or agent and 
includes an underwriter or registered securities issuer with respect to a prospectus". : 
supra note 16, at 257. 
473 OSA, RS.0. 1990,~. S.5, S. 71(1). 
474 Ibid., S. 71(2). 
475 Ibid., S. 133. 
476 Supra note 353, at 37. 
477 PIR, r. 4(1). 
478 Ibid., r. 4(4)(a). 
M e r  allotment is made, no purchaser can rescind the purchase under the securities 
legislation, but can clairn for darnages if the prospectus contains any untrue ~taternent.~'~ 
However, no damages suit for prospectus misstatement has yet been reported, the SEC 
takes administrative actions only.480 The probable reason is that litigation is costly and 
time consurning in ~an~ladesh? '  
2.3.3 ROLE OF THE SECURITIES COMMISSIONS 
As said earlier, in Ontario the distribution of securïties presupposes a 
prospectus to be accepted by the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) unless filing of a 
prospectus is exempted by the statute or an exemption order has been granted by the 
OSC. Where an exemption is not available, an issuer must fde a preliminary prospectus 
with the OSC with full, true and plain disclosure of material facts and accompanied by 
requisite documentation including the board of directors' resolution approving it, 
technical reports, auditor's cornfort letter and financial statements except the auditor's or 
accountant's report(s).482 If it seerns to substantially cornply with the requirements of the 
479 Investors have a right to compensation available through the court of law for 
prospectus misstatement against, inter alia, - 
(a) every person who is a director of the company at the tune of the issue of the 
prospectus; 
(b) every person who is a promoter of the company; and 
every person who has authorized the issue of the prospecnis (e-g., an expert). : The 
Companies Act (CA), 1994, S. 145. 
480 Supra note 48. 
48 ' Supra note 5 1. 
482 See, for example, OSA, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, S. 54, OSAR, R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 
1015, ss. 53-55 and OSC Policies, ss. 5.1 and 5.7. 
securities l e @ ~ a t i o n ~ ~ ~ ,  the Director shall issue a receipt right away.484 Thereafter the 
Director entrusts two members of the Corporate Finance Branch, usually prospectus 
lawyer and prospectus accountant, to review the preliminary prospectus and to determine 
whether it constitutes Ml, m e  and plain disclosure of al1 material fa~ts .~~ ' .  After such 
review the issuer is given a comment letter requiring it to make corrections to defaults, if 
any. Afier removing the defaults, the issuer can file the fmal prospectus attaching 
supporting documents and receive the receipt for it.486 
In between the issuance of preliminary receipt and the final receipt 
,Y 487 ("waiting penod ) a dealer488 is allowed to make communications to any person or 
Company (e-g., through newspaper, or radio or television) identi*ng the security, its 
pnce, the place where and the person from whom the security can be purchasedP89 The 
dealer is also allowed to distribute the preliminary prospectus and to solicit expressions of 
interest fiom potential paities for the purchase of s e c ~ r i t ~ . ~ ~  The dealer must supply a 
483 OSA, ibid., S. 54(1). 
484 Ibid., S. 55. This section rads-  "The Director shall issue a receipt for a preliminary 
prospectus forthwith upon the filing thereof '. 
485 Alboini, supra note 77 at 15-9. 
486 OSA, R.R.O. 1990, c. S.5, S. 61(1). 
487 Ibid., S. 65(1). 
488 See for the definition of "dealery7 supra note 472. 
489 Ibid., S. 65(2)(a). 
490 Ibid. S. 65(2)(b) and 65(2)(c). 
copy of the preliminary prospectus to every interested No sale of security is, 
however, perrnissible in this period because 
m t  would defeat the whole idea of having a prospectus with statutory 
liability for misrepresentations in a prospectus. If representations were 
allowed pnor to the finalization of the prospectus the investor would not 
be protected by the statutory liability provision if representations were 
fâ~se?' 
Through the above process of distribution if the dealer receives an order or 
subscnption from any party, he or she must deLiver a (final) prospectus and amendments 
thereto upon which that party may either confirm or reject the purchase. Thus the final 
receipt is the key to the purchase and sale of securities. 
In Bangladesh, if an issuer intends to offer securities to the public for sale, 
it must file an application, including a prospectus, to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) for its approval before the prospectus is released to the press for 
publication.493 The application is vetted by the SEC, which will comment on its 
"incompleteness" generally within 15 days of submi~sion?~ Thereafter within thirty days 
the incompleteness must be removed and the complete application must be fded by the 
is~uer?~' If, however, no comment on the incompleteness is cornrnunicated to the issuer 
within fifieen days, the application shall be deemed to be complete unless the issuer is 
491 Ibid., S. 66. 
492 M. R., The Securfties Regulation in Canada, (Scarborough: Carswell, 1992), at 108. 
493 SEO, S. 2B and PIR, rr. 3 and 4.. 
494 PZR, r. 18(2). Lïix~mpletene~s'' should be read with regard to the f o m  and contents 
of a prospectus as the SEC does not determine the merits of an issue. 
495 Ibid. r. 1 8 (3). 
notified that the SEC needs additional timePg6 Within sixty days of receipt of a complete 
application, the SEC shall issue a letter of consent subject to such conditions as it may 
think fit, if such application is acceptable to the SEC, or the SEC shall issue a rejection 
order with reasons upon which the applicant may apply for review to the SEC. The SEC'S 
decision after review is final.497 The word "acceptable" should be construed with 
reference to the completeness of the application. The condition of acceptability is 
attached to a complete application that is received by the SEC after its correction by the 
issuer according to the comment letter. This is not added to an application which is 
judged by the SEC to be complete fiom the very beginning. Thus the said acceptability 
condition does not mean that the SEC has a "blue sky" type jurisdiction. This is 
confirmed by another provision which requires the following statements to be contained 
on the front cover page of a prospectus: 
Consent of the Securities and Exchange Commission has been obtained to 
the issueloffer of these securities under the Securities and Exchange 
Ordinance, 1969, and Public Issue Rules, 1998. It must be distinctly 
understood that in giving this consent the Commission does not take any 
responsibility for the financial soundness of the Company, any of its 
projects or the issue price of its share or for the correctness of any of the 
staternents made or opinion expressed with regard to them, responsibility 
for which lies on the issuer, its directors, investment adviser, issue 
manager, valuer and/auditor. II is, however, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission's responsibility to ensure that full and fair disclosures are 
made in the prospectus in terms of the Public Issue Rules, 1998, so that the 
investors can make informed investment de ci si on^.^^^ 
49i Zbid., r.18(5). 
497 Zbid., r. 18(7). 
498 PiR, r. 7.B.(l)(i). 
In respect of any queries about the prospectus the public is directed by another statement 
,499 to consult a "broker or dealer, bank manager, lawyer, professional adviser' , 
However, when the SEC accepts an application and issues a Consent 
Order allowing the publication of a prospectus, the issuer must file with the Registrar of 
Joint Stock Companies (RJSC) the fïnal application dong with its enclosures including 
the Consent Order of the SEC, The RJSC checks whether the necessary documentation is 
enclosed, prescribed fees are paid and the prospectus is duly signed by the directors. 
Then, if satisfied, the Registrar will register the prospectus? Within ten days of 
receiving consent to the issuance of a prospectus, it is advertised arnongst the public in 
general inviting applications for purchase of securities offered."' 
From the above discussion the laws of Ontario and Bangladesh may seem 
to conform in that each of the OSC and the SEC, after vetting, gives consent to a 
prospectus provided they are satisfied that the information required by the law concemed 
have been furnished and that neither of the institutions judges the merit of the securities 
proposed to be offered. But Ontario law requires the OSC to go beyond the statutory 
,9502 
- requirement of disclosure and to refuse receipting a prospectus in "public interest in 
general and on some defmed grounds5" in particular. 
499 Ibid., r-7.B.(l)(h). 
'Oo CA, 1994, S. 138. 
'O1 PIR, r.4(1)- 
'O2  OSA, R.S.O. 1990 C. S.S., S. 61(1). 
'O3 Ibid., S. 61(2). 
Section 61(1) of the OSA, incorporated in 1 9 7 8 ~ ~ ~ ~  provides that "the 
Director shall issue a receipt for a prospectus . . . unless it appears to the Director that it is 
not in the public interest to do so." But it does not define the term, "public interest". 
Black's Law Dictionary defines it to mean, inter alia, "(s)omething in which the public, 
the community at large, has some pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal 
rights or Iiabilities are a f f e ~ t e d . " ~ ~ ~  The power is bestowed on the OSC to decide "what 
the public interest is and whether the issuance of the given receipt is con- to that 
public intere~t."~'~ For instance, in one case the OSC interprets the term to connote "not 
only the interest of residents of Ontario, but the interest of al1 persons making use of 
9,507 Ontario capital markets. In this connection it may be noted that in forming its opinion 
as to public interest the OSC must take into account "the exigencies of the individual 
cases that corne before it".508 
Today the "public interest" phenornenon has become a comerstone of the 
securities IegisIation in Ontario and in other provinces of Canada for the purpose of 
protecting the investing public. There are rnany cases in which the OSC has shown its 
concern and refused to accept prospectuses on this ground. Even before formal insertion 
of this provision the OSC exercised its discretion, under the previous Securities Act, in 
'O4 OSA. R.S.O. 1978 c. 47 S. 60(1). 
'O5 Black's Law Dictionary, supra note 172, s.v. "public interest". 
'O6 Alboini, supra note 77, at 15-29. 
'O7 Per McKiniay J.A. in Asbestos Cor-., [1992] 15 O.S.C.B. 4973 at 4999,58 O.A.C. 
277-97 D.L.R. 144, 10 O.R. (3d) 577 (Ont. C.A.). 
public's interest. In Rivalda Invesîrnent Corporation ~ t d . , ~ ' ~  a company proposed to seek 
funds from the public to invest in purchasing securities of speculative mining companies. 
The Directors of the company did not have any experience in the proposed business. The 
OSC considered them as the asset or Iiability of the company because "(u)pon their ability 
to assess the ments of the securities they propose to purchase will depend the success or 
failure of the c ~ r n ~ a n ~ . ' " ' ~  Therefore, on the public interest ground it declined to accept 
the prospectus of the company until qualified directors were appointed. The OSC gave its 
reasonings as follows: 
The Securities Act is prirnarily a disclosure statute but Section 44(1) (now 
S. 61(1) and 61(2) ) does give the Director a discretion in accepting 
prospectuses. This power must be exercised with caution. The Director or 
the Commission, should not, except in the clearest cases, impose their 
judgment on the ments of an issue, in place of the judgrnent of the 
investing public. The decision to purchase securities ofXered for sale must 
be that of the purchaser. However, there are situations where the Director 
and the Commission are entitled under the discretion in Section 44, to 
require that certain safeguards Se adopted for the benefit of the public. 
The inexperience of the Directors in the present case in our view calls for 
the imposition of some safeguards beyond that of disclosure. One hesitates 
to leave the responsibility for the investing of funds provided by the public 
solely in the hands of these inexperienced persons.511 
508 Ontario (Securities Commission) v. Mitchell,[1957] O.W.N. 595 at 599, cited in 
Gordon Capiral Corp. v. Ontario Securities Commission (1991), 1 Admin. L.R. (2d) 199, 
at 21 1 (Ont. Div. Ct.) (per Craig J.). 
mec. 19651 O.S.C.B. 2. 
'Io Ibid.. at 3. 
511 Ibid., at 4. 
That the OSA is not merely a disclosure statute was also upheld in 
subsequent decisions. In Great Pines Mines ~td.,"' for example, the OSCys power to 
issue policy statements513 as guidelines for exercising its discretion was questioned. 
CouId the OSC issue and maintain such policies under the discretion provision (section 
44) of the then Securities Act? The OSC relied on Rivalda and said that it had the 
necessary authonty in view of the broad discretion provided under section 44 and in the 
51Z Feb. 1966) 0.S.C.B. 7. 
With regard to the Director's discretion under S. 61 various prospectus guidelines are 
laid down in Policy 5.1, which include the following: 
1. "Under S. 6 1(2)(c) of the Securities Act (Ontario) (the "Act") requires 
the Director of the Ontario Securities Commission to refuse to issue a 
receipt for a prospectus where it appears to him that proceeds received 
from the sale of securities to be paid to the treasury of the issuer, 
together with other resources, will be insuffîcient to acccmplishing the 
purposes stated in the prospectus. One major resource is people. 
Sufficient of the directors and officers of the issuer should have 
knowledge and experience in the business for which funding is to be 
sought so that the Director will not conclude that the human and other 
resources are insufficient to accomplish the purpose stated in the 
prospectus. Where such knowledge and ability is not apparent in the 
directors and officers the Director may be satisfied where it is shown 
that the issuer has contracted for such services." 
2. "In a "bat efforts" offering, the minimum subscriptions necessary to 
accomplish the purposes embodied in the prospectus must be 
specified. Section 27(1)7 [38(1)(7)] of the regulations made under the 
Act (the "Regulation") restricts this offering period to a maximum of 
60 days or, with the consent of the Director and those already 
subscribing, for a longer period. During this period any subscriptions 
received must be held by a trust Company or other acceptable 
depository who will, when the minimum amount necessary is received, 
turn it over to the issuer or will, if the minimum is not received within 
the time specified, return the money to the individual subscnbers." 
light of the purpose of protecting the investing public. Justice Kelly cornrnented such an 
authonty to be "a self-conferred extension of the power exercisable, under section 44"514. 
The OSC justified its authority interpreting the word "self-conferred" as follows: 
(T)he Legislature having failed to speciQ the grounds upon which the 
director could and the grounds upon which he could not exercise what is 
on its face an unfettered discretion to refuse to accept a prospectus, the 
Commission had, lacking the guidance of the Legislature, been forced to 
work out those grounds for itself? 
In United Security Fund 'I6the Deputy Director of Filings refused to issue 
a receipt because the proposed Fund lacked the basic principle upon which mutual funds 
are based, narnely diversification and liquidity. On appeal the Commission held that 
We are of the view that it is not in the public interest to accept this 
prospectus. As presently framed the essential element of diversification is 
lacking. Liquidity, from the point of view of Canadian investor, is 
questionable. The decision of the Deputy Director Filings will therefore be 
afEnned?17 
3 'Where securities of a class may be partially redeemed or repurchased, 
the marner of selecting the securities to be redeemed or repurchased 
should be clearly stated." 
In Great Pines, supra note512, the OSC quoted Justice Kelly from the Reporî of the 
Royal Commission to Investigate Trading in the Shares of Windfall Oils and Mines 
Limited, saying as follows: 
h absence of a clear delineation of its purpose, responsibilities and 
powers, over the years, the Securities Commission h a ,  by administrative 
practice, established a workable control over the issue of securities of 
those companies required by The Securities Act to file prospectuses. This 
ha s been accomplished by a self-conferred . . . extension of the power 
exercisable, under Section 44, to reject prospectuses. (at 95) 
Great Phes, ibid. 
Pept. 19711 OSCB 133. 
In Loki Resources ~ n c . ~ ' ~ ,  it was determined that the issuer had no 
resources, properties or prospects nor even any intention to acquire any. The Director, 
therefore, decided that in absence of any assets or business activities or any expectation 
therefor, any disclosure by the issuer would be meaningless. Similady, existence of 
business was considered in Inland National Capital ~ t d . . " ~ .  In that case the prospectus 
indicated, arnong others, that Inland Ltd. had Iimited assets with no pian for future. It also 
had debts and lack of funding. The OSC refused to issue receipt in the public interest 
interpreting the financial position as amounting to non-existence of business. 
In Tricor Holdings Co. ~nc-"' because the company was controlled by a 
convict, the Director refused to accept the prospectus. He based his decision on section 
6 1(2)(e) which provides for refusal of receipting a prospectus when the past conduct of 
the issuer or an officer, director, promoter or controlling shareholder forms reasonable 
grounds for belief that "the business of the issuer will not be conducted with integrity and 
in the best interests of its security holders". On appeal the majority of the Commission 
upheld the decision of the Director, but the minority dissented on the ground that there 
was no evidence that the actual business of the issuer had not k e n  conducted with 
integrity. The majority maintained that: 
So to hold would reflect a narrow view of the legislation and would be 
inconsistent with prior Commission decisions and the decisions of the 
courts. But if clause 60(2)(e) [rnow S. 6 1 (2)(e) 1, narrowly constmed, did 
- - - -- -~ - 
Ibid, at 134. 
518 (Feb. 1984), 8 O.S.C.B. 583. 
519 (1996), 19 0. S. C. B. 773. 
'O Tricor Hotdins, supra note 320. 
not strictly apply the Director would still be obliged to consider the public 
interest test under subsection 60(1) [now S. 61(1)1.~" 
Med-Tech Environmental Ltd.522, addressed the central issue whether a 
private company exemption could be used to issue special warrants. The Director 
determined that a special warrant offering was, in substance, a single distribution under a 
prospectus and therefore a public offering. As such special warrants could not be 
distributed under the camouflage of the private company exemption. The Director's 
decision was prodded by the spirit of investor protection. In her own words: 
The Private Company Exemption does not require the investor to have a 
specified level of investment expertise, nor does it require that the investor 
be provided with independent investment advice. There is unlikely to be a 
dealer involved so there will be no dealer familiar with the transaction to 
whorn the investors may go for advice with respect to the prospective 
investment. Also, in these circumstances, there is a risk that the investor is 
not someone who is tmly able to protect their own interests without the 
benefit of the protection that the prospectus and registration regimes of the 
Act provide?u 
It has been observed in the preceding discussion that unlike the SEC the 
OSC, legally empowered, does, in practice, exercise its discretion in giving approval to 
prospectuses in addition to its responsibility of ensuring the fûlfillment of the disclosure 
requirement under the OSA because "public interest" constitutes "the paramount 
521 Ibid., at 409 1. 
5" M a y  19961 19 O.S.C.B. 2679. 
Ibid., at 268 1. 
consideration" for the O S C ~ ' ~ .  It does so always keeping in mind the tenet of investor 
protection. Thus it c m  be concluded, in the words of Alboini, that 
(In Ontario) (f)ull, tme and plain disclosure of aii  materiai facts in 
accordance with the Act and Regulation does not guarantee the issuance of 
a receipt. The manner in which the Director has exercised his or her 
considerable discretion, and the existence of certain provisions in the Act 
and Regulation have resulted in the administration of the Act going 
beyond a purely disclosure approach and into the realm of a '%lue sky" 
sys tern? 
As such the following statement required to be inscribed on the outside front cover page 
of a prospectus has become ~u~erfluous~'~:  
No secwities commission or similar authority in Canada has in any way 
passed upon the merits of the secuities offered hereunder and any 
representation to the contrary is an offence." 
Whiie a general discretion, as discussed above, has been conferred on the 
Director under S. 61(1) in the fashion of "public interest", S. 61(2) requires the Director to 
refuse a receipt for a prospectus under some specified circurnstances. "The Director is the 
judge of whether such circumstances exist, and this has the effect of confemng additional 
discretion upon the ~ i r e c t o r . " ~ ~  A bief discussion of those grounds ensues below. 
Material Non-compliance and Misstatement 
Three situations corne wiùiin this prohibition as contained in S. 61(2)(a) 
where the Director c m  refuse to accept a prospectus. In the first place, if the Director is of 
524 Terence Edward Robinson, Il9961 19 O.S.C.B. 2643 at 2669. 
525 Alboini, supra note 77, at 15-27 
526 See ibid., 15-12. 
527 OSAR, R.R.O. 1990 Regulation 1015, reg. 5 1. 
the opinion that the prospectus or any document accornpanied by it does not cornply, in 
any substantial respect, with any requirement of the OSA or OSAR the Director can 
exercise the refusal power.5'9 The word "substantial" qualifies the situation, so niinor 
non-cornpliance with any requirement of prospectus should not trigger the refusal of 
receipt. Information about the principal shareholders is, for exarnple, a substantial 
requirement of the OSAR f0rms.5~~ The non-fulfrllment of this requirement rnay, 
therefore, be a ground of the Director's exercising of such power. The Commission sets 
out the guidelines in this respect as under: 
Issuers . . . should organize themselves in a manner which will enable thern 
to obtain and disclose information concerning principal security holders. 
If, however, the issuer has exercised reasonable efforts to obtain the 
information conceming the principal security holder and has been unable 
to do so, the Commission may, in appropriate circumstances, issue a 
receipt for the prospectus and rnay exercise its powers to deny access to 
Ontario capital markets to the principal security holder which has not 
disclosed the required informati~n.~" 
Secondy, the Director rnay not receipt a prospectus where the prospectus or any 
document required to be filed therewith contains any staternent, promise, estirnate or 
forecast that is misleading, false or de~e~tive.'~' For instance, in Famers  & Merchants 
Mutual Funds ~ t d - . ' ~ ~  a prospectus was not accepted because the fact that a Company had 
528 Alboini, supra note 77, at 15-32.2. 
s29 OSA, S. 61(2)(a). 
"O See the text accompanying supra note 3 1 1. 
''' Suprn note 320. 
532 OSA, R.S.O. 1990 C- S.5, S. 61(2)(a). 
533 [April 19621 O S  C.B.  4. AIso see Great Divide Explorations Lirnited, [July-Augus t 
19651 O.S.C.B. 10, 
undertaken services as a tmst company, when it was not legally a tmst company, was 
misleading. Thirdly, the prohibition on accepting a prospectus applies when a prospectus 
or any document required to be filed therewith contains a mi~re~resenta t ion.~~~ In M & M 
Porcupine Gold Mines ~ t d . , ~ ~ ~  a contract effecting disposition of certain property had 
been negotiated before filing the prospectus and entered into before the final prospectus 
was accepted, but the issuer did not include that fact in the prospectus. Therefore, the 
Director held the prospectus having the effect of concealing material facts and ordered 
cessation of the primary distribution based on the prospectus. 
Unscmpuious Consideration 
Section 61(2)@) of the OSA requires the Director to refuse a prospectus on 
the ground that an unconscionable consideration has been paid or given, or is intended to 
be paid or given, for promotional purposes or for the acquisition of property. For instance, 
in Harvard Growth Fund ~ t d . , ~ ~ ~  the Commission, on appeal, did not accept a prospectus 
for filing by a mutual fund company because it appeared to the Commission that a 
provision contained in it permitting the promoters to purchase shares at figure less than 
534 OSA, R.S.O. 1990 C. S.5, S. 61(2)(a). "Misrepresentation" is defined in OSA, R.S.O. 
1990 c. S.5, S. l(1) "rnisrepresentation" as 
(a) an untrue statement of material fact, or 
(b) an omission to state a material fact that is required to be stated or that 
is necessary to make a statement not misleading in the light of the 
circumstances in which it was made. 
For the definition of "material fact", in this context, see the text accompanying supra note 
286. 
535 p e c .  19651 O.S.C.B. 10. 
net asset vaiue was unconscionable. The Commission took into consideration that the 
OSA is not exclusively a disclosure statute and that the mutual funds are primarily 
directed to those who are least experienced in assessing the merits of securities. It then 
assessed the unconscionabfiity of the right granted to the promoters in the following 
words: 
One cannot Say, at this moment, what the eventual benefit to the promoters 
may be, but there is an unlimited possibility for future benefit. . . . 
In addition to the potential benefit the promoters rnay receive from the 
increase in the value of the fund, their profit aiso increases according to 
the number of the shares sold to the public. A portion of each dollar 
invested by the public accrues to the benefit of the promoters regardless 
whether the net asset value of the fùnd increases or 
Inadequate Proceeds 
Under section 61(2)(c) the Director has the authority to detennine whether 
the proceeds fkom the sale of securities proposed to be offered by the prospectus, together 
with other resources of the issue?38, would be sufficient to accomplish the purpose of the 
issue as stated in the prospectus. If the Director considers the proceeds to be insufficient, 
the Director rnay reject the prospectus. Thus in Si. Anrhony Mines ~td.1'. where the issuer 
was carrying on a costly business, mining exploration, the Director estimated that though 
the funds then available were sufficient to complete the initial step of the proposed 
- - 
536 [Sept. 19651 O.S.C.B. 7. 
537 Zbid., at 9. 
538 Other resources include people, cg., directors, officers of the issuer. See supra note 
513, para. 1. 
539 [Oct. 19661 O.S.C.B. 23. 
exploration, the money likely to be raised by the sale of the unissued shares would fa11 
short of the requisite fimding. As such the Director refused to accept the prospectus. 
Peeuniary Condition and Previous Performance 
The OSA empowers the Director not to receipt a prospectus in 
consideration of the financial condition540 or the past conductS4' of the issuer or an 
officer, director or promoter or a person or Company or combination of persons or 
companies holding a sufficient number of securities to affect materially the control of the 
issuer. As described earlier, the prospectus fom(s) asks for an account of the past and 
present state of the issuer's business and ownership of property, names and addresses and 
positions held, in the past and at present, by the directors and officers, etc. Beyond the 
disclosure of such information the Director will determine whether the issuer or the 
persons specified can be reasonably be expected to be financially responsible in carrying 
out the businesss2 or whether from their past conduct it can be expected that the issuer's 
business will be conducted with integrity and in the best interest of the security h01ders.S~~ 
If the Director, after such determination, forms a negative impression, the Director may 
decline receipting the prospectus. In other words, the Director will resort to these 
provisions when "i t  is relatively clear that the persons in question are experiencing 
financial difficulties, or have been subject to disciplinary or enforcement proceedings in 
-- 
"O OSA, R.S.O. 1 9 9 0 ~ .  S.5, S. 61(2)(d). 
"' Ibid., S. 61(2)(e). 
542 Tricor Holdings. supra note 320. 
,7544 securities or criminal matters - These provisions, ''derived from various consumer 
protection statutes in ~ n t a r i o " ~ ~ ,  are meant to "ensure a minimum standard of quaiity for 
the offering itself or the issuer offering the s e c ~ r i t i e s " ~ ~ ~ .  
Required Agreements 
As discussed eariier, there is an obligation on the issuer to disclose 
information concerning shares held in e s ~ r o w . ' ~ ~  Despite that provision the OSA clothes 
the Director with power to look into whether there is any need of executing an escrow 
agreement. If the Director is of the opinion that such an agreement is required but has not 
been done, the Director may not issue a receipt until that agreement is not executedT8 
Thus in Kolvox Communications ~ n c . ~ ~ ~ ,  the Director underlined the need of escrowing a 
substantial number of control block shares and refused to accept the prospectus until an 
agreement to that effect is accomplished. The Commission upheld that decision upon a 
review motion by the issuer. The Director can also exercise the refusal power on the 
ground that the issuer has not made an agreement to the effect of holding the sale 
proceeds in trust pending distribution of securities, albeit the issuer, in the Director's 
543 TriCOr Holdings, supra note 320 and the accompanying text, at 409 1. 
544 Alboini, supra note 77, at 15-37. 
" Ibid., at 15-36. 
546 Ibid. 
547 See the text accompanying supra notes 3 1 1  and 3 12.. 
"8 OSA, R.S.O. 1990 C. S.5, S. 6 1(2)(f). See in this c o ~ e c t i o n  OSC policies 5.2 and 
5.9which set out the circumstances necessitating an escrow of shares of an industriai 
company and the escrow requirements for a naturai resource company respectively. 
549 w a r c h  19941 17 O.S.C.B. 1521. 
judgrnent, should have done such an agreement."' In the guise of this power the Director 
cm, for example, require the issuer of a best efforts offering, as already dwelt upon, to 
escrow the proceeds until al1 or a minimum number of securities are sold."' 
Unacceptability of Professionals 
If any of the professionds like lawyers, engineers, accountants who have 
prepared or certified any report or valuation used in or in connection with a prospectus is 
not acceptable, the Director wili refbse to accept that prospectus."' Though the Director 
has discretion, as seen above, to assess the financial fitness and past conduct of the issuer 
and certain persons involved in the issuer's business, this provision has given greater 
discretion to "the Director to make subjective assessments about persons involved in the 
preparation of a prospectus, and (thereby) . . , to refuse to issue a receipt for a 
prospectus"s53. Thus if an audit is not done according to the generaily accepted auditing 
standards, that will be a ground of prospectus r e f u ~ a l . ~ ~ ~  
As the OSC cm refuse prospectus receipt on certain grounds discussed 
above, it may lead one to the conclusion that the OSC has a limited "blue sky" 
jurisdiction. In fact, it enjoys much discretion when it decides whether a particular 
circumstance merits the application of its discretion on any of those grounds. In addition, 
'31 OSA. R.S.O. 1990 c. S.5, S. 61(2)(g). 
"' OSC Policy 5.1. 
5'2 OSA. R.S.O. 1990 c. S.5, S. 61(2)(i). 
"3 Alboini, supra note 77, at 15-40. 
554 See Price Waterhocse, [April 19901 13 O.S.C.B. 1473. 
the "public interest" provision further expands this jurisdictimn- Zn practice, as appears 
from the foregoing discussion, the OSC takes such a broader view in the application of 
this jurisdiction?" 
Lest the OSC become unscrupulous or tyranniad in the exercise of this 
power, the Legislature has subjected the OSC decisions to judicial appeal. The OSA 
requires the Director to give the person or Company fding the prospectus an opportunity 
to be heard before issuing a refusal order? A person or comTany who is directly 
aggrieved by a decision of the Director may seek and be entitled to a hearing and review 
thereof by the ~ommission.~" Such a person or Company m a y  prefer an appeal to the 
Divisional Court from the review decision of the ~ o m m i s s i o i 7 - ~ ~ ~  Before refusal the 
Director may refer to the Commission for determination a question involving public 
interest under S. 6 l(1) or a new or novel question of interpretation under s- 6 l(2) which 
might result in such r e f u ~ a l ? ~  Before referral, however, the Director shouid "make every 
effort to resolve its comments (relating hie question) through discussion with those 
responsible for filing the prospectus. Only when it is clear tbxt such discussion will not be 
productive should consideration be given to (such) a referral'7560. Upon refend the 
Commission, after holding a hearing of the parties, determines the question and refers it 
555 Alboini, supra note 77, at 15-34. 
5M OSA. R.S.O. 1990 c. S.5, S. 61(3). 
557 Ibid.. S. 8. 
"' Ibid., S. 9. 
"' Ibid.. S. 61(4). 
560 Chmmdlor Futures Fund II, Eeb. 19801 0 . S  C.B.  77, at 77-78. 
back to the Director for final c~nsideration.'~' The Director must act upon the decision of 
the Commission subject to any order of the Divisional Court on appeaLs6' 
2.3.4 SUMMARY 
The foregoing discussion may be put in a capsule form as follows: 
(a) Under both the jurisdictions of Ontario and Bangladesh a prospectus is required 
mainly for sale of securities from an issuer's treasury. Unless an exemption is available, 
an issuer must qualiw a prospectus with the respective securities commission for the 
purpose of fumishing &formation to the potential investors so that they can make 
inforrned decision on investrnent. 
(b) Bangladesh is based on the disclosure theory while Ontario law on the combination 
of the disclosure and merit review theories. So far disclosure is concemed the former 
requires full and fair disclosure of al1 material information through prospectus to the 
public, which, in effect, conforms to the Ontario requirement of full and true disclosure of 
al1 material facts. The two laws, however, differ in that Ontario law calls for plain 
disclosure, but Bangladesh law does not. 
(c) According to the said broad requirement of disclosure both the laws of Ontario and 
Bangladesh set out various categories of information, financial and non-financial. Ontario 
prospectus Form 12 enlists 34 items of non-financial items to be contained in a 
prospectus. Some of the information required by the Ontario form are absent in the 
"' OSA. R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, S. 61(7). 
Bangladesh form, but are contained in prospectuses in practice, e-g., equity capital 
structure- There are some other matters which are totally absent both in law as well as in 
practice, e-g., dividend record, returning money to the investors in the event of a best 
efforts issue being undersubscrîbed. Each of the laws, however, contains a miscellaneous 
item in the respective fonn having "catch-dl" effect. As a result, an issuer is obligated to 
disclose material facts even not specified by the laws for incorporation into the 
prospectuses. 
Both in Ontario and Bangladesh sa&e kinds of fmahcid statements, reports and 
certificates are provided in the respective prospectuses. The Ontario income and cash- 
flow statements and the Bangladesh loss and profit , and cash-flow statements cover the 
same length of time, namely five years. In Ontario balance sheets are prepared for current 
year and imrnediately previous year , in Bangladesh they are made for five preceding 
years- In Ontario financial statements and audit reports are prepared according to the 
GAAP and GAAS, and in Bangladesh they are prepared according to IAS and ISA 
respectively. In practice, it is doubted if any full and true financial disclosure made in 
prospectuses in any of the jurisdictions. 
In Ontario forecasts/projections are made for 24 months only, whiie in Bangladesh they 
cover a 5-year period subsequent to the issue. Unlike Bangladesh's, Ontario 
forecasts/projections are required to be supported by an auditor's report. 
"' Ibid., S. 6 1(8). 
(d) In Ontario both vetting and receipting of prospectuses are performed by the OSC, 
while in Bangladesh vetting and approval is done by the SEC and receipting by the WSC. 
In Ontario during the "waiting period" the public c m  have knowledge of the issue. The 
public has a nght to compensation, if no prospectus is supplied. A member of the public 
can enter into a purchase agreement with the dealer, and can also terminate that 
agreement, at its own, after the fmal prospectus is delivered, if any misrepresentation is 
made in the prospectus. A statement of such right is also made in the prospectus in 
Ontario. In Bangladesh a prospectus, after approval, is published giving 15 days for 
application for allotment of shares, But if shares are allotted, a purchaser cannot cancel 
the purchase. Of course, he or she has the right to compensation, if a prospectus contains 
any misrepresentation. 
(e) The OSC is empowered to review the merit of an issue and refuse receipts on "public 
interest" ground in general and on some specified grounds in particular. In Bangladesh 
the SEC does not have such power either in law or in practice. 
3 CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE COMPARISONS 
1. Absence of Specific Items 
As already discussed, Bangladesh law provides for full and fair disclosure of al1 material 
information, which, in effect, is sirnilar to the full and true disclosure of Ontario law. To 
fulffi this requirement both the laws prescribe almost a sirnilar set of items to be 
contained in a prospectus. But some items, though required by the Ontario form, do not 
have any place in the Bangladesh form. For example, as aforementioned, provisions of 
dividend record and undenmiters responsibility in a best efforts offenng are missing in 
Bangladesh form. From the dividend record of an issuer the intending investors cm make 
a taliy of the percentages of the prornised dividends and the actually declared/disbursed 
dividends. If it is found that the issuer could disburse the promised percentage of 
dividends or an amount close to it, the investors wodd feel cornfortable to invest in the 
proposed project. If the tally gives a reverse picture, they may not have an interest to 
invest. The dividend record is an important item that should be subject to disclosure and a 
clear provision in this respect should, therefore, be put in a Bangladesh prospectus. 
Secondly, the Bangladesh law does not require information about best efforts 
underwriting, whereas, as pointed out previously, there is a scope of such underwriting 
under the CA, 1994. An underwriter is most unlikely to agree to fülly underwrite the 
offering of a new issuing Company because he may have doubts if di of the issuer's 
securities would be purchased by the public. The investing public may have an idea of the 
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performance of the companies that have issued securities earlier. As such when a 
cornpany with a good past record offers securities, the public may be expected to be more 
enthusiastic and confident to purchase those securities. But when a .  issuer is quite a dark 
horse in the market, the public is not likely to eagerly invest in its securities. In 
consideration of this fact an underwriter may be reluctant to fully underwrite a new 
issuer's securities. Rather the underwriter may agree to underwrite on the best efforts 
bais. In that case, to quote Prifti, 
the underwriter acts as an agent for the company and simply uses its best 
efforts to try to sel1 as many securities as he can. If none is sold, there is no 
liability to the underwriter and no proceeds to the cornpany. When 
securities are sold, the net proceeds are rernitted to the issuer-company, the 
underwriting commission being ~ i t h h e l d . ~ ~ ~  
Keeping in view this practical situation Ontario law, as discussed earlier, requires, in 
respect of a best efforts offering, the issuer to disclose the minimum amount to be raised 
for running a proposed project. It also requires the issuer to deposit that amount in a trust 
company so that in case the required amount of money is not raised, the subscnption 
money can be returned to the investors. Since Bangladesh law does not contain any such 
provision, the public may not have faith in the issuer and may fear if the issuer, absconds 
with the public money or if the minimum amount is not raised and he star& business with 
money below the minimum amount and fails to s u c c e s ~ ~ l l y  carry on the business 
ultimately incurring loss. If such a provision is incorporated in the law, that will help 
bolster the public confidence in the market. Thus Ontario law in this respect seerns to be 
better than Bangladesh law- 
Though there is a provision for fixed underwriting of issues and the 
underwriter is under obligation to subscribe securities in the event of 
~nde r subsc r i~ t i on~~ ,  i  practice this obligation is not always carried out. When a hilly 
underwritten issue is undersubcribed, the underwriter who is obligated to purchase the 
unsold securities at a futed rate charges more commissions.56s In some cases the 
underwriter proposes to buy the remaining securities at lower price than the face value. 
Thus such securities of 100 taka value each has to be sold by the issuer to the underwriter 
at oniy 70-80 taka. As a result, a lesser arnount of funds is raised and the issuer cannot 
defray the costs of the investment project and fails to make profits?66 The investors 
purchase shares at a price higher than the underwriter does. Once they have subscnbed, 
their money is locked in the hands of the issuer who cannot make profits. This is one of 
the reasons why the investors have lost their confidence in the securities market of 
Bangladesh. In this connection the disdosure of the interest of the promoters and 
management of the issuer in materid transactions, which is not required by Bangladesh 
law, deserves special attention of, fore example, a director of the issuing company is aiso 
a director of the underwriting company, when an issue is undersubscribed and the 
563 William M .  Prifti, Securities: Public and Private merings, (St. Paul. Minn.: West 
Publishing Co., 1974), at 80. 
PIR. r. 15(2). 
565 Share Bazar, supra note 38, at 3. 
566 Ibid., at 3-4. 
underwriter buys the rernaining securities at a lower price than the pnce at which the 
investors have purchased, that director will gain a benefit from that buy. Or he or she may 
play a role in influencing the issuer to sel1 those securities at the lower price proposed by 
the underwriter. Thus that Bangladesh law does cal1 for information about the interest of 
the promoters and management in material transactions is a colossal oversight. 
Though it may be argued that under the miscelIlaneous item provision of 
the PIR such matters as are mentioned above are subject to disclosure, specific provisions 
reIating to them will facilitate the disclosure. From such categorization the issuers can 
leam what they are obliged to disclose and the investors cm d s o  know what sorts of 
information they are legally entitled to be fimished through a prospectus. If such 
categorization did not have any justification, merely a general provision calling for 
disclosure of al1 material information like the miscellaneous oene would have been laid 
down in the law giving al1 the responsibility to the issuer. But the law-makers have 
preferred specific disclosure so that the investors understand the  risk involved in the 
security offered for sale. So, specific provisions effecting discilosure of the 
aforementioned matters are of great value, 
It has also been observed that both the laws require similar kinds of 
financiai statements to be furnished in respective prospectuses and that the veracity of 
thosz statements is questionable. Sornetimes the issuers prepaxe, contrary to the purpose 
of prospectus in generd567, false or partiaily tme statements and the auditors overlook 
them. In this manner the auditors become accomplices to the issuer-clients paying no 
heed to the public interest, even though they have, as the US Supreme Court rnaintains, "a 
public responsibility transcending any employment relationship with the ~ l i e n t ~ " ~ ~ .  
However, in spite of the fact that both jurisdictions are experiencing problems of non- 
cornpliance with the requirement of fuII and tme disclosure particularly of financial 
information, the Ontario position may be argued to be better in consideration of two 
factors. First, the OSC, in the exercise of its public interest mandate, may refuse to issue 
receipt where any questionable accounting or auditing practices corne to its  vie^.^^^ Thus, 
for example, the OSC staff refused to receipt a prospectus where an issuer wanted certain 
costs, previously spent as incurred, to be treated as costs of creating an internally 
generated intangible asset. The effect of the recognition of such intangible was to make a 
profit instead of loss. The OSC staff considered such recognition having Iittle or no 
justification. Another ground of the refusa1 was that the issuer "inappropriately" 
recognized certain revenue before it had earned. The auditor of the issuer failed to 
buttress the issuer's position with reasoned arguments.570 In the s m e  vein, the Director 
may refuse receipting if the FOFI provided in a prospectus is not acceptable in public 
567 bbIts (prospectus's) primary purpose is not to be a sales tool or to "hype" the offenng 
corporation and its securïties, but rather to provide tnithful and complete information to 
- .  
the investor ...-. ". : Goulet, supra note 16, at 122. 
568 Supra note 435, at 3509. 
569 Ibid. 
no Ibid., at 3506. 
interest. Thus in Petro-NIM 1988 Limited ~ar~nershi~"' the Director refused to issue a 
receipt by reason of the inclusion in the prospectus of certain FOFI in the nature of a 
forecast without the Director's permission. The Commission confirmed the Director's 
decision in the public interest. But since in Bangladesh the SEC does not have such 
power, there is no scope for looking into the ment of financial disclosure. This is a 
S ~ ~ O U S  defect of Bangladesh law, which will be further dealt with Secondly, in 
Ontario after securities have been distributed, if any misrepresentation is found in the 
prospectus disclosure the investors have a right of action for dan~a~es? '~  They may 
invoke justice in an individual or class capacity. The settlement of such a matter may not 
take an unreasonably long the. The Bangladesh investors have a sirnilar right:74 but to 
avaii of that right is difficult. There is no court of law specially meant to deal with 
securities matters. The general courts are overburdened with cases. A host of matters 
remain undisposed for years. The disposal of a case takes five to ten years. Added to this 
is the fee-burden for legal counseling. Moreover, the ultirnate fate of the action is 
uncertain and unknown. All these factors hinder the investors, individudly or 
collectively, from resorting to the legal system in Bangladesh. However, in such 
situations the SEC may apply its administrative mechanism provided for under the PIR 
and impose penalty on the responsible issuer or its representative?75 But this does not 
. - - 
57L [Sept. 19881 11 O.S.C.B. 373 1. 
See the discussion accompanying the infia notes 590-99. 
n3 Supra notes 469476. 
s74 Supra notes 477-48 1 and the accompanying texts. 
s7S PZR,, r. 19. Atso see supra note 5 1. 
help the investors who have lost their money or have not received the forecast dividends 
because o f  false financiai statements. The money received by the SEC as fines is 
deposited in the government treasury; none goes into the pockets of the investors. 
Preventive measures by the SEC, that is merit determination, may be necessary in 
Bangladesh. 
2. No Plain-Disclosure Provision 
As already discussed, another drawback in Bangladesh law is that unlike 
Ontario it does not cal1 for plain disclosure of material information. In practice, 
sometimes information is presented in prospectuses in highly technicd terms. For 
exarnple, a guideline used in preparing the financial statements of a Company has been 
stated as follows: "Fixed Assets except Land & Land Development are depreciated on 
,9576 reducing balance rnethod. Persons having good knowledge of accounting can 
understand such an expression, but people with littie learning in accounting may not. 
Moreover, in practice, prospectuses are published in English which is a foreign language 
for the people of Bangladesh. It is difficult or impossible to read a prospectus in English 
for those investors who have little or no learning in the English language. This is another 
barrier to understanding a prospectus. Ontario law provides for plain disclosure so that a 
prospectus can be "read by investors generaily and not only by security andysts and other 
Supra note 334, at 19. 
7,577 trained persons . Readability, in the present context, means that a prospectus must be 
understandable. In other words, information must be presented in such a manner so that 
even lay investors can read and understand i t  The following (US) SEC'S instruction that 
forms the basis of Ontario law is relevant. 
The purpose of the prospectus is to inform the investors. Hence, the 
information set forth in the prospectus should be presented in clear, 
concise, understandable fashion, Avoid unnecessary and irrelevant details, 
repetition or the use of unnecessary technical Ianguage. . . . . 578 
In this connection it may be acknowledged that security is an "intricate 
m e r ~ h a n d i s e " ~ ~ ~  and may not be so plainly presented to be "intelligible by school 
children" In other words, lay investors may not understand prospecnis disclosure, 
speciaüy financial disclosure: 
There are also the perennial questions of whether prospectuses, once 
delivered to the intended reader, are readable, and whether they are read. 
The cynics answer to both questions is 'No'; the true believer's is 'Yes'; 
probably a more accurate answer than either wouid be: 'Yes7- by a 
relatively smdl  number of professionals or highly sophisticated non- 
Knnber Repon, supra note 233, para 5.09. (emphasis added). 
578 Ibid., (emphasis added). The SEC instruction for plain disclosure has been camied 
fonvard by the United States Securïties and Exchange Cornmittee, Disclosure to 
Investors: A Reappraisal of Administrative Policies Under the 1933 and 34 Act ( 1969) 
(popularly called and hereinafier referred to as Wheat Report). The Wheat Report has 
been echoed by the judiciary in Feit v. Leaseco Data Processing Equipment Corp., 332 F.  
Supp. 544, (ED NY 197 1) at 565-566. 
n9 H.R. Rep. No. 85,73d Cong. 1st Sess. (1933) 8, cited in Loss and Cowett, Blue Sky 
Law. supra note 212, at 1. This report was based to prepare the bill that becarne the 
Securities Act, 1933. 
"O "New Approaches to Disclosure in Registered Security Ofierings- A Panel 
Discussion", (1973) 28 Bus. Law. 505 at 528. 
professionals; 'No7- by the great majority of those investors who are not 
soPhisticated."l . . . 
But this does not negate the need for plain disclosure for two reasons. First, such 
disclosure will help the sophisticated investors comfortably understand the prospectus 
discIosure and make sober investment decisions. The securities legislation is meant to 
protect the "investors", not only lay investors. So, the sophisticated investors will benefit 
from plain disclosure. Secondly, if the unsophisticated investors themselves do not 
understand, they may purchase the services of the securities brokerage fms,  securities 
consultants, lawyers or other intermediaries who may advise them whether an investment 
in a particular security would be profitable in light of the prospectus disclosures. This 
process of passing information through the intermediaries to the investors has been 
termed by the Wheat Report as "filtration" of information: 
Indeed, it was recognized from the beginning that a M y  effective 
disclosure policy would require the reporting of complicated business facts 
that would have little meaning for the average investors. Such disclosures 
reach average investors through a process of filtration in which 
intermediaries (brokers, bankers, investment advisers, publis hers of 
investment advisory literature and occasionaIly lawyers) play a vitai 
r01e.~~' 
581 M.H. Cohen, "Truth in Secunties" Revisited, (1966) 79 H m .  L. Rev. 1340, at 1351- 
1352. One recent survey in USA shows that many investors are unable to understand 
correctly even basic questions about investment. The knowledge of 64% of them in 
financial matters is described as "Only fair" or "poor". 49% do not know that 
diversification of investment reduces nsk. : Princeton Survey Research Associates, The 
Investor Protection Trust Invesror Knowledge Survey: A Report on the Findings (1996), 
cited in Thomas W. Joo, "Who Watches the Watchers? The Securities Investor Protection 
Act, Investor Confidence, and the Subsidization of Failure", supra note 3 1, at 1132, note 
295. 
The importance of such "fdtration" to investors protection in Bangladesh has been 
underscored as follows: 
There is a dark spot here between the information given out by the 
companies and corporations and the investors' ability to choose these lines 
of investrnents- 
There is a need for collecting many other information about the Company 
and andysing those information before the investors can decide to invest. 
. . . This kind of information processing work cannot be done by al1 
potential investors. It has to be done by the brokerage fms. It is the 
brokerage firms which do these work and present the investors with their 
recornmendations to purchase or not purchase.583 
Of course, in Bangladesh no notable professional f m s  have yet been e~tabl ished?~~ To 
improve their services training programs may be conducted by the SEC. 
Thus if the plain disclosure provision is added to the full and fair 
disclosure requirement of the PZR and the 'Tiltration" system is improved, both 
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors may get the benefits of the disclosure regime 
in Bangladesh. They will gradually get used to taking nsks, and making profits and 
enduring los se^?^^ Various investment opporhmities will be available to the investors 
from which they will make their choices according to their varying abilities to bear risk: 
- - 
582 Wheat Report, supra note 578, at 52. 
"' K. U. Ahmad, supra note 43. 
584 See Share Bazar, supra note 38, at 35. 
585 In this process investors will l e m  investing taking the normal business nsk of profit 
and loss just like the children who learn walking through walk-and-stumble process. If 
the children are kept in a m ,  they will not leam walking. They must be aiiowed to walk 
and stumble and, through this process, to leam walking. At the 
same time it is the parents' responsibility to watch out if any life-threatening danger lies 
on their way, which they must remove to Save the children's lives. 
"'Investors have differing ab i l i~es  to bear risk. Although no investor wants to bear a Ioss 
on his or her investment, some are better able, financially and psychologically, to assume 
general risk." 586. 
In the present cantext, risk refers to investment risk free from fraud. 
Investment risk is of two types: external risk and transactional r i ~ k ? ~  The former is 
commonly thought of business investment but is not directly connected with the 
investment transaction. It incliades the risk that the econorny wiIl enter a recession or that 
the "bear" will tum out the "buil" from the market or that a change will take place in the 
issuer's Transactional nsk, unlike external risk, is directly connected 
with the investment transaction itself. It includes two types of risk- fraud risk and 
structural risk. Fraud nsk takes place through omission or misstatement of material fact. 
Structural risk results frorn the terms of the investment offenng itself, e.g., underwrïting 
commission, voting rights, options and warrants.589 Under the disclosure regirne investors 
are protected against fraud nsk: "Pubicity is justly commended as a remedy for social 
and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the 
. most efficient policeman". Thus there remain only the external rïsk and structural nsk 
to be borne by investors. 
'13' Supra note 181, at 148 note 50. This risk bearing capabilities should be given way, 
otherwise economic development will be thwarted. See infra note 59 1. 
5" Gorder, supra note 18 1 à t  P45. 
588 Ibid. 
Ibid., at 146. 
590 L.D. Brandeis, Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use Zt, (Washington: 
National Home Library Foundation, 1933) at 62. Brandeis kas recently been cited as a 
3. Want of Paternalistic Protection 
As seen above, under discIosure regime investors are, as a general nile of 
securities business, supposed to bear extemal and structural risks, but to what extent? 
They should be expected to bear those risks which are "normal" extemal and structurai 
risks. Patemalistic protection is not desirable against such risks because that will blunt the 
risk-bearing abilities of the investors, which will eventually affect economic 
deve l~~rnen t .~~ '  But risks which are likely to jeopardize public interest should be 
justification of mandatory disclosure as a fiaud prevention mechanisrn in Toronto Stock 
Exchange, Interim Repon of the Cornmittee on Corporute Disclosure, Towurd Improved 
Disclosure (1995) (hereafter Allen Report), at 24. But at the same time it is contended by 
some scholars that disclosure alone cannot prevent fraud. They referred to some major 
fraud cases that took place in USA after the 1933 and 1934 securities acts, e.g, Re E q u i ~  
Funding Corp. of Arnerica Securities Litigution, 603 F.2d 1353; Re OPM Leasing 
Services Inc., 769 F.2d 9 11.: see, for example, F.H. Easterbrook and D.R. Fischel, 
"Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors", (1984) 70 Virg. L. Rev. 669, at 
670. Most recently a critique goes to the extent of eclipsing the role of disclosure as a 
means of preventing fraud. For instance, at one place it says, "Indeed, any.effectiveness 
mandatory disclosure might have in preventing fraud occurs primarily because mandatory 
disclosure is coupled with a criminal prohibition against fraud." : C.J.H. Donald, "A 
Critique of Arguments for Mandatory Continuos Disclosure", (1999), 62 Sask. L. Rev. 
85, online:QL (SASL), at para. 13. For critique of mandatory disclosure fiom Australian 
perspective, see J. Azzi, "Disclosure in Prospectus" (Aug. 1991) Co. and Sec. L.J. 205 at 
205. 
591 "A registration system can fail in two ways. If the investor purchases a security with 
more risk than the investor is willing to bear, then the registration system is skewed to 
much in favor of the issuer, not enough investor protection is provided. When, however, 
the investor is precluded fiom purchasing a high nsk securir- (which is done under blue 
s b  system), even though the investor is willing and able to accept the risk that the 
security represents, the system is weighted too much in favor of protection, economic 
expansion and innovation will be retarded-" : supra note 18 1, at 149 note 54. 
precluded from coming to the market as "unacceptable" or "abnormal" nsks. But that is 
not possible under disclosure system: 
Under the disclosure approach, administrators can control issuers to 
prevent risk but not to prevent structural or external risk. Once those nsks 
are hilly disclosed, the administrators' power over issuen ends. Ment 
review, through its preclusion approach to protection, however, gives 
administrators the power to control issuers even in the areas of structural 
and extemal nsks. With preclusion power, administrators c m  prevent 
unacceptable structural and extemal risks, regardess of how they are 
disclosed. This power can provide investors with impo~ant protections 
greater than those that are possible under a disclosure systern a10ne.~~' 
For example, such an "unacceptable" risk situation rnay occur when 
issuers of bad repute are allowed to offer securities. Such issuers may not do fair dealings 
with public money. In respect of such risks a securities commission should not limit itself 
to the disclosure review only, rather should prevent such risks, refuse consent to the 
offering of securities. This point has been recognized recently in Ontario by the AIIen 
Report which States: 
In fact, there are no pure "merit" ccdisclosure" regimes as neither is capable 
of addressing d l  potential abuses. it would be unrealistic to expect a 
securities commission to do a "due diligence" examination of each 
Company that wanted to raise money from the public to ensure that the 
enterprise was viable. Even if such an examination were made, if there 
were no detailed disclosure requirements, potential investors would not be 
able to determine whether the pnce of the public offenng was attractive. It 
would be equally improbable that a securities commission in a disclosure 
regime would approve a prospectus that said, tmthfully, that the promoters 
of the Company intended to abscond with the proceeds of the public 
offering, or that the company's business enterprise had no hope of 
success. 593 
592 Gorder, supra note 18 1 at 150 (footnote omitted and emphasis added) 
593 Allen Reporî. supra note 590, at 25. 
Earlier the Kirnber Report conceded, by indication, the paternalistic role of the OSC in 
the event of "abnormal" or "unacceptable" business risks. It States: 
At ail times, it must be made clear that the risks that are being evaluated 
by the capital market are normal business risks of success or failure, and 
every effort must be made to ensure that the public understands those 
nsks. This is not to suggest that the public must be protected against itseg 
rather, it is a matter of ensuring that the investing public has the fullest 
knowledge to enable it to distinguish the different types of investment 
activity available. In such circurnstances, the public would have reasonable 
assurance that its losses are genuine economic losses, just as its gains are 
genuine economic gains.594 
A close reading of this paragraph irnparts the'idea that paternalistic protection is not 
suggested as long as ''normal" business nsks are involved in an offering. In other words, 
such protection is appropnate where occurs an "abnormal" or "unacceptable" business 
risk. This Ied the report to recommend entrusting the OSC with discretionary powers?95 
The report's recommendation has been materialized by incorporating the OSC7s 
discretionary power provisions into the OSA. By virtue of ihat power the OSC cm, as 
already discussed, refuse to receipt a prospectus in the public interest in general and on 
some specific grounds in particular which also relate to public interest protection so that 
the contemplated ''abnomal" risks situations can be addressed. 
It is a serious defect and shortcoming both fkom the investor protection 
and economic development perspectives that Bangladesh law does not contain such a 
594 Kimber Report, supra note 233, at para. 1.12. (ernphasis added). ''' See supra note 240-243. 
blue sky provision. For example, it has been reported that the SEC aUowed some 
companies, which had failed to comply with their underwriting commitments within the 
time-frarne as determined in the underwriting agreement, to offer IPOs in Bangladesh. 
This created confusion amongst the i n v e s t o r ~ . ~ ~ ~  How can investors be protected in such 
situations? Should the SEC allow such discredited companies to corne to the market and 
play with public money? There is possibility that they wiU not be fair in their dealings 
with the investors. They may not keep their cornmitment of providing dividends to thern 
on time or they may even fiee with their money f ~ r e v e r . ~ ~ ~  Thus, for example, recently it 
was reported that 10 subsidiary companies of a large holding Company of Bangladesh, 
Beximco Ltd., had defaulted in paying dividends within the stipulated period of 60 days 
from the date of declaration, though they declared the dividends last year. The SEC has 
failed to take any steps against the defaulters. The Chairman of SEC has said that 
penalizing such big companies may impact the market adversely, whereas the SEC has 
penalized many other small companies on the sarne ground. It is also reported that the 
market has not improved since May 1999 when the cornplaint of the non-payment of 
dividends was made to the  SEC?^^ Under the given circumstances, the public interest 
philosophy should suggest that such companies be precluded from offering securities so 
"Defadters allowed to offer POs" The Bangladesh Observer (a national daily), (3 
Feb.1998)l and 12. 
597 A member of the public cornplains that money raised by the public limited cornpanies 
has been "swindled, cheated misused or siphoned off by many chairmen, directors, 
executives of those public limited companies ": M. Rahman, supra note 49. 
s98 ''SEC Bends Securities Law" The Daily Star, online:chttp://www.daüystarnews.com,> 
20 Oct., 1999. 
that public confidence cm be sustained, Mere disclosure review should not be the sole 
function of the SEC. It should, it is suggested, be weI1 armed with discretionary powers to 
review merits of the offerings in addition to disclosure review so that no "rotten egg9"'' 
can enter the market to cause food poisoning to the investors. Granting such discretionary 
powers to administrative bodies is, in general, an essential trait of modem statehood? 
Particulariy in the security administration practical necessity and convenience of 
discretion is overemphasized: 
The exercise of discretion is an essential tool for the effective supervision 
of an industry as compiex as the secunties industry. From a practical point 
of view, it would be impossible for the Commission (OSC) to carry out its 
mandate, in either a long-term or day-to-day sense, without the broad 
discretionary powers delegated to it by the &t and ~ e ~ u l a t i o n s . ~ ~ '  
599 While cornmenting on the US securities statute (which is cornpletely a disclosure 
statute), Sommer cailed it a "rotten egg statute". He went on, "You could sell a i l  the 
rotten eggs you wanted if you told people fully how rotten they were- Alas, a lot of rotten 
eggs were sold under this statute and you suspect that a lot of them are continuing to be 
sold." "New Approaches to Disclosure in Registered Secufity Offerings- A Panel 
Discussion", supra note 580, at 505. 
'O0 Condon writes: 
A distinctive feature of the modern state is the extent of governance 
devolved onto specialized trîbunals- Administrative statutes, which gant 
these tribunals their power, are characterized by the gant  of significant 
discretionary powers to the relevant agency." 
Supra note 225, at 89-90. Also see D.J. Galligan, Discretionary Powers, (Oxford: 
Newyork: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1986); B.P. Bellmore, "The Ontario 
Securities Ccmmission as an Administrative Tribunal" (1967) 5 Osgoode Hall L. J. 2 10; 
J.M. Evans, H.N. Janisch & D.J. Mullan, Administrative Law: Cases, Text and Materials, 
4th ed. (Toronto: Edmond Montogomery, 1995). Patrick Moyer, 'The Regulation of 
Corporate Law by Securities Regdators: A Cornparison of Ontario and the United 
States", (1997) 55(1) U.T.Fac.L.Rev. 43, oniine:QL (UTFL), para 32 note 1 12. 
Under the proposed jurisdiction the SEC, like the OSC~", would be entitled to define 
what constitutes "public interest" in a given circumstance. It will be able to issue policy 
statements as guidelines for the issuers which would facilitate exercising of its power. But 
those staternents must not be treated as laws.603 
'O1 Ainsely Financial Corporation (Aug. 1993), 16 O.S.C.B. 4077, at 5010. 
60' In Ainsely, ib id  at 5001 ir was said that "[ilt is beyond dispute that the Commission 
(OSC) is entitled to particular judicid deference and "a particularly broad latitude in 
formulating its opinion as to the public interest in matters relating to (securities)." (note 
omitted) 
603 This point came before the court for determination in Ainsely. In this case the extent 
and nature of the OSC's power of promulgation of policies within its public interest 
jurisdiction was challenged. It was alleged that the OSC promulgated policy 1.10 which 
assumed the effect of law and, therefore, violated the basic pnnciple that Policy 
Statements do not have the force of law and are not intended to have such effect". 
Ainsely, ibid. at 5004. The impugned policy was held to be have been made outside the 
statutory mandate of the OSC- "[TJhe Commission must be exercising a public interest 
discretion entrusted to it . . . within the scope of its statutory mandate." Ainsely, ibid. at 
409 1 .  As an explmation of why the OSC policies should not have the effect of 
substantive law the following quote by the court is interesting: 
It is vitally important to recognize, however, that the 'public interest 
power' was never intended to be, nor could it be logicaily be constnied to 
be unlimited in nature. Had the legislature intended it to be unlimited, then 
it need not have troubled itself with the task of devising a Securities Act. 
The Ontario legislature, for example, need only have created the Ontario 
Securities Commission, ceded to it p l e n q  powers, and instmcted it to act 
'in the public interest'. It need not have outlined in great detail precisely 
that which the Lieutenant Govemor in Council can (and ,implicitly, that 
which he cannot) do to add to the statutory niles by way of regulation. 
That the provincial legislatures have both created legislative law and limits 
to the regulatory powers is not merely accidental. 
While it is clear that the ability to act remedially 'in the public interest' 
cedes some residual discretionary authonty to the regulators, it was 
obviously the intention of the legislature not to delegate to the Ontario 
Securities Commission the power to make substantive law of a legislative 
or regulatory character. Indeed, had the legislature wished to do so, it 
It was described that the SEC had the blue sky jurisdiction, but it failed to 
provide the benefits of its power to the public. The concerned officiais could not even 
correctly assess the financial projections and some of them were alleged to be 
dishonest? Therefore, before vesting the proposed power to the SEC it is an imperative 
to ensure that it is cornposed of professionally efficient and morally upright persons. 
Traditionally, in most cases, the Chairman and members of the  SEC^'' are appointed 
could have easily accomplished that objective by giving the OSC rule- 
making authority like that possessed by the SEC in the United States. 
However much this might be a good idea, it has not been done. It is thus 
impossible to escape the conclusion that policy statements must not be 
used [to] create substantive legal requirernents of a legislative or 
regulatory character. Any other conclusion would be inconsistent with the 
Rule of LAW. " J. G. MacIntosh, "The Excessive Use of Policy Staternents 
by Canadian Securities Regulators", (1992), 1 Corporate Fin. 19, at 20, 
cited in Ainsely. ibid.. B. 4077.. at 5005. (emphasis in original quote). 
However, following this case a task force (The Ontario Task Force on 
Securities Regulation) was entmsted to assess, inter alia, its implications 
and to recornmend proper Iegislative responses to it. The Report of the 
task force (Daniels Report) recommended that the OSC be given rule- 
making power. A. Anand, D. Johnston and G. Peterson, Securitiies 
Regulation- Cases, Notes & Materials. (Toronto and Vancouver: 
Butterwortsh, 1999) at 56-60. The Ontario legislature adopted the 
recommendation of the Daniels Report and vested the OSC with rule- 
making power. Johnston and Rockwell, supra note 57 at 46. 
604 Supra notes 3940. 
605 The SEC consists of two strata, Commission and Staff. The Commission is composed 
of the Chairman, four permanent members and two part-time members. The Commission 
(permanent) members are appointed by the Govemment and the part-members are 
nominated by the h4inistq of Finance and the Bangladesh Bank, the central bank, 
respectively. The Staff consists of officers and employees appointed by the Commission. 
SECA, 1993, s. 5(1) and S(2). The Commission is assigned with the responsibility of, 
inter alin. registration of securities market intermediaries, approval of the issuance of 
securities and exemption therefiom ( SECA.. ss. 8(2), s.23, PIR, S. 18), conducting 
frorn amongst retired civil servants606 who do not have any knowledge of or experience in 
securities industry607. This practice of the Govemment evidences a deviation from the 
strict cornpliance with law which requires the Govemment to give prionty to persons with 
standing in the securities industry or in some closely related fields. The Government 
seerns to overexercise its discretion in this regard.608 Political considerations influence 
investigation and inquj., hearing appeal frorn an officer's decision or order, ( SECA, 21) 
and enforcement of administrative sanctions (SEO, 22 and PIR, 19) 
'06 Rashid, S.M., "SEC-te ki dakhkha byaktider sthan habe na" ('Wili not There be any 
Place for the Skilled Persons in the SEC?" Muktakantha (a Bengali national daily), (17 
July 1998) at 9. 
'O7 See Star Magazine, supra note 44 at 7. 
"' S. 5(4) of the SECA. 1993 requires that 
"the C h h a n  and other full-time members shall be appointed from 
amongst the persons of capability and standing who have shown capacity 
in dealing with problems relating to company matters, securities markets 
or have special knowledge or experience of law, finance, economics, 
accountancy and such other disciplines as, in the opinion of the 
Government, shall be useful to the Commission. 
The wording of this sub-section shows that with regard to the disciplines from which 
people should be selected to the offlces of the Commission the Legislature has ascribed 
priority, by specification, to the security, company, law, finance, economics and 
accountancy. The Legislature's intent seems to be that if people frorn these fields are 
available, the Government must give preference to them because it considers their 
appointment would be "useful" to the Commission. The discretion applies where people 
fiom the specified fields are not available. Again, before exercising the discretion the 
Government must detennine what the Legislature has intended to mean by the phrase 
"such other disciplines". The words "such other" point to disciplines which are sirnilar to 
the specified ones. This interpretation is based on the rule of ejusdern generis which 
requires general words following particular words pertaining to a class, category or genus 
to be constnied to refer to the similar kind of things as are entailed by the particular 
words. In light of this argument the Government may select persons from fields similar to 
those specified provided such fields are useful to the Commission in the opinion of the 
Government. In short, the Government may choose persons for the offices of the 
Commission who are fiom the similar kind of disciplines as are specified and whose 
service would be useful to the accomplishment of the fûnctions of the Commission. 
appointments to the SEC. It has become a neo-political culture in Bangladesh that 
whichever party cornes to power politicizes ail possible institutions by placing its pro- 
party men regardless of whether they are fit or unfk The same consideration influences 
replacement decisions as well? This proclivity may hinder the SEC from becorning 
While appointing persons to the offices of the Commission the Government must satisfy 
these two conditions. 
'O9 Under S. 6(1) of the SECA the Chair or a full-tirne member shall be removed by the 
Government fiom the office if he or she 
(a) is, or at any has been, adjudicated as insolvent by a competent court; 
(b) is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court; 
(c) has been convicted of a criminal offence involving moral turpitude; 
(d) has, in the opinion of fhe Government, so abused his position so as to render his 
continuation in offlce detrimental to public interest; 
(e) is appointed a director or official of a Company or any other organization registered 
with the Commission. (emphasis added) . 
A condition has been attached to this sub-section that before taking an action under clause 
(d) or (e) agsùnst the Chair or any full-tirne member a hearing must be held. [S. 6(2) 1. 
Under this provision the tenure of the Chair or any full-time member is secure unless he 
or she is liable on any of the specified grounds. His or her liability would not, however, 
result ipso facto in the vacation of the office. The Government must first take a positive 
action of rernoving the a commissioner; unless this is done, the Commissioner will not be 
liable to quit his or her office, : See K.R. Chandratre, B. Acharya, S.D. Israni and K. 
Sethuraman, Bharat's Compendium on SEBI Capital Issues & Listing, vol. 1 (New Delhi: 
Bharat Publishing House, 1996) at 12. Since mostly political consideration forms the 
cnterion of the Govemment action, it is questionable whether the it will take any 
"positive action" against its pro-party person in spite of his or her actual liability under on 
any of the said grounds. Besides, clause (c) invites special attention. The applicability of 
that clause depends on the subjective judgment of the Government that a particular 
commissioner has abused his or her position and that that abuse is deleterious in "public 
interest". There is no objective standard of public interest. Whether an abusive act makes 
a commissioner's holding of the office h m  in public interest is determinable by the 
Government. And that determination depends on the Government's pditical liking for or 
disliking against a particular commissioner. Though a right of appeal has been granted by 
section 6(2) mentioned above, it can help little an aileged commissioner because the 
Govenunent is not, by law, bound to accept the explanation of the commissioner, it may 
disregard the explanation and remove the commissioner unless and until the removal 
order is vitiated by the court of law. Thus, for instance, previously two Commission 
professionally efficient Given the esotenc nature of the securities industry people having 
standing or at least an orientation to securities as a discipline should be chosen, as a top 
priority, for the offices of the ~ o m m i s s i o n ~ ~ ~  and their teriure should be secure. 
members were removed by the Governrnent and subsequently the removal order was 
annulled by the court of law, but that could not benefit the victims because by the time of 
the coua decision their office tenure was over. Supra note 606. B y contrast, the OSC 
commissioners hold their office "at pleasure" of the Lieutenant General in Council who 
can turn them out remove before the formal end of their tenure. This seems to be a sword 
hanging over the head and may fa11 on the neck any moment, but has not yet cut anyone's 
neck since the birth of the OSC. This evidences the long deep-rooted sound political 
practice in Canada. To the contrary, with regard to the given situations in Bangladesh it 
may be said that political masters, as the executives, drive the legal vehicle with 
discretionary brakes and may, depending on their political will, reach their selfish 
olitical goal derailing from the leeway and goal intended by the legislature. 
In Ontario there are not statutorily defmed criteria for selecting people for the offices 
of the Commission, though the Kimber Report recommended a Chair with a legal 
background and cornmissioners with special ski11 or experience in security matters, such 
as accounting, brokering, investment dealing and financial analysis. However, in practice, 
selection is made from amongst people with backgrounds in fields related to security and 
commodity futures industry, e.g., lawyers, accountants, securïty analysts, dealers and 
investors. : 1992 Annual Report of the OSC excerpted in H. L. O'Brien, Securities 
Regulation Cases and Materials, (Halifax: Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University, Fall 
1995), at 301. 
4 EPILOGUE 
4.1 CONCLUSION 
Bangladesh is pursuing solely a disclosure regime while Ontario has an amphibious 
system that reflects both the disclosure and ment regimes. Though both have a disclosure 
review system, Bangladesh lacks some significant requirements that are essential to make 
the disclosure meaningful. Ontario law requires prospectus disclosure to be full, û-ue and 
plain, but Bangladesh Iaw does not cal1 for plain disclosure which is a must for investors, 
specially the Iay ones, to understand the information furnished in a prospectus, either by 
themselves or with the aid of securities market intermediaries. Some important non- 
financial rnatters, though required by Ontario law, are missing in Bangladesh law (for 
example, dividend record). Both juisdictions face troubles in respect of true disclosure of 
financial matters in particular. Misstatement or faise statement of financial information is 
common. Ontario law, however, provides two safeguards which may mitigate, if not 
eliminate, the degree of the probIem. It allows investors to repudiate the securÏty sale 
contract odand claim damages invoking the jurisdiction of civil courts. Secondly, the 
OSC staff keeps vigilant eyes on the disclosure and sometimes refuses to issue a 
prospectus receipt where the staff deems it necessary in public interest The staff 
exercises this power to ensure that a proposed investment project is free h m  "abnormal" 
or "unacceptable" business nsks. Investors are expected to bear "normal" business risks 
only and to make their own investment decisions in light of the information made 
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available through prospectuses. Bangladesh law provides for civil remedy for prospectus 
misstatements, but heavy litigation costs and excessive delay in the disposal of suits are 
the barriers to invoking the remedy the provision. Secondly, the SEC does not have any 
"blue sky" type of jurisdiction. As a result, the investors are deprived of protection 
against "abnormal" business risks. 
It is encouraging that Bangladesh has made a shift h m  ment to disclosure 
regime. In this regime the investors have available various investment opportunities with 
varying nsks. They choose which of those risks they can bear depending on their own 
financial and psychological capabilities. In choosing the investment risks the investors 
needs professional advisors' help. Therefore, for obtaining the benefits of the disclosure 
regime developrnent of the interrnediq bodies is a must. As well, the underwriters must 
play their role sincerely to venQ the soundness of the securities offered. At the same 
time, however, the SEC should have the "blue sky" jurisdiction to discem "abnormal" 
risks involved in an investment enterprise. Moreover, the access to Iegal justice for 
redressing securities fiaud must also be ensured by the state. By introducing the 
disclosure approach the Govenunent of Bangladesh has opened the field of cornpetition 
for investment in the securities industry, which was absent in the previous "blue sky" 
system. It had in mind that this would mobilize resources into various production sectors, 
which would ultimately affiicts national economic development. But unless a sense of 
security can be instilled that the prospectus disclosures underwritten by the underwriters 
are tme, that the services by the intermediaries are reliable, and that the SEC is ever 
vigilant against an intrusion of unacceptable or abnorrnal risks in the market, the mere 
introduction of the disclosure system in Bangiadesh wiU not heIp- The SEC has a greater 
role to play in this regard As a watchdog it should not only to watch, but should also bark 
and bite, where necessary, for investor protection and economic development of the 
country. To that end, the SEC must be reconstituted with professionally capable persons. 
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
From the above discussion Ontario law appears to excel Bangladesh law. 
Ontario law may be borrowed, where proposed, to bring about improvements of 
Bangladesh law. To that effect the following recommendations may be put forward for 
consideration: 
1 - To fulfill the full disclosure requirement there should be added provisions calling for 
information about the issuer's past dividend record- In respect of best efforts offerings it 
should be required by law that the security sale price be deposited in a trust company. If 
the minimum amount needed for conducting the proposed project and fuced by the 
underwriting agreement is raised by sale, it may then be received by the issuer. If, 
however, it is not, the investors will get their money back. Another provision should be 
added to the concerned law that if an issue firmly underwritten is undersubscribed and the 
underwriter rcfuses to purchase the remaining securïties at the face value at which the 
investors have purchased, the issues must notiw the SEC. Thereupon the SEC may, after 
giving an opportunity of being heard, fine the underwriter and disqualiQ him for five 
years from underwriting any further issue. Again, if it is reported that the issuer bas sold 
securities at a lesser pnce, the SEC must, subject to a hearing, fine it and disqualiQ it for 
five years fiom offering any issue. 
2. In order that the investors, with or without the aid of market intermediaries, can 
understand the prospectus disclosure, it is recommended that a provision requiring plain 
disclosure in Bengali be inserted in the Public Issues Rule (PIR). At the same time, to 
ensure that the market intermediaries can provide correct investment advise to the 
investors, the SEC should conduct a training program. The provisions concerning the 
qualifications611 required for registration as intermediaries should be strictly enforced to 
ensure entry of qualified persons or institution to this profession. 
3. As there is no court of exclusive juilsdiction to deal with security matters, one 
Division Bench of the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, should 
be given original junsdiction, as in Company matters, to receive disputes for decision, e.g. 
misstatement or false statement in prospectus. This is recommended for two reasons: 
frrst, security being a discipline of an esoteric nature, should be dealt with by the highest 
court of the land. The lower courts do not have any grasp on this field, as they are 
concerned with general matters of civil and criminal nature. Though there is a specialized 
commercial court, Artha Reen Adalat (Court of Financial Debt), it is not recommended 
that it deal with securiq matters because it does not have any orientation to securities 
61 ' Eg., educational qualifications, financiai cornpetence and professional training and 
experience. : S. 3B and S. 4 of the SEC (Stock-Dealer, Stock-Broker and Sub-Broker) 
matters and also it is otherwise overburdened with cases under its present jurisdiction, 
The second reason for proposing jurisdiction to be given to the Division Bench of the 
High Court Division is that in disposa1 of suits the Division Bench would require, as in 
other matters, less time compared to the courts of subordinate jurisdiction. 
4. The SEC, like the OSC, may be granted a discretionary jmïsdiction to review the merit 
of securities and to refuse consenting to the application in the public interest in general 
and on the similar grounds on which the OSC c m  refuse receipting in particular. This 
would strengthen the SEC to safeguard the investor interest which is the principal 
objective of the securities legislation in Bangladesh. The decisions of the SEC under the 
proposed jurisdiction should be made subject to judicial review by the proposed court 
(viz., High Court Division Bench) in order to "to safeguard notions of fair play, 
>,61' substantial justice and due process -. This would strike a balance between the investors' 
interest and the security industry in Bangladesh. 
5. Since securities, as a discipline, is understandable by persons having particular 
orientation to security or closely related fields, in choosing people for the offices of the 
Commission of the SEC the Government should give priority to those who have standing 
in the fields specified by the statute, namely securities, law, finance, economics and 
accountancy. The Government should not normalIy exercise its discretion in this regard. 
Similar consideration should be made by the Commission in appcinting officiais of the 
-- 
Regulation. 1994; S. 5 of the SEC (Merchant Banker and Portfolio Manager) Regulation. 
1996. 
Smith, supra note 149, at 464. 
SEC. AdditionalIy, at the tirne of selection of both cornmissioners and officiais special 
regard should be had to the moral stature of the appointees. To this effect required 
amendment should be made to the law concerned. 
6. In order that the commissioners may work with the sense of security of their tenure the 
provision effecting removal by the Government on the ground of abuse of position should 
be amended. The amendment may be made to the effect that if a three-member inquiry 
committee headed by a sitting judge of the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh finds a commissioner guilty of abusing his or her office or position, the 
Government of Bangladesh shall issue a removai order after giving him or her an 
opportunity of k ing  heard. The proposed amendment will subject the Govemment7s 
subjective opinion about a comrnissioner's guilt of position-abuse to an objective scmtiny 
by an inquiry cornmittee and thereby reduce the likelihood that the present provision be 
used capriciously. 
By the above recommendations a fundamental refonn is suggested in the 
securities regulation of Bangladesh, namely a compromise between the disclosure and 
merit review approaches. Both of these approaches have their own merits. To foiiow the 
extreme line of either approach is to miss the advantages of the other. The principal 
benefit of the disclosure regime followed by Bangladesh is that it encourages cornpetition 
for investment among the pubtic offering various (investment) opportunities, which has 
the effect of mobilizing resources towards productive areas. These opportunities cary 
both ' ' ~ O I T Y E L ~ "  and "'abnormal" business risks. Under the proposed system the investors of 
Bangladesh will bear normal business risks and the SEC will preclude the abnormal 
business risks. Thus the investors will have double protection, which will, it is expected, 
increase their confidence in the securities industry of the country, 
BIBLiOGRAPEN 
Primarv Materials 
(A) Statutes. Rules, Orders and Policies 
1. Canada 
Manitoba 
Sale of Shares Act, 19I2, S.M. 19 12, c.75 
Ontario 
Environmenral Protection Act, RS-O 1990, c, E- 19 
Ontario Secun'ties Act, 1945, c.22 
Ontario Securities Act, 1966, c, 142 
Ontario Securities ActJ R.S .O. 1990, c. S -5 
OSC Policies 5.1,5.2 and 5 -7 
Ontario Securities Act Regulation, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 10 15 
The Security Frauds Prevention Act, S .O. 1928 c.24 
Quebec 
Quebec Secunties ActJ S.Q. 1982, c.42 
Federal Level 
National Policy No. 3 
National Policy No. 3 
National Policy No. 2 7 
National Policy No- 48. 
2. Ban~rladesh 
The Capital Issues Act, 1947, Act no. XXIX of 1947 
The Companies Act, 1913, Act VII of 1913 
The Companies Acr, i994 Act no. 18 of L994, published by Notification No. SR0 177- 
law dated 1. 10. 1995 of Mïnistry of Commerce. 
The Constitution of the People S Republic of Bangladesh 
The Bangladesh Environment Conservation Act, 1995, Act no 1 of 1995 
Public issue Rules, 1998, No. SEC/Sec. 7/P/R-98/140, Bangladesh Gazette 
(supplernentary), 25 Jan. 1999, 12 1- 140. (also accessed through <http://www.secbd.org> 
on 2 June 1999). 
The Securities Act, 1920, Act no. X of 1920 
Securities and Exchange Commission Act, 1993, Act no. 15 of 1993 
Securities and Exchange (Amendment) Act, 1993, Act no. 16 of 1993 
Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969, Ordinance no. XVII of 1969 
Securities and Exchange Rules, 1987, No. S.R.O. 2374437 
3. Other Jurisdictions 
British India 
Indian Independence Act, 1947, 10 & 1 1 Geo. VI c.85 
United Kingdom 
The Bubble Act, 172O,(U.K) 6 Geo. f, c. 18 
The Companies Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict. c.48 
The Directors' Liability Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict. c.60 
The Joint Stock Companies Act, 1844,7 & 8 Vict. c.110 &Il1 
The Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, 8 Edw. ViI, c.69 
United States of America 
The Securities Act, 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77a (1 995) 
1- Canada 
Alberta 
R. v. Piepgrass (1959), 29 W.W.R. 218, 23 D.L.R. (2d) 220, 125 C.C.C. 364, 31 C.R. 
2 13 (Alta. C.A.) 
British Columbia 
Amesl v. hvestor-Plan Ltd(1973), 35 D.L.R. (3d) 6 13 (B.C.C.A.) 
R. v. Empire Dock Ltd. (1940), 55 B.C.R. 34 (CC) 
R. v- Hansen (1973), 12 C.C.C. (2d) 368 (B.C. Prov. Ct.) 
Ontario 
Asbestos Corp. (1992) 15 O.S.C.B. 4973, 58 O.A.C. 277, 97 D.L.R. 144, 10 O.R. (3d) 
577 (Ont. C.A.) 
Ainsely Financial Corporation (Aug. 1993), 16 O.S.C.B. 4077, 106 D.L.R. (4th) 507 
(Ont. Gen. Div.) 
Chancellor Futures Fund II, peb. 19803 O.S.C.B. 77 
Company X, Re (1995), 18 O.S.C.B. 797. 
Durham Securities Corporation Ltd. (December 1 !%O), 13 O S  .C.B. 5 109 
Emery English (1965), [Jan. 19661 0,s-C.B, 27 
Famzers & Merchants Mutual Funds Ltd. (March 1962), [ A p n l  19621 O.S.C.B. 4 
Gordon Capital Corp. v. Ontario Securities Commission (1 99 l), 1 Admin. L.R- (2d) 199 
(Ont. Div. Ct.) 
Great Divide Explorations Ltd., [July-August 1965 O S  .C.B. 10 
Great Pines Mines Ltd, [Feb- 1966 1 0,S.C.B. 7 
Harvard Growth Find Ltd., [Sept. 19651 O.S.C.B. 7 
Huntingford, W. Thomas and Anchor Machine & Manufacturer (1990), 13 O.S.C.B.3478 
Inland National Capital Ltd. (1996), 19 O S  .C.B. 773. 
Jones v. F.H. Deacon Hodgeson Inc. , Cl9861 9 O.S.CB. 5579 (Ont. H. C.) 
Kolvox Communications Inc., Narch 19941 17 O.S.C.B. 1521 
Loki Resources Inc. (Feb. l984), 8 0.SC.B.  583 
M & M Porcupine Gold Mines Ltd. (Nov- 1965), D e c .  19651 OS .C.B. 10 
Med-Tech Environntental Ltd., [May 19961 19 O.S.C.B. 2679 
OSC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distributors (Can.) Ltd., [ 19701 3 O.R. 7 14, 14 D.L-R.(3d) 38 
(Ont. H.C.) 
OSC v. Luccis & Co., [June 19621 0.S .C.B. 1 
OSC v. Mitchel, [1957] O.W.N. 595, 12 D.L.R. (2d) 22 1 (Ont. C.A.) 
Paczfic Coast Coin Exchange v. OSC (1977), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 112,80 D.L.R. (3d)529 
Petro-MM 1988 Limited Partnership (May J.988), [September 19881 1 1 O S  .C.B. 373 1 
Prince Waterhouse, [April  19901 13 O.S.C.B. 1473 
R. v. Dalley, Cl9571 O.W.N. (C.A.) 123, 118 C.C.C. 116,8 D.L.R. (26) 179 (Ont. C.A.) 
R. v. Golden Shambrock Mines Ltd,, [1965] O.R. 692, Cl9651 3 C C C - 7 2  (Ont- CA,) 
R. v. McKillop, [1972] 1 O.R. l m ,  4 C.C.C. (2d) 390 (Ont. Prov. CL) 
R, v, Sussman, Cl9931 16 O.S.C.B. 1209 
Raymond Lee, [June 19781 O.S.C.B. 1 19 
Re Deer Hom Mines Ltd., [January 19681 0-S.C.B. 12 
Re Goeorge Alboni, web. 19911 14 O.S.C.B. 365 
Re Ontario Securities Commission and C.A.P. Ltd-,Cl97211 O.R. 205 (Ont. H.C.) 
Rivalda Invesiment Corporation Ltd., [Dec- 1 965 ] O S  .C.B. 2 
St. Anthony Mines Ltd. (Nov. 1965). [October 19661 O.S.C.B. 23 
Terence Edward Robinson, [May 19961 19 O.S.C.B. 2643 
Tricor Holdings Co. Ltd., [October 19883 1 1 O.S.C.B. 4059 
United Security Fund, [September 197 11 O.S.C.B. 133 
2. Bangladesh 
Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh and others, 1 B.L.C. (AD) (1996), 189 
Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque v. Bangladesh, 48 D.L.R. 438 (HCD) (1996) 
3. Other Jurisdictions 
United Kingdom 
Derry v, Peek (1889), 14 A.C. 337 (H.L.) 
Nash v. Lynde, Cl9291 AC.  158 (H-L-) 
Roussell v. Burnham (1909), 1 Ch. 127 
United States of America 
Archer v. SEC, 133 FI 2d 795, (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 3 19 U.S. 767 
Feit v. Leasco Data Processihg Equipment Corp., 332 F. Supp., 544, (ED N'Y 1971) 
Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 37 S.Ct 2 17 (19 l6), 242 US. 539 (19 17) 
Merrick v. N, W. Halsey & Co. 242 US. 568 (1 9 17) 
Re Epiry Funding Corp. of Americu, 603 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1979) 
Re OPM Leasing Services Inc., 769 F.2d 91 1 (2d Cir. 1985) 
Re Penn Central Securities Litigation, 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974) 
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corporation, 320 U.S. 344 ( 1943), 64 S.Ct. 120 
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, 348 F. Supp. 766 @. Ore., 1972) 
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 US. 1 19 (1953), 73 S .Ct. 98 1 
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 US. 293 (1946) 
State Commission of Securities v. Hawaii Market Center, 485 P.2d. 105 (Hawaii Sup. Ct. 
197 1) 
US v. Austin, 462 F.2d. 724 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 US. 1048 (1972) 
(C) Reports 
1. Canada 
Report of the Royal Ontario Mining Commission, 1944 (Urquhart Report) 
Report of the Royal Commission on Banking and Finance (Porter Reporî), (Ottawa: 
Queen's Printer, 1 964). 
Report of the Attorney General 's  Cornmittee on Secun'ties Legislation in Ontario (Kim ber 
Report), (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1965). 
Report of the Royal Commission to Investigate Trading in the Shares of Windfall Oils and 
Mines Limited (Kelley Report), (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1965). 
Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Failure of Atlantic 
Acceptunce Corp. (Hughes Commission), (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1969). 
Report of the Committee of the Ontario Securities Commission on the Problems Raised 
for Investors by Business Combinations and Priva te Placements, (Ontario: De partment of 
Financial and Cornmerciai Affairs, Province of Ontario, February 1970) (Merger Report) 
1992 Ontario Securities Commission Annual Report. 
1997 Ontario Securities Commission Annual Report 
Toronto Stock Exchange, Interim Report of the Committee on Corporate Disclosure 
Toward Improved Disclosure (1995) (Allen Report) 
2, Bangladesh 
Asian Development Bank, Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of 
Directors and Proposed h a n  and Technical Assistance Grants to the People's Republic 
of Bangladesh for the Capita Market Development Program (Manila: Asian 
Development Bank, October 1997). 
Bangladesh Bank, Barshik Report (Annual Report) 1997-98 (Dhaka: Bangladesh Bank, 
February 1999). 
World Bank, Bangladesh Annual Economic Update, (South Asian Region: World Bank, 
October 1997). 
3. Other Jurisdictions 
United States of America 
United States Securities and Exchange Cornmittee, Disclosure to Investors: An Appraisal 
of Administrative Policies under the '33 and '34 Acts (1969) (Wheat Report) 
(D) Government Documents, Le&lative Debates and Institutional 
Handbook and Corporate Prospectuses 
1. Canada 
Canadian hstitute of Chartered Accountants (CICA), CICA Handbook, (Toronto: CICA, 
1997), vols. 1-III- 
kgislature of Ontario Debates- Oficial Report (Hansard), 3 1 ( 6 April 1978). 
Prospectus, Husky Injection Molding S ystems Ltd,, 28 October 1 998 - 
2. Bangladesh 
Prospectus, Bionic Seafood Exports Limited, 25 August 1999. 
Prospectus, Prime Bank Limited, 29 Aupst 1999. 
3. Other Jurisdictions 
77 (US) Congress Record (March 29, 1933), 954-955. 
Secondarv Materials 
(A) Books and Booklets 
1. Canada 
Ontario 
Alboini, V .  P., SecunYies Lhw and Practice, (Toronto: Carsweil, 1984), vol. 1. 
Condon, M. G., Making Disclosure: Ideas and Interests in Ontario Securities Regulation, 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998). 
Johnston, D. L-, Canadian Securities Regulation, (Toronto: Butterworths, 1977) 
Johnston, D. L. and Rockwell, K .  D., Canadian Securities Regulation, (Toronto: 
Butterworths, 1998). 
Evans, J.M., Janisch, H-N- and MuIlan, D.J., Administrative Law: Cases, Text and 
Materials, 4th ed., (Toronto: Edmond Montogornery, 1995) 
Gillen, M.R., Secunlies Regulation in Canada, (Scarborough: Carsweil, 1992). 
, Securities Regulation in Canada, 2d ed., (Scarborough: Carswell, 1998). 
Goulet, G- R.D., Public Share Oflerings and Stock Exchange Listings in Canada, (North 
York: CCH Canadian Limited, 1994). 
McQuiIlm, P. E., Going Public in Canada, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountmts, 197 1)- 
Mulvey, T., Canadian Company Law, (Montreal: John Loveil & Son Ltd., 19 13). 
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE), Toward an Ideal Market, (Toronto: TSE, 1983). 
Williamson, J. P., Securities Regulation in Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1960). 
2. Bangladesh 
Ahrned, M. F. Stock Market Behavior in Bangladesh, @haka: Bureau of Business 
Research, uni ver si^ of Dhaka, 1992). 
Asian Development Bank, Asian Development OufZook- 1998 (Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press, 1998)- 
Patwari, A.B .M.M.I., Legal System of Bangladesh, @haka: Humanist and Ethical 
Association of Bangladesh, 199 1). 
Rahman, R., Civil Litiga tion in Bangladesh, (Dhaka: Nuruzzaman Choudhury, 1986). 
3. 'Other Jurisdictions - 
Bogdan, M., Comparative Law. (Sweden: Norway: KIuwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 
1994). 
Brandeis, L. D., Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It, (Washington: 
National Home Library Foundation, 1933). 
Budington, A., me English Business Company a fer  Bubble Act 1720-1800, (Newyork: 
The Commonwealth Fund, 1938). 
Chandrattre, K.R-, Acharya, B., Israni, S.D. and Sethuraman, K., SEBI Capital Issues & 
Listing, (New Delhi: Bharat Publishing House, 1996), vol. 1 
Dhaka Stock ExchangePSE), Bangladesh: Introduction to the Dhaka Stock Exchange, 
(Dhaka: DSE, 1998). 
Eagleton, T., The Significance of Theory, (Oxford, UK; Cambridge, USA: Basil, 1990). 
Galligan, D 3.. Discretionary Powers, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
Gower, L.B.C., Prînciples of Modem Company Law, 5th ed., (London: Sweet & axwell, 
1992). 
Jain, M.P., Outlines of Indian Legal History, (Bombay: N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd., 1972). 
Keenan, D., Smith and Keenan 's  Company Law, 7th ed., (London: Pitman Publishing, 
1987). 
Kulshresth, V.D., Landmarks in Indian Legal and Constitutional History, (Lucknow: 
Eastern Company Ltd., 198 1). 
Loss, L., Fundamentals of Securiries Regulation, (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1983). 
Loss, L. and Cowett, EM., Blue S b  Law. (Boston: Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 
1958). 
Maxweil, P.B ., The Interpretation of Statutes, (Colorado: Fred B. Rothman & Co., 199 1). 
Prifti, WM., Securities: Public and Private merings, (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing 
Co., 1974). 
Winter, E.L., A Complete Guide to Making a Public Stock Oflering, (Englewood Cliffs, 
N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962). 
(B) Artides and Essavs 
1. Canada 
Ontario 
Anisman, P., ''The Regulation of Securities Market " in Cumming, R., ed, Hannonizatian 
of Business Law in Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), at 77-82. 
Baillie, J-C., "The Protection of the Investor in Ontario", 8 Cm. h b .  Adm. 172. 
Beck, S.M., "Securities Regulation- Failure to F i e  Prospectus- Validity of Contract- 
Exclusiveness of Statutory Remedies " 52 Can. Bar Rev. 589. 
Belmore, B.P., 'The Ontario Securities Commission a an Administrative Tribunal" 
(1967), 5 Osgoode Hall L. 1.210. 
Bray, H.S., "Recent Development in Securities Administration in Ontario: The Securities 
Act, 1966", in Ziegel, J.S., (ed.), Studies in Canadian Company Law, vol. 1, (Toronto: 
Butterworths, 1967) 4 15. 
Cameron, W-W., "Regulation and Distribution of Securities in Ontario", 10 U.T.L.J. 199. 
Denstedt, S.T. and Miller, S.R., "Due Diligence in Disclosing Environmental Information 
for Securities Transactions", (1995) 33 Alta, L. Rev. 23 1. 
Deturbide, M.E., "Corporate Protector or Environmental Safeguard? The Emerging Role 
of the Environmenta1 Audit", 5 J. Env. L.& Pract, 1. 
Dillon, "The Prospectus Exemptions, Process and Presentation", in Law Society of Upper 
Canada, Basic Securities, (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, April 1988), 1- 13 
excerpted in O' Brien, H.L., Securities Regulation Cases and Materials (Halifax: Facul ty 
of Law, Dalhousie University, Fail 1995), 623-636- 
Emerson, H. G., "Business Finance under the "Closed System" of the Ontario Securities 
Act: Statutory Scheme and PitfalIs", in Law Society of Upper Canada, Special Lectures- 
Corporate Law in the 1980s, @on Mills: Richard De Boo Publishers, 1982), 35-45. 
Easterbrook F.H. and Fischel, DR., "Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of the 
Investors", (1984) 70 Virg, U- LI Rev., 669. 
lacobucci, F., "The Definition of Security for Purposes of a Security Act, 227-231 in 
Proposais for a Securities Market Law for Canada, (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and 
Services, 1979), excerpted in O' Bnen, H. L., Securities Regulation Cases and Materials 
(Halifax: Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University, Fall 1995), 40 1-405. 
Lennox, O.E., "Securities Legislation and Administration" in Law Sociecy of Upper 
Canada, Special Lectures- Company Law, (Torornto: Richard De Boo Ltd., 1950), 8 1-88. 
MacIntosh, J.G., 'The Excessive Use O of Policy Statements by Canadian Securities 
Regulators", (1992) 1 Corp. Fin. 19, cited in Ainsely, 16 0.S.C.B. 4077. 
Mulvey, T., "Blue Sky Law"(19 l6), 36 Cm. L. T. 37. 
Rodier, A. R., "Prospectus Disclosure under the Proposed Securities Act in Ontario: 
Problem in a Changing Environment", (1985), 23 (No. 1) U. W. O. L. Rev. 22. 
2. Bangladesh 
"Freestyle Not to Let Loose", (October-December 1996) B. Account., 67. 
Hoque, M. M., "Capital Market Development in Bangladesh- Problems and Prospects" in 
Challenges of Market Economy, (Dhaka: Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Bangladesh, 1994). 
Hossain, A. and Rashid, S., "Financial Sector Reform", in Quibria, M.G., ed., The 
Bangladesh Economy in Transition, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 22 1-274 
Kabir, M. H., "lnternational Accounting Standards- IAS  1 (Revised 1997)- Presentation 
of Financial Statements" (an unpublished paper presented in a seminar on "International 
Accounting Standards- IAS l", Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh, Dhaka, 
15 June 1998), (unpublished). 
Khan, M. H. R. and Howlader., S. R., "Bangladesh Securities Market- Challenges and 
Prospects", (1984) D. U. Sud. (Part-C) 121. 
3. Other Jurisdictions 
h i ,  J., "Disclosure in Prospectuses", (Aug. 1991) Co. and Sec. L. J. 205. 
'Wew Approaches to Disclosure in Registered Security Offerhgs- A Panel Discussion", - 
(1973) 28 Bus. Law. 505- 
Coffey, Rondd J., ''The Economic Realities of "Security": 1s there a more Meaningful 
Formula?" (1967) 18 W. Res. L. Rev., 366. 
Cohen, M. H., '"Truth in Securities" Revisited", (1966) 77 H m .  L- Rev. 1340, 
Gorder, G., "Compromise Merit Review- A Proposal for Both Side of the Debate", 
(1984) 60 Wash. L. Rev. 141. 
Joo, T. W., "Who Watches the Watchers? The Securities hvestor Protection Act, 
Investor Confidence and the Subsidization of Future", (1999) 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 107 1 
Macey, J.R. and Miller, G.P., "Origin of the Blue Sky Law7'(1991), 70 Tex. L. Rev. 347. 
Robertson, R. A., "In Search of the Perfect Mutual Fund Prospectus", (1999), 52 Bus. 
Law., 46 1. 
Smith, W. V.R., "Securities Regulation in Canada" (1968), 4 Tex. Int'l L. Forum 454. 
(C) Survevs and Remarks 
Canada 
Ontario 
FOFZ in Prospectuses- An OSC Staff Survey, (January 1994) 17 OS-C. B. 6. 
Brown, D., "Public Accounting at a Cross-road ", remarks (June 1999) 22 O.S.C.B. 3507. 
Ot her Jurisdictions 
Princeton Survey Research Associates, The Investor Protection Trust Investor Knowledge 
Survey: A Report on the Findings (1996), cited in Joo, Thomas W., 'Who Watches the 
Watchers? The Securities Investor Protection Act, Investor Confidence and the 
Subsidization of Future", (1999) 72 S. Cal L. Rev. 107 1 
(E) Dictionaries 
Black's Law Dictionary, (6th ed.). 
Dukelow, D. A. and Nuse, B., The Dictionary of Canadian Law, 2d ed., (Carswell, 
Scarborough, 1995). 
Kinney, J. K., Law Dictionary and Glossary, (Colorado: Fred B .  Rothman & Co., 1987. 
Pope, B- W., Legal Definitîons, vol II (Chicago: Callaghan arid Company, 1920). 
(F) Magazines 
Portpolio,( June 1998) (a  monthly review of the Chittagong Stock Exchange). 
Porifolio,( April 1998). 
Monthly Review, 6 1 :6 (monthly review of the Dhaka Stock Exchange 1998). 
SEC Quarterly Review, (January-March, 1998). 
Shure Bazar, (a share bazar fortnightly magazine), (1 6-3 1 July 1 998). 
Share Bazar, (1-14 Novernber 1997)- 
(G) Newspapers 
The Bangladesh Observer, (a  national daily), (3 February 1998). 
The Bangladesh Observer, (a  national daily), (5 July 1998). 
The Daily Star (a national daily of Bangladesh), (27 July 19923). 
The Holiday (a national weekly of Bangladesh), (26 June 1998). 
The Znqilab (a Bengali national daily), (1 1 March 1998)- 
Mukrokantho (a Bengali national daily), (1 7 July 1998). 
Star Magazine (a supplementary issue of ï?ze Daily Star), (3 April 1998). 
Donald, C. J.H., "A Critique of Arguments for Mandatory Continuous Disclosurey' (1999) 
62 Sask- L. Rev. 85, online: QL (SASL). 
Moyar, P., "The Regdation of Corporate Law by Security Regulators: A Cornparison of 
Ontario and the United States," (1997) 55 U- T. Fac, L. Rev. 43, online: QL (UTFL), 
(I) Intemet 
dittp://www.daily~tarnews.com> 
Note: (a) "daiiystamews" stands for the news in The Dazïy Star (a national daily of 
Bangladesh) put on the website. 
(b) "secbd" stands for the Securities and Exchange Commission (of Bangladesh). 
